reviewing claim in Texas

2019See United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (op. on reh’g).

2016See U.S. v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992).

2008App. 2001); see also Shaw v. State , 117 S.W.3d 883 , 888–89 (Tex. Crim.

2006Ann. art. 1.05 (Vernon 2005) (“[i]n all criminal trials the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”)). 11 When a defendant makes a claim that he or she has been *337 denied the right to a speedy trial, the court reviewing that claim must use the four-part test from Barker : the court must consider, under the totality of the circumstances, “the length of the delay, the State’s reason for delay, whether the delay was due to lack of diligence on the part of the State, and whether the delay caused harm to the accused.” Ex parte Martin, 33 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-Austin 20

2008When a defendant makes a claim that he or she has been denied the right to a speedy trial, the court reviewing that claim must use the four-part test from Barker : the court must consider, under the totality of the circumstances, "the length of the delay, the State's reason for delay, whether the delay was due to lack of diligence on the part of the State, and whether the delay caused harm to the accused." Ex parte Martin , 33 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted , 46 S.W.3d 932 (Tex. Crim.

2006Ann. art. 1.05 (Vernon 2005) (“[i]n all criminal trials the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”)). 11 When a defendant makes a claim that he or she has been *337 denied the right to a speedy trial, the court reviewing that claim must use the four-part test from Barker : the court must consider, under the totality of the circumstances, “the length of the delay, the State’s reason for delay, whether the delay was due to lack of diligence on the part of the State, and whether the delay caused harm to the accused.” Ex parte Martin, 33 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-Austin 20

2006Sutherlin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).

2005Sutherlin v. State , 682 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. Crim.

2025A court reviewing a claim of a constitutionally disproportionate sentence “initially make[s] a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then consider[s] whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense.” Davis v. State, 125 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.)).

2020A court reviewing a claim of a constitutionally disproportionate sentence “initially make[s] a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then consider[s] whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense.” Davis v. State, 125 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.)).

2025A court reviewing a claim of a constitutionally disproportionate sentence “initially make[s] a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then consider[s] whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense.” Davis v. State, 125 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.)).

2020A court reviewing a claim of a constitutionally disproportionate sentence “initially make[s] a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then consider[s] whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense.” Davis v. State, 125 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.)).

2012See McGruder v. Puckett , 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992).

2010See McGruder v. Puckett , 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992) Satisfying the initial criterion requires the sentence to be grossly disproportionate to the crime—that is, when the severity of the sentence is extreme when objectively compared to the gravity of the offense.

2007Compare Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.

2007Compare Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.

2016See Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 713-14 ; see also Tex. R.

2015The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2015The Court stated the Appellant must prove: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense. ( 466 U.S. at 687 [1984]).

2015We must “detail the evidence relevant to the in any action involving a construction defect brought issue” and “state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly after a recommendation of a third-party inspector or outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict.” Id. (quoting ruling by a panel of state inspectors on the existence Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986)). of the construction defect or its appropriate repair, the The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility, and it recommendation or ruling shall constitute a rebuttable may choose to believe one witne

2012See State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) ("Because the admission and practice of Texas attorneys is inextricably intertwined with the administration of justice, the Court must have the power to regulate these activities in order to fulfill its constitutional role.") .

2012However, in the event a TEA rule allows a non-attorney to engage in conduct that constitutes the practice of law, a court reviewing the rule would have a basis on which to determine the rule is invalid due to a conflict with subsection 81.101(a).4 See State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tex. 1964) (stating that "[t]he rulemaking power of administrative agencies does not permit the enactment of regulations which are inconsistent with the expression of the lawmakers' intent in statutes other than those under which the regulations are issued") (emphasis added). 4The judiciary has inherent powe

2011Hernandez v. State, 198 S.W.3d 257, 261 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. ref‘d).

2008The cases cited by Appellant set out the standard for reviewing error in cases in which improper jury argument or jury questioning takes place, but they do not lend support for Appellant’s argument that the question in this case resulted in incurable error. 13 Because Appellant 584 S.W.2d at 839-40 . 13 … See Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13-15 (Tex. Crim.

2008App. 2003) (stating that “to preserve error, an objection must be timely, specific, [and] pursued to an adverse ruling,” and that a motion in limine preserves nothing for review and holding that the appellant had preserved his complaint because the trial court overruled his objection to admitted evidence); Westmoreland v. State, 174 S.W.3d 282, 290-91 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding that the trial court did not err when it did not grant a mistrial after a witness violated a motion in limine because the appellant objected when the testimony was admitted at trial, the trial court sus

2004See Waldo , 746 S.W.2d at 754 .

1999See Scott v. State, 934 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.).

1995Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1995Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587 .