33 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences2006Alpental Cmty. Club, 154 Wn.2d at 320 ; Buchanan, 134 Wn.2d at 683 (a party cannot move next to a farm and then complain that the existing agricultural activities are a nuisance). ¶13 Yakima County passed similar legislation. 2006Alpental Cmty. Club, 154 Wn.2d at 320 ; Buchanan, 134 Wn.2d at 683 (a party cannot move next to a farm and then complain that the existing agricultural activities are a nuisance). ¶13 Yakima County passed similar legislation. | 2 | 3 |
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc.green2 sentences2014App. 411, 418 , 922 P.2d 115 (1996) (Tiegs !)(emphasis omitted) (quoting Branch v. W Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 271, 276 (Utah 1982)). 2014App. 411, 418 , 922 P.2d 115 (1996) (Tiegs !)(emphasis omitted) (quoting Branch v. W Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 271, 276 (Utah 1982)). | 2 | 2 |
Tiegs v. Wattsgreen2 sentences2016A person who conducts a business or a plant lawfully and in the best manner practicable with a sound operation may still commit a *170 nuisance if the operation interferes unreasonably with other persons’ use and enjoyment of their property.” Tiegs, 135 Wn.2d at 13 (footnote omitted). 4 Jordan also argues that a nuisance claim cannot be based on a single act, citing out-of-state case law as authority. 2006As the court noted in Tiegs, “[t]he fact a governmental authority tolerates a nuisance is not a defense if the nuisance injures adjoining property.” Tiegs, 135 Wn.2d at 15 . ¶37 Moreover, LUPA specifically exempts from its coverage “[c]laims provided by any law for monetary damages or compensation.” RCW 36.70C.030(1)(c). | 1 | 5 |
Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc.green2 sentences2023Id. at 921-31 . 2023Reasonableness is typically a question of fact, but a court can resolve a question of reasonableness “as a matter of law where reasonable minds could come to only one conclusion.” Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909, 924 , 296 P.3d 860 (2013). | 1 | 3 |
Hurley v. Port Blakely Tree Farms LPgreen2 sentences2026App. 753, 769 , 332 P.3d 469, 477 (2014), this court described when a nuisance claim is duplicative of a negligence claim. 2026Id. at 771 . | 1 | 1 |
Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Insurancegreen1 sentence2020See Expedia, 180 Wn.2d at 803 . | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Krussellgreen1 sentence2014Appellants misinterpret the meaning of "intentional act" in this context. "[N]uisance dependent upon negligence consists of anything lawfully but so negligently or carelessly done or permitted as to create a potential and unreasonable risk of harm which, in due course, results in injury to another." 12 See also Lewis v. Krussel, 101 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp.
green
2 sentences2014In contrast, " [a] nuisance per se is an act, thing, omission, or use of property which of itself is a nuisance, and hence is not permissible . or excusable . under any circumstance," regardless of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. ld. (lead opinion by Smith, J., writing for four justices) (citing Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320 , 154 P. 450 (1916)). 3 As our Court of Appeals put it, "When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of .statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se, and the issue of the reasonableness of 2014Id. (lead opinion by Smith, J., writing for four justices) (citing Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 P. 450 (1916)). 3 As our Court of Appeals put it, “When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se, and the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct and the weighing of the relative interests of the plaintiff and defendant is precluded because the Legislature has, in effect, already struck the balance in favor of the innocent party.” Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 83 Wn | 4 | 2014–2014 |
Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co.
green
2 sentences2024The case cited in the Weymillers’ brief, Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wn.2d 677 , 709 P.2d 782 (1985), is limited to the notion that spreading microscopic particles could give rise to both a trespass and nuisance claim for their adverse effects on humans. 2024The case cited in the Weymillers’ brief, Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wn.2d 677 , 709 P.2d 782 (1985), is limited to the notion that spreading microscopic particles could give rise to both a trespass and nuisance claim for their adverse effects on humans. | 3 | 1995–2024 |
ATHERTON CONDO APARTMENT-OWNERS ASS'N BD OF DIRECTORS v. Blume Dev. Co.
green
2 sentences2014“In those situations where the alleged nuisance is the result of defendant’s alleged negligent conduct, rules of negligence are applied.” Atherton, 115 Wn.2d at 527 . 12 ¶28 Appellants argue that they asserted a nuisance claim independent of their negligence claim because the nuisance was the result of Respondents’ intentional act of cutting down trees. 2000Atherton, 115 Wn.2d at 528 . | 3 | 2000–2014 |
Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co.
green
2 sentences2014In contrast, " [a] nuisance per se is an act, thing, omission, or use of property which of itself is a nuisance, and hence is not permissible . or excusable . under any circumstance," regardless of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. ld. (lead opinion by Smith, J., writing for four justices) (citing Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320 , 154 P. 450 (1916)). 3 As our Court of Appeals put it, "When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of .statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se, and the issue of the reasonableness of 2014In contrast, " [a] nuisance per se is an act, thing, omission, or use of property which of itself is a nuisance, and hence is not permissible . or excusable . under any circumstance," regardless of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. ld. (lead opinion by Smith, J., writing for four justices) (citing Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320 , 154 P. 450 (1916)). 3 As our Court of Appeals put it, "When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of .statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se, and the issue of the reasonableness of | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Alpental Community Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Society
neutral
2 sentences2006Alpental Cmty. Club, 154 Wn.2d at 320 ; Buchanan, 134 Wn.2d at 683 (a party cannot move next to a farm and then complain that the existing agricultural activities are a nuisance). ¶13 Yakima County passed similar legislation. 2006Alpental Cmty. Club, 154 Wn.2d at 320 ; Buchanan, 134 Wn.2d at 683 (a party cannot move next to a farm and then complain that the existing agricultural activities are a nuisance). ¶13 Yakima County passed similar legislation. | 3 | 2006–2006 |
Tiegs v. Watts
green
2 sentences2006As the court noted in Tiegs v. Watts , "[t]he fact a governmental authority tolerates a nuisance is not a defense if the nuisance injures adjoining property." Tiegs, 135 Wash.2d at 15 , 954 P.2d 877 . ¶37 Moreover, LUPA specifically exempts from its coverage "[c]laims provided by any law for monetary damages or compensation." RCW 36.70C.030(1)(c). 2005“The fact a governmental authority tolerates a nuisance is not a defense if the nuisance injures adjoining property.” Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wn.2d 1, 15 , 954 P.2d 877 (1998). | 3 | 2005–2006 |
Hostetler v. Ward
green
2 sentences2014Appellants misinterpret the meaning of “intentional act” in this context. “ ‘[N]uisance dependent upon negligence consists of anything lawfully but so negligently or carelessly done or permitted as to create a potential and unreasonable risk of harm which, in due course, results in injury to another.’ ” Hostetler, 41 Wn. 1989Hostetler v. Ward, 41 Wn. | 2 | 1989–2014 |
Right-Price Recreation, L.L.C. v. Connells Prairie Community Council
green
2 sentences2013However, CR 12(b) mandates that where a trial court considers "matters outside the pleading[s]" and does not exclude them, "'the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56.'" Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 381 , 46 P.3d 789 (2002) (quoting CR 12(b)). 2013However, CR 12(b) mandates that where a trial court considers “matters outside the pleading[s]” and does not exclude them, “ ‘the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule [CR] 56.’ ” Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 381 , 46 P.3d 789 (2002) (quoting CR 12(b)). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences2013The homeowners seek review of the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of their expert under the rule announced in Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 , 293 F. 1013 (1923), and its ultimate decision to grant summary judgment to PSE on the homeowners’ nuisance claim. 1 The homeowners also seek review of the trial court’s decisions to apply the provisions of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, to their inverse condemnation claim and to grant summary judgment to the City on this claim. 2013The homeowners seek review of the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of their expert under the rule announced in Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 , 293 F. 1013 (1923), and its ultimate decision to grant summary judgment to PSE on the homeowners’ nuisance claim. 1 The homeowners also seek review of the trial court’s decisions to apply the provisions of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, to their inverse condemnation claim and to grant summary judgment to the City on this claim. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Right-Price Recreation v. Connells Prairie
green
2 sentences2013However, CR 12(b) mandates that where a trial court considers "matters outside the pleading[s]" and does not exclude them, "'the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56.'" Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 381 , 46 P.3d 789 (2002) (quoting CR 12(b)). 2013However, CR 12(b) mandates that where a trial court considers “matters outside the pleading[s]” and does not exclude them, “ ‘the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule [CR] 56.’ ” Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 381 , 46 P.3d 789 (2002) (quoting CR 12(b)). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Grundy v. Thurston County
green
2 sentences2009Though some wave splash entered Grundy's property during winter months before the Bracks raised their bulkhead, "the intensity and amount of the invasion from this splash increased after the Brack bulkhead was raised." CP at 881. ¶ 5 Grundy originally brought a nuisance claim against the Bracks. [2] Grundy, 155 Wash.2d at 4 , 117 P.3d 1089 . 2009Though some wave splash entered Grundy’s property during winter months before the Bracks raised their bulkhead, “the intensity and amount of the invasion from this splash increased after the Brack bulkhead was raised.” CP at 881. ¶5 Grundy originally brought a nuisance claim against the Bracks. 2 Grundy, 155 Wn.2d at 4 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Grundy v. Brack Family Trust
neutral
2 sentences2005“At oral argument, Grundy’s counsel explained that she does not seek anything but the abatement of the nuisance, namely, the removal of the heightened portion of the sea wall.” Grundy, 116 Wn. 2005"The fact a governmental authority tolerates a nuisance is not a defense if the nuisance injures adjoining property." Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wash.2d 1, 15 , 954 P.2d 877 (1998). [6] "At oral argument, Grundy's counsel explained that she does not seek anything but the abatement of the nuisance, namely, the removal of the heightened portion of the sea wall." Grundy, 116 Wash.App. at 629 n. 5, 67 P.3d 500 . [7] The Court of Appeals neglected to address the limits on the common enemy doctrine that have been judicially created since 1896. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Gnecchi v. State
green
2 sentences2022Twitchell neither states nor implies either that a nuisance claim fails, or that a nuisance suit should not have been filed, once the nuisance has been abated. 13 No. 55075-0-II County’s proof of the violation, Patton would then easily prevail on the nuisance claim because the County, as the plaintiff, would lack the proof necessary to meet its burden.6 Patton also cites to Gnecchi v. State, 58 Wn.2d 467 , 364 P.2d 225 (1961). 2022Twitchell neither states nor implies either that a nuisance claim fails, or that a nuisance suit should not have been filed, once the nuisance has been abated. 13 No. 55075-0-II County’s proof of the violation, Patton would then easily prevail on the nuisance claim because the County, as the plaintiff, would lack the proof necessary to meet its burden.6 Patton also cites to Gnecchi v. State, 58 Wn.2d 467 , 364 P.2d 225 (1961). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sheng-Yen Lu v. King County
green
1 sentence2021Grandmaster Sheng-Yen Lu v. King County, 110 Wn. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Greenwood v. the Olympic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Then Sorrels asserts that Greenwood v. Olympic, Inc., 51 Wn.2d 18 , 315 P.2d 295 (1957), prohibits the County from designating something as a nuisance without proving all the elements for nuisance. 2020Then Sorrels asserts that Greenwood v. Olympic, Inc., 51 Wn.2d 18 , 315 P.2d 295 (1957), prohibits the County from designating something as a nuisance without proving all the elements for nuisance. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Moore v. Steve's Outboard Service
green
2 sentences2020Sorrels relies on Moore v. Steve’s Outboard Service, 182 Wn.2d 151 , 339 P.3d 169 (2014), to argue that an essential element of a nuisance claim is injury to another’s property. 2020Sorrels relies on Moore v. Steve’s Outboard Service, 182 Wn.2d 151 , 339 P.3d 169 (2014), to argue that an essential element of a nuisance claim is injury to another’s property. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Jennifer Mustoe v. Xiaoye Ma And Anthony Jordan
green
1 sentence2018Mustoe v. Xiaoye Ma, 193 Wn. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kaech v. Lewis County PUD
green
1 sentence2014No. 1, 106 Wn.App. 260, 282 , 23 P.3d 529 (2001) (Plaintiff "alleged that stray voltage escaped from faulty insulators and damaged his dairy herd. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jones v. Rumford
green
1 sentence2014Id. (lead opinion by Smith, J., writing for four justices) (citing Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 P. 450 (1916)). 3 As our Court of Appeals put it, “When the conditions giving rise to a nuisance are also a violation of statutory prohibition, those conditions constitute a nuisance per se, and the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct and the weighing of the relative interests of the plaintiff and defendant is precluded because the Legislature has, in effect, already struck the balance in favor of the innocent party.” Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 83 Wn | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kaech v. Lewis County Public Utility District No. 1
neutral
1 sentence2014No. 1, 106 Wn.App. 260, 282 , 23 P.3d 529 (2001) (Plaintiff "alleged that stray voltage escaped from faulty insulators and damaged his dairy herd. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Grundy v. Thurston County
green
2 sentences2009Though some wave splash entered Grundy's property during winter months before the Bracks raised their bulkhead, "the intensity and amount of the invasion from this splash increased after the Brack bulkhead was raised." CP at 881. ¶ 5 Grundy originally brought a nuisance claim against the Bracks. [2] Grundy, 155 Wash.2d at 4 , 117 P.3d 1089 . 2009The trial court granted summary judgment to the Bracks, finding that Grundy "did not timely seek review under the Land Use Petition Act." Grundy, 155 Wash.2d at 5 , 117 P.3d 1089 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Alpental Community Club, Inc. v. SGS
neutral
1 sentence2006Alpental Cmty. Club, 154 Wash.2d at 320 , 111 P.3d 257 ; Buchanan, 134 Wash.2d at 683 , 952 P.2d 610 (a party cannot move next to a farm and then complain that the existing agricultural activities are a nuisance). ¶ 13 Yakima County passed similar legislation. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders LP
green
1 sentence2006Alpental Cmty. Club, 154 Wash.2d at 320 , 111 P.3d 257 ; Buchanan, 134 Wash.2d at 683 , 952 P.2d 610 (a party cannot move next to a farm and then complain that the existing agricultural activities are a nuisance). ¶ 13 Yakima County passed similar legislation. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Grundy v. Brack Family Trust neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Laspino v. City of New Haven green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.