30 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lee Engineering & Construction Company v. Fellowsgreen2 sentences2012Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla.1968) (applying Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to rule 4-1.5(b)). 2008Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1968) (applying Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to rule 4-1.5(b)). | 2 | 3 |
In Re Criminal Procedure, Rule No. 1green2 sentences2025Proc., Rule No. 1., 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963); State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1964) (noting that Rule 1, the predecessor of rule 3.850, “provides a remedy co-equal with, but actually more expeditious than post-conviction habeas corpus”); State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988) (calling rule 3.850 “a procedural 7 vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus”). 2016As noted in Baker v. State, when the Florida Supreme Court enacted “Rule 1” (the predecessor to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure) to provide an avenue for prisoners to challenge their convictions under Gideon, the rule provided that where this new rule did not provide an adequate remedy, a prisoner could seek relief by petition for writ of habeas corpus “to test the legality of his detention.” 878 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Fla. 2004) (quoting In re Criminal Procedure, Rule No. 1, 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Bolyeagreen1 sentence2025Proc., Rule No. 1., 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963); State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1964) (noting that Rule 1, the predecessor of rule 3.850, “provides a remedy co-equal with, but actually more expeditious than post-conviction habeas corpus”); State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988) (calling rule 3.850 “a procedural 7 vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Weeksgreen1 sentence2025Proc., Rule No. 1., 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963); State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1964) (noting that Rule 1, the predecessor of rule 3.850, “provides a remedy co-equal with, but actually more expeditious than post-conviction habeas corpus”); State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1988) (calling rule 3.850 “a procedural 7 vehicle for the collateral remedy otherwise available by writ of habeas corpus”). | 1 | 1 |
Bumgarner v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Rule 3.840(e) provides that a trial judge must disqualify herself if the charged contempt "involves disrespect to or criticism of" the judge. "[T]he purpose of the rule is to assure that a person cited for a contempt of court which involved a criticism of a judge, would not be tried on the -3- contempt charge before the judge who was the subject of the criticism." Bumgarner v. State, 245 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (construing Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.840(a)(5), the predecessor rule that is materially the same as the current rule 3.840(e)). | 1 | 1 |
In re Florida Rules of Judicial Administrationgreen1 sentence2019Admin., 389 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 1980) (noting that the predecessor to rule 2.140 was “entirely rewritten to - 19 - codify the procedures for changes to all Florida rules of procedure” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Stategreen2 sentences2016As noted in Baker v. State, when the Florida Supreme Court enacted “Rule 1” (the predecessor to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure) to provide an avenue for prisoners to challenge their convictions under Gideon, the rule provided that where this new rule did not provide an adequate remedy, a prisoner could seek relief by petition for writ of habeas corpus “to test the legality of his detention.” 878 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Fla. 2004) (quoting In re Criminal Procedure, Rule No. 1, 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963)) (emphasis added). 2016As noted in Baker v. State, when the Florida Supreme Court enacted “Rule 1” (the predecessor to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure) to provide an avenue for prisoners to challenge their convictions under Gideon, the rule provided that where this new rule did not provide an adequate remedy, a prisoner could seek relief by petition for writ of habeas corpus “to test the legality of his detention.” 878 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Fla.2004) (quoting In re Criminal Procedure, Rule No: 1, 151 So.2d 634 (Fla.1963)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Luz Mariana Donado and Oscar Donado v. Pennymac Corpgreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Donado v. PennyMac Corp., 174 So.3d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing a final foreclosure judgment where the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the initial complaint which did not comply with the verification requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b), a predecessor to rule 1.115). | 1 | 1 |
Florida Silica Sand Co. v. Parkergreen2 sentences2016In Florida Silica Sand Co. v. Parker, 118 So.2d 2, 4 (Fla.1960), this Court concluded that Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to rule 4-1.5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar — the ethical rule governing attorneys’ fees — was a “safe guide in fixing the amount of [E/C-paid] fees” awarded to the claimant. 2016In Florida Silica Sand Co. v. Parker, 118 So. 2d 2, 4 (Fla. 1960), this Court concluded that Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to rule 4-1.5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar—the ethical rule governing attorneys’ fees—was a “safe guide in fixing the amount of [E/C-paid] fees” awarded to the claimant. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Vandinegreen1 sentence2015See Kennedy v. Vandine, 185 So.2d 693 (Fla.1966); Ward v. Gibson, 340 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); First Wisconsin Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Coto-Ojeda v. Samuelgreen1 sentence2015The continued use of the terms "general appearance” and "special appearance” has long been criticized as obsolete, see id. at 588 (Cope, J. concurring), as the 1948 adoption of the Florida Rulesi.of Civil Procedure (including the predecessor to rule 1.140) eliminated the need for, and distinction between, general and special appearances. | 1 | 1 |
Cassas v. Lazangreen1 sentence2015Admin. 2.514(b) (extending a deadline computed pursuant to rule 2.514(a) by five days when an act must be undertaken following service by mail or email); see also Cassas v. Lazan, 488 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (applying the predecessor to rule 2.514(b), i.e., Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e), to the rule governing requests for admissions, i.e., rule 1.370). | 1 | 1 |
Gidden v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Gidden v. State, 613 So.2d 457, 460 (Fla. 1993) (addressing the predecessor to rule 3.840(f), the court stated that "the rule’s purpose is fulfilled when sufficient oral findings are made on the record”). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Speer v. Stategreen1 sentence2014But see J.D.J. v. State, 120 So.3d 229 , 230 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (opining that, absent an adequate excuse for nonappearance, a defendant's failure to appear may be summarily punished as direct criminal contempt and recognizing that in Kelley the Second District disagreed with the Fourth District’s position on this point); Speer v. State, 742 So.2d 373, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (opining that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt); Porter v. Williams, 392 So.2d 59, 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (same); James v. State, 385 So.2d 1145, 1145 ( | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2014But see J.D.J. v. State, 120 So.3d 229 , 230 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (opining that, absent an adequate excuse for nonappearance, a defendant's failure to appear may be summarily punished as direct criminal contempt and recognizing that in Kelley the Second District disagreed with the Fourth District’s position on this point); Speer v. State, 742 So.2d 373, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (opining that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt); Porter v. Williams, 392 So.2d 59, 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (same); James v. State, 385 So.2d 1145, 1145 ( | 1 | 1 |
James v. Stategreen1 sentence2014But see J.D.J. v. State, 120 So.3d 229 , 230 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (opining that, absent an adequate excuse for nonappearance, a defendant's failure to appear may be summarily punished as direct criminal contempt and recognizing that in Kelley the Second District disagreed with the Fourth District’s position on this point); Speer v. State, 742 So.2d 373, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (opining that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt); Porter v. Williams, 392 So.2d 59, 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (same); James v. State, 385 So.2d 1145, 1145 ( | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 826 So.2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(noting that "[w]hether relief should be granted pursuant to Rule 1.540 is a fact specific question and the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed on appeal absent a gross abuse of discretion"); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 289 So.2d 781, 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)(confirming that relief from judgment under rule 1.540(b)(3) is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court); see also Shongut v. Malnik, 173 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of a motion under | 1 | 1 |
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickardgreen1 sentence2005See LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 826 So.2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(noting that "[w]hether relief should be granted pursuant to Rule 1.540 is a fact specific question and the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed on appeal absent a gross abuse of discretion"); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 289 So.2d 781, 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)(confirming that relief from judgment under rule 1.540(b)(3) is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court); see also Shongut v. Malnik, 173 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of a motion under | 1 | 1 |
LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Bank of America, NAgreen1 sentence2005See LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Bank of America, N.A., 826 So.2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(noting that "[w]hether relief should be granted pursuant to Rule 1.540 is a fact specific question and the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed on appeal absent a gross abuse of discretion"); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 289 So.2d 781, 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)(confirming that relief from judgment under rule 1.540(b)(3) is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court); see also Shongut v. Malnik, 173 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of a motion under | 1 | 1 |
Bowe v. Stategreen1 sentence2000The Fifth District agreed, stating that "anything less than literal compliance with rule 3.400 requires reversal." Wilson, 746 So.2d at 1210 ; accord Bowe v. State, 600 So.2d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (finding reversible error when the trial court failed to comply strictly with the procedure mandated by rule 3.400(c), the predecessor to rule 3.400(a)(3)). | 1 | 1 |
Pettit v. Stategreen1 sentence2000In Pettit v. State, 612 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), this court observed that it "was error for the trial court to give the jury only some of the written instructions." Normally, we noted, this would be reversible error; however, in Pettit defense counsel invited the error. | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
J.D.J. v. Stateyellow1 sentence2014But see J.D.J. v. State, 120 So.3d 229 , 230 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (opining that, absent an adequate excuse for nonappearance, a defendant's failure to appear may be summarily punished as direct criminal contempt and recognizing that in Kelley the Second District disagreed with the Fourth District’s position on this point); Speer v. State, 742 So.2d 373, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (opining that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt); Porter v. Williams, 392 So.2d 59, 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (same); James v. State, 385 So.2d 1145, 1145 ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tascano v. State
green
2 sentences1981Williams’ clear right to the penalty instruction did not arise until after his trial was concluded, that is, when Tascano v. State, 393 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1980), was handed down. .The rule reads: “(d) No party may assign as error grounds of appeal the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects, and the grounds of his objection. 1981Williams' clear right to the penalty instruction did not arise until after his trial was concluded, that is, when Tascano v. State, 393 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1980), was handed down. [3] The rule reads: "(d) No party may assign as error grounds of appeal the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects, and the grounds of his objection. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Terry
green
2 sentences1981The predecessor rule had been construed as vesting discretion in the trial court, see State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and cases collected in n. 1; Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1975); Golson v. State, 353 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 1981The predecessor rule had been construed as vesting discretion in the trial court, see State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and cases collected in n. 1; Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1975); Golson v. State, 353 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1981The predecessor rule had been construed as vesting discretion in the trial court, see State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and cases collected in n. 1; Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1975); Golson v. State, 353 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 1981The predecessor rule had been construed as vesting discretion in the trial court, see State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and cases collected in n. 1; Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1975); Golson v. State, 353 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Golson v. State
neutral
2 sentences1981The predecessor rule had been construed as vesting discretion in the trial court, see State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and cases collected in n. 1; Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1975); Golson v. State, 353 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). 1981The predecessor rule had been construed as vesting discretion in the trial court, see State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and cases collected in n. 1; Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1975); Golson v. State, 353 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Watson v. State
green
2 sentences2017In Watson v. State, 651 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 1994), the court, in construing the predecessor to rule 3.220(b)(1)(B), determined that the State’s withholding of an oral statement made by its expert witness was not a discovery violation because the statement was not discoverable. 2017The court held that the reference in the rule to “ ‘statement’ is limited to written statements or contemporaneously recorded oral statements.” Watson, 651 So.2d at 1163-64 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ward v. Gibson
green
1 sentence2015See Kennedy v. Vandine, 185 So.2d 693 (Fla.1966); Ward v. Gibson, 340 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); First Wisconsin Nat. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute
green
2 sentences2008A forum-selection clause in her contract of passage, a predecessor clause to the one before us, required that “all disputes ... arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.” Id. at 587-88 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 . 2008A forum-selection clause in her contract of passage, a predecessor clause to the one before us, required that “all disputes ... arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.” Id. at 587-88 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2006In Jones v. State, 514 So.2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), for example, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that when a witness informs the State of his intention to materially alter information provided in a sworn statement, rule 3.220(f) (the predecessor to rule 3.220(j)) imposes a continuing duty upon the State to disclose such information to the defense. 2006Id. at 435 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Wilson v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Federman v. State, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Andrews v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Oster v. Cay Construction Company green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Bruns green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Hensley v. Seminole County neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Garcia green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Carroll v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Wertman v. Tipping green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Simmons v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Parker v. Parker green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| McCann Plumbing Co. v. Plumbing Industry Program green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.