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10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Mark Jessupgreen2 sentences1999Judge Breyer reasoned that "[t]he case for a 'middle ground' position is particularly strong in [the] setting of a detention hearing, where the procedures are informal and there is no jury.” A "bursting bubble” approach, by contrast, “would call on the judge ... to consider the presumption and then, if it is met with contrary evidence, to erase the presumption from his mind — not a task that is psychologically easy to accomplish.” 757 F.2d at 383 . 1999In J.L.M., supra, we recognized that the statutory changes "leav[e] the District with the burden of showing that `there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation.'" 673 A.2d at 182. [4] Judge Breyer reasoned that "[t]he case for a `middle ground' position is particularly strong in [the] setting of a detention hearing, where the procedures are informal and there is no jury." A "bursting bubble" approach, by contrast, "would call on the judge ... to consider the presumption and then, if it is met with contrary evidence, to erase the presumption from his mind — not a task that is psychologic | 1 | 3 |
Blackson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See generally Jessup, 757 F.2d at 380-85 ; see also Blackson v. United States, 897 A.2d 187, 196 (D.C. 2006) (confirming that it is “the government’s burden to prove future dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence” for detention under § 23-1322)(c)). | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2006As we stated in Pope , the “defendant’s past conduct is important evidence — perhaps the most important — in predicting his [or her] probable future conduct.” 739 A.2d at 827 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hawthorne v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003On appeal, appellant argues that “the hearsay evidence of a single accomplice witness who confessed to involvement in a shooting ... [and] was under arrest ... [and] had been held in jail for ‘awhile’ prior to cooperating with the police was insufficient to support a finding that [appellant] committed the shooting by a substantial probability.” Appellant further contends that “[o]nce Witness One’s status as an accomplice was revealed at the detention hearing, the judge was required to assess the hearsay presentation differently than had the information come from an uninvolved citizen bystander | 1 | 1 |
In Re JLMgreen2 sentences1999In J.L.M., supra, we recognized that the statutory changes "leav[e] the District with the burden of showing that `there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation.'" 673 A.2d at 182. [4] Judge Breyer reasoned that "[t]he case for a `middle ground' position is particularly strong in [the] setting of a detention hearing, where the procedures are informal and there is no jury." A "bursting bubble" approach, by contrast, "would call on the judge ... to consider the presumption and then, if it is met with contrary evidence, to erase the presumption from his mind — not a task that is psychologic 1999In J.L.M., supra, we recognized that the statutory changes "leav[e] the District with the burden of showing that `there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation.'" 673 A.2d at 182. [4] Judge Breyer reasoned that "[t]he case for a `middle ground' position is particularly strong in [the] setting of a detention hearing, where the procedures are informal and there is no jury." A "bursting bubble" approach, by contrast, "would call on the judge ... to consider the presumption and then, if it is met with contrary evidence, to erase the presumption from his mind — not a task that is psychologic | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sam Cagnina, A/K/A \Sam\"green2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kent August Moeckly, Joseph Diego Ramirez, and William J. Coulombe, Defendantsgreen2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Connie Clark (90-3153) and Cliffton Clark (90-3312)green2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1 |
Aguirre v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1 |
Gossett v. Gladdengreen2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1 |
Crockett v. Millergreen1 sentence1980We need not decide whether, in a replevin action brought solely under § 16-3701 et seq., the court may deem the “detention” damages expressly awardable under the statute insufficient, and award other damages as well, including consequential damages, despite the contrary, pre-UCC, dicta in Wardman-Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie, supra 59 App.D.C. at 264 , 39 F.2d at 514 (citing Crockett v. Miller, 112 F. 729, 735 (8th Cir.1901) (consequential damages “not proper . under the detention clause of the replevin act, but [are] proper . in [a] subsequent action for malicious trespass” when possession | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Montalvo-Murillo
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bryan v. United States
green
1 sentence2003Bryan I, 831 A.2d at 387 n. 5. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Marquez v. United States
green
2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Piatkowska v. Vons Foodmarkets
green
2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Jones v. Mississippi River Grain Elevator Co.
green
2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Union Oil Co. v. Spaeth
green
2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Massman Construction Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority
green
2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
DiBernardo v. United States
green
2 sentences1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) (“Agent DeWald’s testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought”); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) (“In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 9 1991See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 144 , 116 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991) *812 ("Agent DeWald's testimony at the detention hearing was not transcribed at the time of trial and, thus, the government was not in possession of the information sought"); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir.1985) ("In regard to the federal trial in Miami, the testimony had not been transcribed and therefore was not in possession of federal authorities"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 , 106 S.Ct. 1947 , 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Cagnina, 6 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wardman-Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie
green
2 sentences1980We need not decide whether, in a replevin action brought solely under § 16-3701 et seq., the court may deem the “detention” damages expressly awardable under the statute insufficient, and award other damages as well, including consequential damages, despite the contrary, pre-UCC, dicta in Wardman-Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie, supra 59 App.D.C. at 264 , 39 F.2d at 514 (citing Crockett v. Miller, 112 F. 729, 735 (8th Cir.1901) (consequential damages “not proper . under the detention clause of the replevin act, but [are] proper . in [a] subsequent action for malicious trespass” when possession 1980We need not decide whether, in a replevin action brought solely under § 16-3701 et seq., the court may deem the “detention” damages expressly awardable under the statute insufficient, and award other damages as well, including consequential damages, despite the contrary, pre-UCC, dicta in Wardman-Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie, supra 59 App.D.C. at 264 , 39 F.2d at 514 (citing Crockett v. Miller, 112 F. 729, 735 (8th Cir.1901) (consequential damages “not proper . under the detention clause of the replevin act, but [are] proper . in [a] subsequent action for malicious trespass” when possession | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Ex Parte Rowland
green
2 sentences1973She did recommend that he be so remanded until the disposition hearing in the neglect case on Friday, the 11th, or at the very least until she could contact his mother and talk with her. [12] R. at 28. [13] R. at 28-29. [14] See, e. g., Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 , 26 L.Ed. 861 (1882); Drew v. Hogan, 26 App.D.C. 55 (1905). 1973She did recommend that he be so remanded until the disposition hearing in the neglect case on Friday, the 11th, or at the very least until she could contact his mother and talk with her. [12] R. at 28. [13] R. at 28-29. [14] See, e. g., Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 , 26 L.Ed. 861 (1882); Drew v. Hogan, 26 App.D.C. 55 (1905). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Drew v. Hogan
neutral
1 sentence1973She did recommend that he be so remanded until the disposition hearing in the neglect case on Friday, the 11th, or at the very least until she could contact his mother and talk with her. [12] R. at 28. [13] R. at 28-29. [14] See, e. g., Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 , 26 L.Ed. 861 (1882); Drew v. Hogan, 26 App.D.C. 55 (1905). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Wallace R. Fulwood v. William Stone
green
2 sentences1973Fulwood v. Stone, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 314 , 394 F.2d 939 (1967). 1973Fulwood v. Stone, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 314 , 394 F.2d 939 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.