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5 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DeMille v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024The trial court’s ultimate decision whether a respondent remains a sexually violent predator must “be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert testimony.” DeMille, 283 Va. at 318. 2024A trial court’s ultimate decision regarding whether a respondent remains a sexually violent predator must “be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert testimony.” DeMille v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 316 , 318 (2012). | 1 | 2 |
Com. v. Squiregreen2 sentences2026On appeal, we defer to the court’s judgment “unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 Va. 746, 749 (2009). “[T]he mere use of the phrase mental abnormality or personality disorder does not automatically invoke a conclusion that a respondent is likely to engage in sexually violent acts.” Id. at 752 . 2026On appeal, we defer to the court’s judgment “unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 Va. 746, 749 (2009). “[T]he mere use of the phrase mental abnormality or personality disorder does not automatically invoke a conclusion that a respondent is likely to engage in sexually violent acts.” Id. at 752 . | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Millergreen1 sentence2026“This evidentiary standard describes an intermediate level of proof that exceeds the ‘preponderance’ standard, but does not reach the level of certainty required in criminal cases of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Miller, 273 Va. 540, 551 (2007) (quoting Grubb v. Grubb, 272 Va. 45, 54 (2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Grubb v. Grubbgreen1 sentence2026“This evidentiary standard describes an intermediate level of proof that exceeds the ‘preponderance’ standard, but does not reach the level of certainty required in criminal cases of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Miller, 273 Va. 540, 551 (2007) (quoting Grubb v. Grubb, 272 Va. 45, 54 (2006)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Com. v. Bell
green
2 sentences2014Although allocation of the burden of proof was not the subject 8 of the Commonwealth's assignments of error in Bell, this Court stated: "We agree with [the respondent's] allocation of the burden of proof, and recognize it as the appropriate allocation on conditional release in sexually violent predator cases." Id. at 313 , 714 S.E.2d at 564 . 2014Although allocation of the burden of proof was not the subject 8 of the Commonwealth's assignments of error in Bell, this Court stated: "We agree with [the respondent's] allocation of the burden of proof, and recognize it as the appropriate allocation on conditional release in sexually violent predator cases." Id. at 313 , 714 S.E.2d at 564 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.