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13 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2022Id. at 218, 296 . 2022Id. at 218, 296 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2018"As [the] Court observed, applying the predecessor rule to N.J.R.E. 403, a trial court's weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect "must stand unless it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)). 2017As this Court observed, applying the predecessor rule to N.J.R.E. 403, a trial court’s weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect “must stand unless it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.” State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 , 449 A.2d 1280 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Prado v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Prado v. State, supra, 376 N.J.Super. at 237 n. 2, 870 A.2d 294 . 4 The predecessor to the rule “contemplated that ‘every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the Appellate Division.' ” Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 52 , 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (quoting Central R.R. 2006See Prado v. State, supra, 376 N.J.Super. at 237 n. 2, 870 A.2d 294 . 4 The predecessor to the rule “contemplated that ‘every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the Appellate Division.' ” Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 52 , 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (quoting Central R.R. | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Mayor of Bernards Townshipgreen1 sentence1989There the authors note that the predecessor rule to R. 4:27-2 authorized "a plaintiff to join a claim to have his status fixed as a stockholder with a claim to enforce a secondary right as a shareholder without first obtaining a judgment establishing his claim as a shareholder." See also the specific example given in R. 4:27-2 itself of the permissive joinder of a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a fraudulent conveyance without first having obtained the judgment establishing the claim for money. [4] The Supreme Court stated that the Township had noted in its Appellate Division bri | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Koedatich
green
1 sentence2018"As [the] Court observed, applying the predecessor rule to N.J.R.E. 403, a trial court's weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect "must stand unless it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State, in Interest of Rr
green
1 sentence2016Ibid. 4 On the same day that it decided R.R., the Court granted the State's petition for certification in Zamorsky and remanded for reconsideration in light of R.R. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Gomez
green
1 sentence2016Ibid. 16 certif. denied, 170 N.J. 86 (2001), the Appellate Division acknowledged that the “preferred procedure” is for a court officer to “administer a ‘traditional’ oath and for the judge to engage in colloquy constituting its functional equivalent with a youthful witness.” However, the T.E. panel rejected the defendant’s argument that, by conducting the competency examination of a child victim, the prosecutor usurped the court’s function. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Walsh
neutral
2 sentences2010Moreover, the court in Walsh concluded that a predecessor to the rule, in importing the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 criteria, also imported the limitation that they apply only to offenses. 236 N.J.Super. at 156-57 , 564 A. 2d 901 . 2010Moreover, the court in Walsh concluded that a predecessor to the rule, in importing the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 criteria, also imported the limitation that they apply only to offenses. 236 N.J.Super. at 156-57 , 564 A. 2d 901 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. D.R.
green
2 sentences2007The predecessor to this rule, former Evidence Rule 63(33), was first proposed by the Court in State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 371-77 , 537 A. 2d 667 (1988), which recognized the need for a more liberal admissibility rule regarding out-of-court statements made by young victims of sexual abuse. 2007The predecessor to this rule, former Evidence Rule 63(33), was first proposed by the Court in State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348, 371-77 , 537 A. 2d 667 (1988), which recognized the need for a more liberal admissibility rule regarding out-of-court statements made by young victims of sexual abuse. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Central RR Co. v. Neeld
green
1 sentence2006Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 111, 185, 139 A.2d 110 , cert. denied, 357 U.S. 928 , 78 S.Ct. 1373 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1371 (1958)). 5 Notably, within ten days of receiving a complaint, a state employee seeking indemnification must notify the Attorney General, who then may "assume exclusive control of the employee's representation.” N.J.S.A. 59:10-3. 6 The Attorney General does not question whether his duty-to-defend responsibilities under the Tort Claims Act extend to a LAD or CEPA claim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Central Railroad v. Neeld
green
2 sentences2006Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 111, 185, 139 A.2d 110 , cert. denied, 357 U.S. 928 , 78 S.Ct. 1373 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1371 (1958)). 5 Notably, within ten days of receiving a complaint, a state employee seeking indemnification must notify the Attorney General, who then may "assume exclusive control of the employee's representation.” N.J.S.A. 59:10-3. 6 The Attorney General does not question whether his duty-to-defend responsibilities under the Tort Claims Act extend to a LAD or CEPA claim. 2006Co. of N.J. v. Neeld, 26 N.J. 111, 185, 139 A.2d 110 , cert. denied, 357 U.S. 928 , 78 S.Ct. 1373 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1371 (1958)). 5 Notably, within ten days of receiving a complaint, a state employee seeking indemnification must notify the Attorney General, who then may "assume exclusive control of the employee's representation.” N.J.S.A. 59:10-3. 6 The Attorney General does not question whether his duty-to-defend responsibilities under the Tort Claims Act extend to a LAD or CEPA claim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pascucci v. Vagott
green
2 sentences2006See Prado v. State, supra, 376 N.J.Super. at 237 n. 2, 870 A.2d 294 . 4 The predecessor to the rule “contemplated that ‘every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the Appellate Division.' ” Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 52 , 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (quoting Central R.R. 2006See Prado v. State, supra, 376 N.J.Super. at 237 n. 2, 870 A.2d 294 . 4 The predecessor to the rule “contemplated that ‘every proceeding to review the action or inaction of a state administrative agency would be by appeal to the Appellate Division.' ” Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 52 , 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (quoting Central R.R. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
STATE BY COMMISSIONER OF TRANSP. v. Hancock
green
1 sentence1989The Appellate Division in Hancock recognized that the new rule does not deal with pre-litigation disclosure. 210 N.J.Super., at 570 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Alvarado
green
1 sentence1977There defendant had timely filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to the predecessor rule 3:7-13, (which provided for a 60-day limitation period for filing the motion and its disposition); due to the fact that the trial judge scheduled to hear the motion was unavailable, it was not heard until approximately 20 days after the 60-day period had expired. 95 N.J. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Montalbano
neutral
1 sentence1974State v. Montalbano, 94 N.J. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.