detention hearing in California

2024Code, § 202, subd. (a); see, e.g., In re Jose S. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1118 , review denied [“Unlike the adult criminal justice system, which has a primary punitive purpose, reunification of a minor with his or her family and rehabilitation are the primary objectives of the juvenile system.”].)1 At an initial detention hearing, the juvenile court determines whether to order the minor to remain in custody pending his jurisdictional hearing. (§ 632, subd. (a).) “To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, ‘the court shall make its order releasing the minor fro

2017GOVERNING PRINCIPLES It is the declared purpose of our Juvenile Court Law “to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, “the court shall make its order releasing the minor from custody,” “unless it appears . . .

2022Thus, if at most four months remain until the next review hearing (i.e., the 12-month hearing or 18-month hearing), at most only four months of services can by law be ordered, and the juvenile court therefore should consider only what the impact of those four months of services would be on the parent and child, not whether another hypothetical two months of services beyond the next prospective hearing might have a different or additional impact.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 846 [construing § 366.21, subd. (e).) As the juvenile court noted, the mother had been receiving s

2014(See Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 847, fn. 4 [courts “have long recognized that providing children expeditious resolutions is a core concern of the entire dependency scheme. [Citations.] If this is true of dependency cases in general, it is doubly true for the very young.”].) A disposition hearing must be conducted within 60 days of the detention hearing unless the court finds that there are exceptional circumstances requiring such a continuance. (§ 352, subd. (b).) In the present case, the juvenile court determined that D.C. could not be placed with father until he comple

2010Proc., §413.10 et seq. [governing service of summons and complaint on defendant in civil action].) Dependency proceedings often commence on an emergency basis with a detention hearing, and under section 290.1, notice of a detention hearing may be “written or oral.” (§ 290.1, subd. (e).) If the parents were present at the detention hearing, it is permissible to thereafter serve a copy of the petition and a notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings by first-class mail. (§ 291, subd. (e)(2); see In re Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 441 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 551 ] [“A parent’s gene

2010Proc., §413.10 et seq. [governing service of summons and complaint on defendant in civil action].) Dependency proceedings often commence on an emergency basis with a detention hearing, and under section 290.1, notice of a detention hearing may be “written or oral.” (§ 290.1, subd. (e).) If the parents were present at the detention hearing, it is permissible to thereafter serve a copy of the petition and a notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings by first-class mail. (§ 291, subd. (e)(2); see In re Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 441 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 551 ] [“A parent’s gene

2020Counsel shall continue to represent the parent . . . unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause. . . .’ (§ 317, subd. (d).)” (In re J.P., supra, at p. 796 .) “There is nothing vague or ambiguous about the legislative command—in the absence of a waiver, the juvenile court must appoint an attorney to represent an indigent parent at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings, and the attorney shall continue to represent the parent unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause.” (In re Tanya H. (1993) 17 Cal.App.

2020(In re J.P., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 795 .) The Court of Appeal agreed that the court erred, noting, “‘There is nothing vague or ambiguous about the legislative command—in the absence of a waiver, the juvenile court must appoint an attorney to represent an indigent parent at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings, and the attorney shall continue to represent the parent unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause.’” (Id. at p. 796, quoting In re Tanya H. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 825, 829 .) The court held that reversal was warranted, becaus

2024(See § 291, subds. (a)(2), (d), (e)(1); In re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539, 546 [‘If parents were not present at the detention hearing, they must be personally served with a copy of the petition and notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings served by “certified mail, return receipt requested.” (§ 291, subd. (e)(1).)’].)” (A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 367-368, fn. omitted.) II Analysis We agree with C.B. that the Agency and the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice and parentage inquiry requirements of the dependency statutes and rules of court, and that

2024(See § 291, subds. (a)(2), (d), (e)(1); In re Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539, 546 [‘If parents were not present at the detention hearing, they must be personally served with a copy of the petition and notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings served by “certified mail, return receipt requested.” (§ 291, subd. (e)(1).)’].)” (A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 367-368, fn. omitted.) II Analysis We agree with C.B. that the Agency and the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice and parentage inquiry requirements of the dependency statutes and rules of court, and that

2024In so doing, we recognize that the juvenile court and DCFS “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” into Royal’s Indian status as these dependency proceedings continue. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see also In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14 .) DCFS “has a duty ‘on an ongoing basis’ to report ‘a detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status.’ ([Cal. Rules of Court, r]ule 5.481(a)(5).) And the juvenile court, even after it concludes that ICWA does not apply, retains the power (and duty

2022Court explained, “necessarily subsumed a present determination of ICWA’s inapplicability.” (Isaiah W., at p. 15.) 7 The Department in the opening paragraph of its respondent’s brief emphasizes the several years gap between the initial detention hearing at which Juan’s possible Indian ancestry was formally addressed and the current timely appeal following termination of parental rights—an entirely irrelevant datum in light of Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th 1 . 14 Cervando did just that.

2017In Cristian , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , we held a detention hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 at which the parents and child and their counsel were present satisfied the requirement of an evidentiary hearing before a California court could assert temporary emergency jurisdiction and rejected the mother's contention a further evidentiary hearing was necessary to maintain that jurisdiction while waiting to learn whether Arizona intended to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 1099-1100, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 .) We explained,

2017In Cristian , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , we held a detention hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 319 at which the parents and child and their counsel were present satisfied the requirement of an evidentiary hearing before a California court could assert temporary emergency jurisdiction and rejected the mother's contention a further evidentiary hearing was necessary to maintain that jurisdiction while waiting to learn whether Arizona intended to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 1099-1100, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 .) We explained,

2016G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ].) There is no dispute mother was present for the detention hearing and original jurisdiction hearing and consequently had actual notice of the continued jurisdictional hearing.

2016G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 ].) There is no dispute mother was present for the detention hearing and original jurisdiction hearing and consequently had actual notice of the continued jurisdictional hearing.

2015In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires parents be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend." (In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114 .) When a section 300 petition is filed, the clerk of the juvenile court is required to issue notice by attaching a copy of the petition and causing it to be served on the parents. (§ 290.2.) When a parent is not present at the detention hearing, the parent must receive notice of the jurisdiction and disposition hearings by personal service or certified ma

2006(In re Alyssa F. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 846, 855 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].) There is no dispute that Gene was given notice of the proceedings and he appeared after the detention hearing but during the reunification period.

2023(In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701 , 712.) “Due process for an alleged father requires only that the alleged father be given notice and ‘an opportunity to appear and assert a position and attempt to change his paternity status. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Paul H. (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 753, 760 .) While alleged fathers are not entitled to appointed counsel either (ibid.), father was appointed counsel at the detention hearing.

2021(Paul H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 761 .) Where one or more men are identified as an alleged father, “each alleged father shall be provided notice” of the dependency proceedings and the potential for termination of parental rights, and JV-505 “shall be included with the notice.” (§ 316.2, subd. (b).) Of significance here, the inquiry into alleged fathers must occur “[a]t the detention hearing, or as soon thereafter as practicable.” (§ 316.2, subd. (a).) It follows that diligent efforts to locate and serve notice and form JV-505 on alleged fathers must likewise occur from the earliest stage

2024Due process for an alleged father requires only that he ‘be given notice and “an opportunity to appear and assert a position and attempt to change his paternity status. [Citations.]”’ (Ibid.)” (In re Christopher M., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 159-160.) “Section 316.2, subdivision (a) requires the court to inquire as to the identity of all presumed or alleged fathers, at the detention hearing or as soon after as practicable.” (In re Kobe A., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1120 .) 3.

2022Section 316.2, subdivision (a) “requires the court to inquire as to the identity of all . . . alleged fathers, at the detention hearing or as soon after as practicable.” (In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120 .) When an alleged father has been identified, section 316.2, subdivision (b) requires the juvenile court to provide the alleged father with “notice . . . by certified mail return receipt requested alleging that he is or could be the father of the child.

2022Likewise, in Ashly F. “[t]he record show[ed] that [the mother] removed herself from the family home following the detention hearing and had moved back just prior to the jurisdiction hearing because the children were not present and to save the family the cost of renting two residences.” (Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 , italics added.) The appellate court in Ashly F. reversed a dispositional order placing the children with relatives because the juvenile court failed to consider the option of removing the offending parent from the home, “even though the evidence showed that it was a

2022Likewise, in Ashly F. “[t]he record show[ed] that [the mother] removed herself from the family home following the detention hearing and had moved back just prior to the jurisdiction hearing because the children were not present and to save the family the cost of renting two residences.” (Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 , italics added.) The appellate court in Ashly F. reversed a dispositional order placing the children with relatives because the juvenile court failed to consider the option of removing the offending parent from the home, “even though the evidence showed that it was a

2022Only with adequate advisement can one choose to appear or not, to prepare or not, and to defend, or not.’ [Citation.]” (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701 , 712 (Daniel F.).) “After a petition is filed seeking to have a child declared a dependent of the court, the juvenile court must set a jurisdictional hearing within a specified period. [Citations.] Once the jurisdictional hearing has been set, notice must be given to the appropriate parties (§ 291, subd. (a)) and must include, among other things, the date, time and place of the proceeding and a statement of the ‘nature of the hearing

2007Section 291 provides, that with respect to jurisdiction and disposition hearings, “(d) The notice shall include all of the following: [f] . . . [1] (2) The nature of the hearing.” (See also In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 751 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 317 ] [notice of hearing “ ‘on the petition’ ’’ is insufficient notice of a pretrial resolution conference or jurisdiction hearing because all pretrial, jurisdictional and disposition hearings are “ ‘on the petition’ ”].) Because J.H. was detained and Father was not present at the detention hearing, the notice of the jurisdiction and disposit

2017GOVERNING PRINCIPLES It is the declared purpose of our Juvenile Court Law “to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, “the court shall make its order releasing the minor from custody,” “unless it appears . . .

2017GOVERNING PRINCIPLES It is the declared purpose of our Juvenile Court Law “to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, “the court shall make its order releasing the minor from custody,” “unless it appears . . .

2014The record shows that Mother removed herself from the family home following the detention hearing and had moved back just prior to the jurisdiction hearing because the children were not present and to save the family the cost of renting two residences. “[O]ur dependency system is premised on the notion that keeping children with their parents while proceedings are pending, whenever safely possible, serves not only to protect parents’ rights but also children’s and society’s best interests.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 ].) The requirement for a discussio

2014The record shows that Mother removed herself from the family home following the detention hearing and had moved back just prior to the jurisdiction hearing because the children were not present and to save the family the cost of renting two residences. “[O]ur dependency system is premised on the notion that keeping children with their parents while proceedings are pending, whenever safely possible, serves not only to protect parents’ rights but also children’s and society’s best interests.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 ].) The requirement for a discussio

2025Because section 728 becomes operative once a petition under section 300 is filed concerning a child, courts have interpreted the section 728 to “give[] the juvenile court the authority to terminate a Probate Code guardianship at any stage in the dependency proceeding, including at the detention hearing or the jurisdictional hearing.” (Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 253, italics added; see also A.H. v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1388 [“when a minor who is a ward under an existing probate guardianship becomes subject of dependency proceedings, the juvenile court has 8

2025(Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 252; see also § 315 [if a child has been taken into custody, “the juvenile court shall hold a hearing (which shall be referred to as a ‘detention hearing’) . . . not later than the expiration of the next judicial day after a petition to declare the child a dependent child has been filed”].) Thus, a detention hearing is a “regularly scheduled hearing” in a proceeding to declare a child dependent.

2024Code, § 202, subd. (a); see, e.g., In re Jose S. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1118 , review denied [“Unlike the adult criminal justice system, which has a primary punitive purpose, reunification of a minor with his or her family and rehabilitation are the primary objectives of the juvenile system.”].)1 At an initial detention hearing, the juvenile court determines whether to order the minor to remain in custody pending his jurisdictional hearing. (§ 632, subd. (a).) “To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, ‘the court shall make its order releasing the minor fro

2017GOVERNING PRINCIPLES It is the declared purpose of our Juvenile Court Law “to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) To this end, section 635 directs that, after holding a detention hearing, “the court shall make its order releasing the minor from custody,” “unless it appears . . .

2024A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition Section 388 “accords a parent the right to petition the juvenile court for modification of any of its orders based upon changed circumstances or new evidence. [Citations.] To obtain the requested modification, the parent must demonstrate both a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. [Citations.]” (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478 .) Where, as here, reunification services have been terminated, “the parents’ interest in the

2021(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 304 .) But by the time of the disposition hearing, concerns had arisen that the child had been malnourished in Mexico and that the grandmother didn’t believe the parents had abused the child and thus could not protect the child from them.

2023There, the mother contended the order terminating her parental rights “was wrongly entered because it was the inevitable product of a collection of erroneous orders — detention, jurisdiction, disposition and review — that preceded it.” (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 .) She contended she had been denied her right to counsel from the initial detention hearing until an 18-month review and that her counsel from that hearing forward had rendered ineffective assistance.

2014(Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 .) “Permitting a parent to raise issues going to the validity of a final earlier appealable order would directly undermine dominant concerns of finality and reasonable expedition.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 207 ; see also In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143 , 1151- 1153 [mother’s claim, on appeal from an order terminating parental rights, that she had been denied her right to counsel at the detention hearing, was waived by failure to raise it before her parental rights were terminated].) Here, if there had been err

2014(In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337, 346 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 579 P.2d 1 ]; Sino Century Development Limited v. Farley (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 688, 695 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ]; Cooper v. Westbrook Torrey Hills (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1298 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 742 ].) *938 Welfare and Institutions Code section 657’s subdivision (b) states: “At the detention hearing, or any time thereafter, a minor who is alleged to come within the provisions of Section 601 or 602, may, with the consent of counsel, admit in court the allegations of the petition and waive the jurisdictional hearing.” (Italics ad

2014(In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337, 346 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 579 P.2d 1 ]; Sino Century Development Limited v. Farley (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 688, 695 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ]; Cooper v. Westbrook Torrey Hills (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1298 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 742 ].) *938 Welfare and Institutions Code section 657’s subdivision (b) states: “At the detention hearing, or any time thereafter, a minor who is alleged to come within the provisions of Section 601 or 602, may, with the consent of counsel, admit in court the allegations of the petition and waive the jurisdictional hearing.” (Italics ad

1991(Id. at pp. 30-31.) The appellate court in In re Larry W. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 290 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 31 ] held that a probation officer’s report or police reports are admissible evidence at a detention hearing on a 600 petition, noting that detention hearings must be held within a short period of time.

1991(Id. at pp. 30-31.) The appellate court in In re Larry W. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 290 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 31 ] held that a probation officer’s report or police reports are admissible evidence at a detention hearing on a 600 petition, noting that detention hearings must be held within a short period of time.

2004Further, children in protective custody have an interest in the prompt resolution of their custody status. ( D.E. v. Superior Court, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 513 , 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 10 .) Once the petition is filed, a detention hearing must be held no later than the expiration of the next judicial day. (§ 315.) After the child is detained, the court must hold a jurisdictional hearing within 15 judicial days of the detention hearing. [10] (§ 334.) The dispositional hearing may not be held more than 60 days after the detention hearing unless exceptional circumstances exist and may not, under any

2004Further, children in protective custody have an interest in the prompt resolution of their custody status. ( D.E. v. Superior Court, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 513 , 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 10 .) Once the petition is filed, a detention hearing must be held no later than the expiration of the next judicial day. (§ 315.) After the child is detained, the court must hold a jurisdictional hearing within 15 judicial days of the detention hearing. [10] (§ 334.) The dispositional hearing may not be held more than 60 days after the detention hearing unless exceptional circumstances exist and may not, under any

2024(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) We find no reversible error. 13 II The ICWA Prior to the detention hearing, the Agency reported it had asked mother, father, and the maternal grandmother if they were aware of any Native American ancestry.

2016(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 717-718 [ 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 849 ] [harmless error test set forth in Watson applies to UCCJEA procedural error].) D Analysis At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that R.L.’s removal from Cynthia’s care was required because there was a substantial danger to the physical health of the child, and there were no reasonable means to protect her without removal from parental custody.

2022It provides that “a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 .) The purpose of this rule, which applies in dependency cases, “is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” (Ibid.) Though application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic, “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (Ibid.) Mother’s cou

2022Code, §§ 500, 550, subd. (b).) Except on a finding of exceptional circumstances, when a minor has been removed from his or her parents’ custody, a juvenile court may not grant a continuance that would cause the dispositional hearing to be completed over 60 days after the hearing at which the minor was ordered remove or detained. (§ 352, subd. (b).) Further, “the court may not, under any circumstances, grant continuances that would cause the disposition hearing to be completed more than six months after the detention hearing.” (Renee S. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 .) “As a