33 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shrout v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Prior to 1977, the predecessor rule provided that "[a]ny defense or objection capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.” Maryland Rule 725(b) (1971 Repl.Vol.) (emphasis added); see also Shrout v. State, 238 Md. 170, 173-74 , 208 A.2d 585 (1965). 2015Prior to 1977, the predecessor rule provided that "[a]ny defense or objection capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.” Maryland Rule 725(b) (1971 Repl.Vol.) (emphasis added); see also Shrout v. State, 238 Md. 170, 173-74 , 208 A.2d 585 (1965). | 2 | 2 |
Kelch v. Mass Transit Administrationgreen2 sentences1999See Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 229 , 411 A.2d 449 (1980). 1999See Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 229 , 411 A.2d 449 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Bar Ass'n of Balto. City v. Siegelgreen2 sentences2003As this Court stated in Bar Association of Baltimore City v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 527 , 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975), the integrity of a criminal conviction “cannot be attacked in a disciplinary proceeding by invoking this Court to reweigh or to re-evaluate the respondent’s guilt or innocence.” Given this clear precedent, coupled with the hearing judge’s acceptance of Dr. Tellefsen’s findings relating to respondent’s claimed inability to file his income taxes, this Court overrules respondent’s exception regarding the “willfulness” of his actions. 2003As this Court stated in Bar Association of Baltimore City v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 527 , 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975), the integrity of a criminal conviction “cannot be attacked in a disciplinary proceeding by invoking this Court to reweigh or to re-evaluate the respondent’s guilt or innocence.” Given this clear precedent, coupled with the hearing judge’s acceptance of Dr. Tellefsen’s findings relating to respondent’s claimed inability to file his income taxes, this Court overrules respondent’s exception regarding the “willfulness” of his actions. | 1 | 2 |
Kohr v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Kohr v. State, 40 Md.App. 92, 98 , 388 A.2d 1242 (observing that the predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-252 is parallel to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12), cert. denied, 283 Md. 735 (1978). 2016See Kohr v. State, 40 Md.App. 92, 98 , 388 A.2d 1242 (observing that the predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-252 is parallel to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12), cert. denied, 283 Md. 735 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jasebgreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Jaseb, 864 Md. at 476-77, 773 A.2d at 523-24 (finding that an attorney did not knowingly misrepresent that a bankruptcy petition had been filed, and thus violate MRPC 8.4(d), when she was operating under the mistaken impression that it had been filed); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 673-74 , 496 A.2d 672, 676-77 (1985) (affirming a hearing judge’s conclusion that an attorney did not violate the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) when he unwittingly misrepresented the status of a settlement offer because of a misunderstanding between the attorney and an insurance adjust | 1 | 1 |
Foos v. Steinberggreen2 sentences2007When construing the applicability of the defense of limitations under the predecessor rule relating to the time for the filing of defenses of limitations, we said in Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 37 , 230 A.2d 79, 80 (1967) that: “In reversing the lower court we need go no further than to hold that the appellee’s plea of limitations was not filed within the time contemplated by the Maryland Rules and thus should have been stricken____Rule 342 provides that a plea of limitations must be specially pleaded ... and further provides that the ‘plea of limitations must be filed within the time requi 2007When construing the applicability of the defense of limitations under the predecessor rule relating to the time for the filing of defenses of limitations, we said in Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 37 , 230 A.2d 79, 80 (1967) that: “In reversing the lower court we need go no further than to hold that the appellee’s plea of limitations was not filed within the time contemplated by the Maryland Rules and thus should have been stricken____Rule 342 provides that a plea of limitations must be specially pleaded ... and further provides that the ‘plea of limitations must be filed within the time requi | 1 | 1 |
Dupont, Glore, Forgan, Inc. v. Barshackgreen2 sentences2007When construing the applicability of the defense of limitations under the predecessor rule relating to the time for the filing of defenses of limitations, we said in Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 37 , 230 A.2d 79, 80 (1967) that: “In reversing the lower court we need go no further than to hold that the appellee’s plea of limitations was not filed within the time contemplated by the Maryland Rules and thus should have been stricken____Rule 342 provides that a plea of limitations must be specially pleaded ... and further provides that the ‘plea of limitations must be filed within the time requi 2007When construing the applicability of the defense of limitations under the predecessor rule relating to the time for the filing of defenses of limitations, we said in Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 37 , 230 A.2d 79, 80 (1967) that: “In reversing the lower court we need go no further than to hold that the appellee’s plea of limitations was not filed within the time contemplated by the Maryland Rules and thus should have been stricken____Rule 342 provides that a plea of limitations must be specially pleaded ... and further provides that the ‘plea of limitations must be filed within the time requi | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kempgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Jaseb, 864 Md. at 476-77, 773 A.2d at 523-24 (finding that an attorney did not knowingly misrepresent that a bankruptcy petition had been filed, and thus violate MRPC 8.4(d), when she was operating under the mistaken impression that it had been filed); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 673-74 , 496 A.2d 672, 676-77 (1985) (affirming a hearing judge’s conclusion that an attorney did not violate the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) when he unwittingly misrepresented the status of a settlement offer because of a misunderstanding between the attorney and an insurance adjust 2007See, e.g., Jaseb, 864 Md. at 476-77, 773 A.2d at 523-24 (finding that an attorney did not knowingly misrepresent that a bankruptcy petition had been filed, and thus violate MRPC 8.4(d), when she was operating under the mistaken impression that it had been filed); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp, 303 Md. 664, 673-74 , 496 A.2d 672, 676-77 (1985) (affirming a hearing judge’s conclusion that an attorney did not violate the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) when he unwittingly misrepresented the status of a settlement offer because of a misunderstanding between the attorney and an insurance adjust | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2005The predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-231 “is virtually a pro tanto adoption of Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (1952) proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,” and "[l]he progenitor of Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure ... is Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Brown v. State, 272 Md. 450, 456-57, 464 , 325 A.2d 557 (1974). 4 . 2005The predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-231 “is virtually a pro tanto adoption of Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (1952) proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,” and "[l]he progenitor of Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure ... is Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Brown v. State, 272 Md. 450, 456-57, 464 , 325 A.2d 557 (1974). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Bradyhouse v. Levinsongreen2 sentences2003Id. at 609 , 248 A.2d 159 ; see also Bradyhouse v. Levinson, 230 Md. 519, 522 , 187 A.2d 838 (1963)(stating that a third-party claim must be for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant). 2003Id. at 609 , 248 A.2d 159 ; see also Bradyhouse v. Levinson, 230 Md. 519, 522 , 187 A.2d 838 (1963)(stating that a third-party claim must be for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Barnesgreen2 sentences2003See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 478 , 408 A.2d 719, 722 (1979) (where, in discussing the predecessor rule, we stated that “[ujnder Maryland Rule BV10 e 1, Barnes’ conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, is ‘conclusive proof of his guilt and hence that his failure to file was willful.”)(alteration added). 2003See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barnes, 286 Md. 474, 478 , 408 A.2d 719, 722 (1979) (where, in discussing the predecessor rule, we stated that “[ujnder Maryland Rule BV10 e 1, Barnes’ conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, is ‘conclusive proof of his guilt and hence that his failure to file was willful.”)(alteration added). | 1 | 1 |
Wilmer v. Placidegreen2 sentences2002Petitioner was “unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.” In a case involving a predecessor to the rule at issue in the case sub judice, Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247 Md. 475, 490 , 231 A.2d 702, 711 (1967), we said: “There was no evidence that the absence from the state of the witness Jerry Price was procured by any connivance on the plaintiffs’ part and we think the trial judge properly allowed its [a deposition] admission into evidence.” In the older case, Wilmer v. Placide, 137 Md. 107, 109 , 111 A. 822, 823 (1920), where we upheld the denial of admission of a deposi 2002Petitioner was “unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.” In a case involving a predecessor to the rule at issue in the case sub judice, Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247 Md. 475, 490 , 231 A.2d 702, 711 (1967), we said: “There was no evidence that the absence from the state of the witness Jerry Price was procured by any connivance on the plaintiffs’ part and we think the trial judge properly allowed its [a deposition] admission into evidence.” In the older case, Wilmer v. Placide, 137 Md. 107, 109 , 111 A. 822, 823 (1920), where we upheld the denial of admission of a deposi | 1 | 1 |
Perlin Packing Co. v. Pricegreen2 sentences2002Petitioner was “unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.” In a case involving a predecessor to the rule at issue in the case sub judice, Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247 Md. 475, 490 , 231 A.2d 702, 711 (1967), we said: “There was no evidence that the absence from the state of the witness Jerry Price was procured by any connivance on the plaintiffs’ part and we think the trial judge properly allowed its [a deposition] admission into evidence.” In the older case, Wilmer v. Placide, 137 Md. 107, 109 , 111 A. 822, 823 (1920), where we upheld the denial of admission of a deposi 2002Petitioner was “unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.” In a case involving a predecessor to the rule at issue in the case sub judice, Perlin Packing Co. v. Price, 247 Md. 475, 490 , 231 A.2d 702, 711 (1967), we said: “There was no evidence that the absence from the state of the witness Jerry Price was procured by any connivance on the plaintiffs’ part and we think the trial judge properly allowed its [a deposition] admission into evidence.” In the older case, Wilmer v. Placide, 137 Md. 107, 109 , 111 A. 822, 823 (1920), where we upheld the denial of admission of a deposi | 1 | 1 |
| Parker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Broadwater v. Archgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Metheanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. State
red
2 sentences1994In other words, he claims that subsection (a) applies, but subsection (e) does not. *686 In Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99, 101 , 175 A.2d 775 (1961), the Court held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed under the predecessor rule to Rule 4-345 constituted a “statutory remedy” within the meaning of PCPA. 1994In other words, he claims that subsection (a) applies, but subsection (e) does not. *686 In Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99, 101 , 175 A.2d 775 (1961), the Court held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed under the predecessor rule to Rule 4-345 constituted a “statutory remedy” within the meaning of PCPA. | 2 | 1973–1994 |
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg
green
2 sentences1982Chief Judge Murphy had occasion to discuss the predecessor rule for the Court in Rosenberg, 273 Md. 351 , stating: "[O]ther states provide, as we do, by rule, statute, or case law, that a conviction of an attorney is conclusive proof of guilt. 1982Chief Judge Murphy had occasion to discuss the predecessor rule for the Court in Rosenberg, 273 Md. 351 , stating: "[0]ther states provide, as we do, by rule, statute, or case law, that a conviction of an attorney is conclusive proof of guilt. | 2 | 1981–1982 |
Divver v. State
green
2 sentences2015The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ’’[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]" Similarly, Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides ”[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury[.]” The Maryland Court of Appeals ’’considers United States Supreme Court precedents interpreting the sixth amendment to be 'very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,’ as to the proper construction of Maryland’s parallel Arti 2015The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ’’[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]" Similarly, Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides ”[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury[.]” The Maryland Court of Appeals ’’considers United States Supreme Court precedents interpreting the sixth amendment to be 'very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,’ as to the proper construction of Maryland’s parallel Arti | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smith v. Cylus
green
2 sentences2015We pointed out in Smith that this understanding of Rule 2-322 is premised upon "a predecessor to that rule that required a motion to dismiss [asserting a mandatory defense] be made prior to filing of any pleading." 147 Md.App. at 81 n. 1, 807 A.2d 777 . 16 . 2015We pointed out in Smith that this understanding of Rule 2-322 is premised upon "a predecessor to that rule that required a motion to dismiss [asserting a mandatory defense] be made prior to filing of any pleading." 147 Md.App. at 81 n. 1, 807 A.2d 777 . 16 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
West Coast Theater Corporation v. City Of Portland
green
1 sentence2015The Ninth Circuit, in West Coast Theater, found that service of a draft complaint did not comply with Federal Rule 4(j), the predecessor rule to current Rule 4(m). 897 F.2d at 1529 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stewart v. State
green
2 sentences2015The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ’’[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]" Similarly, Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides ”[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury[.]” The Maryland Court of Appeals ’’considers United States Supreme Court precedents interpreting the sixth amendment to be 'very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,’ as to the proper construction of Maryland’s parallel Arti 2015The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ’’[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.]" Similarly, Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides ”[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury[.]” The Maryland Court of Appeals ’’considers United States Supreme Court precedents interpreting the sixth amendment to be 'very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,’ as to the proper construction of Maryland’s parallel Arti | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2015In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334-38 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979), the Court of Appeals held that the provisions of the predecessor statute to CP § 6-103 and the substantively identical provisions of the predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-271(a) were mandatory, and further held that dismissal of the charges pending against a defendant was the sanction for a violation of the statute’s mandate. 16 . 2015In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334-38 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979), the Court of Appeals held that the provisions of the predecessor statute to CP § 6-103 and the substantively identical provisions of the predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-271(a) were mandatory, and further held that dismissal of the charges pending against a defendant was the sanction for a violation of the statute’s mandate. 16 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Vogel v. Grant
green
2 sentences2012The respondent relies on Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984) (discussing the predecessor rule to Md. 2012The respondent relies on Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984) (discussing the predecessor rule to Md. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Perez v. State
green
2 sentences2011Rule 758(d), deleted the preliminary phrase “[ajfter the jury has retired to deliberate ...,” thus clearly suggesting that the rule is not limited to communications during deliberations. 6 Our conclusion comports with Perez and Canela v. State, 420 Md. 57 , 21 A.3d 1048 (2011). 2011Rule 758(d), deleted the preliminary phrase “[ajfter the jury has retired to deliberate ...,” thus clearly suggesting that the rule is not limited to communications during deliberations. 6 Our conclusion comports with Perez and Canela v. State, 420 Md. 57 , 21 A.3d 1048 (2011). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner
neutral
2 sentences2007In Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner, 231 Md. 543 , 191 A.2d 222 (1963), the Court addressed the time for filing an appeal from an order of the Insurance Commissioner in the context of Maryland Rule B4, the predecessor rule to Rule 7-203. 2007In Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner, 231 Md. 543 , 191 A.2d 222 (1963), the Court addressed the time for filing an appeal from an order of the Insurance Commissioner in the context of Maryland Rule B4, the predecessor rule to Rule 7-203. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Levitt
green
2 sentences2007Not only does Levitt not mention or discuss an intent element as Respondent intimates, the Levitt Court rather was persuaded by the context in which the knowingly false statement was made that the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) was not violated. 286 Md. at 239 , 406 A.2d at 1299-1300 . 2007Not only does Levitt not mention or discuss an intent element as Respondent intimates, the Levitt Court rather was persuaded by the context in which the knowingly false statement was made that the predecessor rule to MRPC 8.4(c) was not violated. 286 Md. at 239 , 406 A.2d at 1299-1300 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Renehan v. Public Service Commission
green
2 sentences2007The Court concluded that service was made by mailing the order to the affected party and specifically stated that: “There is no provision of law which requires that notice of the action of the Public Service Commission be received by a party in order to make it effective.” Renehan, 231 Md. at 63 , 188 A.2d at 568 . 2007The Court concluded that service was made by mailing the order to the affected party and specifically stated that: “There is no provision of law which requires that notice of the action of the Public Service Commission be received by a party in order to make it effective.” Renehan, 231 Md. at 63 , 188 A.2d at 568 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
green
2 sentences2004Rule 2-520(e) provides that “[n]o party *327 may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds for the objection.” “[A] party must fully comply with the requirements of the rule at every stage of the instructions in order to preserve his rights.” Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 612 , 143 A.2d 627 (1958) (addressing the predecessor rule). 2004Rule 2-520(e) provides that “[n]o party *327 may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds for the objection.” “[A] party must fully comply with the requirements of the rule at every stage of the instructions in order to preserve his rights.” Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 612 , 143 A.2d 627 (1958) (addressing the predecessor rule). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
White v. Land Homes Corporation
green
2 sentences2003In White v. Land Homes, 251 Md. 603 , 248 A.2d 159 (1968), the Court, discussing the predecessor rule and finding it in pari materia to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, explained: A third-party claim will lie in any case where it can be alleged that the third-party defendant is necessarily answerable to the original defendant should judgment be entered against him. 2003In White v. Land Homes, 251 Md. 603 , 248 A.2d 159 (1968), the Court, discussing the predecessor rule and finding it in pari materia to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, explained: A third-party claim will lie in any case where it can be alleged that the third-party defendant is necessarily answerable to the original defendant should judgment be entered against him. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Giddens v. State
green
2 sentences2003In Giddens v. State, 97 Md.App. 582 , 631 A.2d 499 (1993), the question arose whether a conviction for distribution of cocaine was usable as impeachment evidence under the predecessor rule to Rule 5-609. 2003In Giddens v. State, 97 Md.App. 582 , 631 A.2d 499 (1993), the question arose whether a conviction for distribution of cocaine was usable as impeachment evidence under the predecessor rule to Rule 5-609. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Quecedo v. DeVries
green
2 sentences2002Rule 2-419, which contained nearly identical language, the Court of Special Appeals held that “Lw]ithin the clear contemplation of the rule is the fairly routine situation wherein a witness has been deposed and is then, for some reason, unable to attend the trial.” Quecedo v. DeVries, 22 Md.App. 58, 62 , 321 A.2d 785, 787 , cert. denied, 272 Md. 747 (1974). 2002Rule 2-419, which contained nearly identical language, the Court of Special Appeals held that “Lw]ithin the clear contemplation of the rule is the fairly routine situation wherein a witness has been deposed and is then, for some reason, unable to attend the trial.” Quecedo v. DeVries, 22 Md.App. 58, 62 , 321 A.2d 785, 787 , cert. denied, 272 Md. 747 (1974). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Mayor of Baltimore v. Theiss
green
2 sentences2002In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Theiss, 354 Md. 234 , 729 A.2d 965 (1999), we discussed the historical development of Rule 2-517 and, quoting from a predecessor rule, Rule 17, noted that “[fjormal exceptions to the rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; ... it is sufficient that a party at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take.... ” Id. at 245 , 729 A.2d at 971 (quoting Court of Appeals Rule 17 (1945)); accord Univ. of Maryland Med. 2002In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Theiss, 354 Md. 234 , 729 A.2d 965 (1999), we discussed the historical development of Rule 2-517 and, quoting from a predecessor rule, Rule 17, noted that “[fjormal exceptions to the rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; ... it is sufficient that a party at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take.... ” Id. at 245 , 729 A.2d at 971 (quoting Court of Appeals Rule 17 (1945)); accord Univ. of Maryland Med. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Womble v. Miller green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tydings v. Allied Painting & Decorating Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Uhler v. Real Properties, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Zitzer v. California green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Smith v. Brantley neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Klein v. Weiss green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Klopfer v. Werber green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Valentine v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| A. S. Abell Co. v. Skeen green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| McBurnie v. McBurnie neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Robinson v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Davis v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Tiller v. Elfenbein green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Roberts v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Carter v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lester green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Lurkins green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Higbie green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Fumo green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.