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5 Oregon opinions name it 1 courts 2020–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tiner v. Premogreen2 sentences2026See Tiner v. Premo, 284 Or App 59, 78 , 391 P3d 816 , rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017) (prosecutor did not commit a Napue violation by making an improper closing argument because “statements an attorney makes during closing argument are not evidence”). 12 State v. Oatney reason to doubt’ ” (quoting United States v. Blueford, 312 F3d 962, 968 (9th Cir 2002))). 2026See Tiner v. Premo, 284 Or App 59, 78 , 391 P3d 816 , rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017) (prosecutor did not commit a Napue violation by making an improper closing argument because “statements an attorney makes during closing argument are not evidence”). 12 State v. Oatney reason to doubt’ ” (quoting United States v. Blueford, 312 F3d 962, 968 (9th Cir 2002))). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Roy Shelby Bluefordgreen2 sentences2026See Tiner v. Premo, 284 Or App 59, 78 , 391 P3d 816 , rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017) (prosecutor did not commit a Napue violation by making an improper closing argument because “statements an attorney makes during closing argument are not evidence”). 12 State v. Oatney reason to doubt’ ” (quoting United States v. Blueford, 312 F3d 962, 968 (9th Cir 2002))). 2026See Tiner v. Premo, 284 Or App 59, 78 , 391 P3d 816 , rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017) (prosecutor did not commit a Napue violation by making an improper closing argument because “statements an attorney makes during closing argument are not evidence”). 12 State v. Oatney reason to doubt’ ” (quoting United States v. Blueford, 312 F3d 962, 968 (9th Cir 2002))). | 1 | 1 |
BALBOA APARTMENTS v. Patrickgreen2 sentences2026See Balboa Apartments v. Patrick, 351 Or 205, 212 , 263 P3d 1011 (2011) (an amended pleading super- sedes prior pleadings under ORCP 23 D). 2026See Balboa Apartments v. Patrick, 351 Or 205, 212 , 263 P3d 1011 (2011) (an amended pleading super- sedes prior pleadings under ORCP 23 D). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Napue v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2020Petitioner also sought to add four new claims: a Napue claim based on the prosecutor having not corrected false testimony by Hope about his criminal history, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264, 269 , 79 S Ct 1173 , 3 L Ed 2d 1217 (1959), and three claims of “actual innocence.” However, petitioner’s appellate arguments are directed solely to her Brady claim. 2020Petitioner also sought to add four new claims: a Napue claim based on the prosecutor having not corrected false testimony by Hope about his criminal history, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264, 269 , 79 S Ct 1173 , 3 L Ed 2d 1217 (1959), and three claims of “actual innocence.” However, petitioner’s appellate arguments are directed solely to her Brady claim. | 2 | 2020–2026 |
Serrano v. Fhuere
neutral
2 sentences2026To prove a Napue claim, a petitioner must establish that “(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 724 (2026) 729 false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material.” Tiner, 284 Or App at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2026To prove a Napue claim, a petitioner must establish that “(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 724 (2026) 729 false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material.” Tiner, 284 Or App at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bray v. Reyes
green
2 sentences2026Id. at 747-48 . 2026Id. at 747-48 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.