predecessor rule in Iowa

2015See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 1990) (interpreting DR 1-102(A)(4), the predecessor to rule 32:8.4(c)). *561 In regards to the execution of a will, the Iowa Code provides: All wills and codicils, except as provided in section 633.283, to be valid, must be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s express direction writing the testator’s name thereto, and declared by the testator to be the testator’s will, and witnessed, at the testator’s request, by two competent persons who signed as witnes

2015See Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 1990) (interpreting DR 1–102(A)(4), the predecessor to rule 32:8.4(c)). 10 In regards to the execution of a will, the Iowa Code provides: All wills and codicils, except as provided in section 633.283, to be valid, must be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s express direction writing the testator’s name thereto, and declared by the testator to be the testator’s will, and witnessed, at the testator’s request, by two competent persons who signed as witnesse

2015See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1992) (interpreting DR 1-102(A)(4), the predecessor to rule 32:8.4(c)).

2015See Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1992) (interpreting DR 1–102(A)(4), the predecessor to rule 32:8.4(c)).

2014Bank, 278 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Iowa 1979) (rejecting a petition to vacate as untimely under the predecessor to rule 1.1013).

2014Bank, 278 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Iowa 1979) (rejecting a petition to vacate as untimely under the predecessor to rule 1.1013).

2026Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 191 (Iowa 2013); Reyes v. Int’l Van Lines, Inc., 9 N.W.3d 793 , 801 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024); cf. Erickson, 485 N.W.2d at 85 (relying on rule 89—which was the predecessor of rule 1.402(5)—but finding amended petition did not relate back).

2026Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 191 (Iowa 2013); Reyes v. Int’l Van Lines, Inc., 9 N.W.3d 793 , 801 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024); cf. Erickson, 485 N.W.2d at 85 (relying on rule 89—which was the predecessor of rule 1.402(5)—but finding amended petition did not relate back).

2026Another example is our rules of electronic filing, whose promulgation was legislatively authorized in Iowa Code section 602.1614, and which we have read to “allow[] a corrected filing to relate back to the date of [a timely filed] original submission.” Jacobs v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 887 N.W.2d 590, 599 (Iowa 2016); see also Toney v. Parker, 958 N.W.2d 16 202, 209 (Iowa 2021) (discussing the rules of electronic filing and applying the Jacobs relation-back framework).

2025See In re T.V., 563 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 1997) (applying the predecessor to rule 6.806).

2024See In re Moser, No. 12–0762, 2012 WL 5954180 , at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012); In re Marriage of Woldegabir, No. 13-0765, 2014 WL 2348255 , at *5 (Iowa Ct. App May 29, 2014); cf. Stoner v. Kilen, 528 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (affirming denial based on the predecessor to rule 1.1013’s discovery requirement in the context of a default judgment).

2024See State v. Beaver, 429 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“[R]ule 6(6) [(the predecessor to rule 2.6(6))] does not require a specific reference to section 902.7.”) In this way, rule 2.6(6) differs from its neighbor, rule 2.6(7), which requires pleadings that rely on foreign statutes—that is, the statutes of 3As we emphasized in State v. Harris, the rules of criminal procedure have been amended recently.

2021Despite substituting the phrase “wholly new and different” in place of “different,” the new rule, according to Sharpe, was “merely an adoption of the prior law.” 7 v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932): “Under [the State’s] reasoning, offenses which lie within the chain of included offenses could be substituted, either raising or lowering the original charge.” Id.

2021Despite substituting the phrase “wholly new and different” in place of “different,” the new rule, according to Sharpe, was “merely an adoption of the prior law.” 7 v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932): “Under [the State’s] reasoning, offenses which lie within the chain of included offenses could be substituted, either raising or lowering the original charge.” Id.

2021Toomer v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 340 N.W.2d 594, 597-98 (Iowa 1983) (finding that the predecessor to rule 1.981(8), which is materially identical, was “designed in part to assist [the] trial court in 15 examining the entire record before it . . . in light of the allegations in the motion.”).

2020The purposes of this rule “may not adequately be served to the extent that the trial court delegates to counsel its own responsibility to scrutinize the record, select apt principles of law, and fully articulate the bases for a sound, fair decision.” Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1984) (discussing the predecessor to rule 1.904, former Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(a)).

2017A narrower gloss is consistent with Knudsen v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., where we allowed additional testimony about a singular event—a prior phone call—under rule 106, the predecessor of rule 5.106. 464 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Campbell, 178 Mont. 15 , 582 P.2d 783, 785 (1978) (holding under rule of completeness, balance.or portions of the same document, correspondence, or conversation may be admitted, but not all hearsay communications regarding what the informant may have told law enforcement).

2017A narrower gloss is consistent with Knudsen v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., where we allowed additional testimony about a singular event—a prior phone call—under rule 106, the predecessor of rule 5.106. 464 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Campbell, 178 Mont. 15 , 582 P.2d 783, 785 (1978) (holding under rule of completeness, balance.or portions of the same document, correspondence, or conversation may be admitted, but not all hearsay communications regarding what the informant may have told law enforcement).

2017A narrower gloss is consistent with Knudsen v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., where we allowed additional testimony about a singular event—a prior phone call—under rule 106, the predecessor of rule 5.106. 464 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Campbell, 178 Mont. 15 , 582 P.2d 783, 785 (1978) (holding under rule of completeness, balance.or portions of the same document, correspondence, or conversation may be admitted, but not all hearsay communications regarding what the informant may have told law enforcement).

2015The district court ruled it was without jurisdiction to reinstate the case after the six-month window noted in rule 1.944(6).3 This ruling is consistent with Walker v. State, 572 N.W.2d 589, 590 (Iowa 1997), which dealt with the predecessor to rule 1.944.

2015There, the court wrote, “This court has repeatedly held that even if ‘good cause’ is shown for reinstating a case dismissed pursuant to rule 215.1, a district court lacks the authority to do so where the application for reinstatement was filed more than six months after the dismissal.” Walker, 572 N.W.2d at 590 .

2014See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 586 N.W.2d 523, 525-26 (Iowa 1998).

2014See id. at 126–27.

2013See Hays v. Hays, 612 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa Ct.App.2000) (noting that “[a] litigant may avoid the harsh consequences of [the predecessor to rule 6.101(5) ] by filing a motion to vacate or modify under [the predecessors of rules 1.1012 and 1.1013].”).