78 California opinions name it 3 courts 1905–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Melton v. Boustredgreen2 sentences2025(See People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 101-102 [“the causation element of a public nuisance cause of action is satisfied if the conduct of a defendant is a substantial factor in bringing about the result”]; Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542 (Melton) [“The elements ‘of a cause of action for public nuisance include the existence of a duty and causation’ ”]; El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [when the alleged nuisance is the result of the defendant’s alleged negligent conduct and the cause of action 2025Under the circumstances presented, plaintiffs’ nuisance cause of action has no “independent vitality” because it “merely restates” their negligence cause of action against the County Defendants “ ‘using a different label.’ ” (Melton, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 543 ; see id. at p. 542 [where negligence and nuisance claims rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim “ ‘stands or falls’ ” with the determination of the negligence claim].) 30 III RTA’s Demurrer The operative complaint alleged two causes of action against RTA--fourth (negligence) and fifth (public and private | 5 | 7 |
El Escorial Owners' Ass'n v. DLC Plastering, Inc.green2 sentences2025(See People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 101-102 [“the causation element of a public nuisance cause of action is satisfied if the conduct of a defendant is a substantial factor in bringing about the result”]; Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542 (Melton) [“The elements ‘of a cause of action for public nuisance include the existence of a duty and causation’ ”]; El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [when the alleged nuisance is the result of the defendant’s alleged negligent conduct and the cause of action 2024The court held: “Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a 21 negligence claim.” (El Escorial, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 .) With great respect to our distinguished colleagues in our sister court, we find this framework for analyzing the viability of a nuisance claim in the construction defect context a bit rigid. | 3 | 8 |
Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green2 sentences2017A property interest sufficient to support a cause of action for private nuisance is generally sufficient to support a cause of action for public *417 nuisance as well. ( Venuto, supra , 22 Cal.App.3d at pp. 124-125, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350 .) Given our conclusion that the District has a property interest sufficient to support a nuisance cause of action, we need not consider whether the District could assert a cause of action even in the absence of that property interest, i.e., based solely on its special injury. ( Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540 , 1551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ["[W] 2017A property interest sufficient to support a cause of action for private nuisance is generally sufficient to support a cause of action for public *417 nuisance as well. ( Venuto, supra , 22 Cal.App.3d at pp. 124-125, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350 .) Given our conclusion that the District has a property interest sufficient to support a nuisance cause of action, we need not consider whether the District could assert a cause of action even in the absence of that property interest, i.e., based solely on its special injury. ( Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540 , 1551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ["[W] | 2 | 4 |
Regents of University v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 558 [accepting as true reasonable inferences from plaintiff’s allegations].) These undisputed facts are fatal as a matter of law to the Coalition’s nuisance claim under the sovereign immunity cases discussed above — the New Hospital serves the Regents’ broad education purposes, and they are entitled to immunity from the relevant City planning code provisions at issue here. 2024(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 558 [accepting as true reasonable inferences from plaintiff’s allegations].) These undisputed facts are fatal as a matter of law to the Coalition’s nuisance claim under the sovereign immunity cases discussed above — the New Hospital serves the Regents’ broad education purposes, and they are entitled to immunity from the relevant City planning code provisions at issue here. | 2 | 2 |
Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.green2 sentences2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense 2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense | 2 | 2 |
KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghriggreen2 sentences2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense 2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense | 2 | 2 |
Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences1995Code, § 3279.) “The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an activity or condition which causes damage or other interference with the enjoyment of adjoining or neighboring land.” (Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 732, 745 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 ].) “Actual physical interference with land use constitutes the most obvious and common type of nuisance.” (11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Equity, § 126, p. 807.) Fortunately, we need not determine the entire scope of coverage under the term. 1995Code, § 3279.) “The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an activity or condition which causes damage or other interference with the enjoyment of adjoining or neighboring land.” (Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 732, 745 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 ].) “Actual physical interference with land use constitutes the most obvious and common type of nuisance.” (11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Equity, § 126, p. 807.) Fortunately, we need not determine the entire scope of coverage under the term. | 2 | 2 |
Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO CTY.green2 sentences2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense 2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense | 1 | 3 |
Martinez v. Pacific Bellgreen2 sentences2015Relying on Martinez v. Pacific Bell (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1557 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 878 ], plaintiffs argue that the City’s nuisance finding improperly held them responsible for the intervening criminal acts of third parties. 2015Relying on Martinez v. Pacific Bell (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1557 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 878 ], plaintiffs argue that the City’s nuisance finding improperly held them responsible for the intervening criminal acts of third parties. | 1 | 3 |
Pegastaff v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences2019In Covalt , the California Supreme Court established the test to determine whether an action is barred by section 1759. ( Id. at pp. 923, 926, 925, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) There, the plaintiffs filed an action to obtain damages and injunctive relief from an electric company for alleged harm caused by electromagnetic radiation *284 (EMFs) emitted from power lines based on trespass and nuisance theories. ( Id. at p. 910-912, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) The Covalt court concluded that the CPUC had exclusive jurisdiction over the nuisance claim, in large part because the plai 2019In Covalt , the California Supreme Court established the test to determine whether an action is barred by section 1759. ( Id. at pp. 923, 926, 925, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) There, the plaintiffs filed an action to obtain damages and injunctive relief from an electric company for alleged harm caused by electromagnetic radiation *284 (EMFs) emitted from power lines based on trespass and nuisance theories. ( Id. at p. 910-912, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) The Covalt court concluded that the CPUC had exclusive jurisdiction over the nuisance claim, in large part because the plai | 1 | 2 |
McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co.green2 sentences2018(See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247 , 254, 172 P.2d 758 ["mere apprehension of injury from a dangerous condition may constitute a nuisance where it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of property"].) *805 Edison's reliance on Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , for the proposition that fear of a future injury is insufficient to support a nuisance claim is misplaced. 2018(See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247 , 254, 172 P.2d 758 ["mere apprehension of injury from a dangerous condition may constitute a nuisance where it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of property"].) *805 Edison's reliance on Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , for the proposition that fear of a future injury is insufficient to support a nuisance claim is misplaced. | 1 | 2 |
Birke v. Oakwood Worldwidegreen2 sentences2017A property interest sufficient to support a cause of action for private nuisance is generally sufficient to support a cause of action for public *417 nuisance as well. ( Venuto, supra , 22 Cal.App.3d at pp. 124-125, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350 .) Given our conclusion that the District has a property interest sufficient to support a nuisance cause of action, we need not consider whether the District could assert a cause of action even in the absence of that property interest, i.e., based solely on its special injury. ( Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540 , 1551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ["[W] 2014(Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551 [“ [A] child living with her family in a rented apartment has standing to bring a private 9 nuisance claim based on interference with her right to enjoy the rented premises”].) It was error to grant summary judgment against plaintiff based on lack of standing as to the nuisance claim. | 1 | 2 |
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1014 ["Recent decisions have confirmed . . . a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini, inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 (Newhall), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. 2017Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 44 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1014, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ["Recent decisions have confirmed ... a subsequent owner's right to sue a prior possessor of property for creating the continuing nuisance," citing Mangini , inter alia].) In Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 ( Newhall ), the Court of Appeal determined an owner was not precluded from stating a nuisance claim against prior owners. ( Id. at p. 343, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 .) The court rejected extension of Mangini 's lessee holding, explaining "it does not make sense | 1 | 2 |
Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Districtgreen2 sentences2014“In California, it is settled that where negligent conduct, i.e., conduct that violates a duty of care toward another, also interferes with another’s free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises. [Citations.]” (Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist. (1998) 206 Cal.App.3d 92, 101 (Lussier).) “Given ‘the broad definition of nuisance,’ the independent viability of a nuisance cause of action ‘depends on the facts of each case.’ [Citation.] ‘Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim. 2013In these cases there is no liability.’ ” (Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 92, 100 .) In sum, “where negligent conduct, i.e., conduct that violates a duty of care toward another, also interferes with another’s free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Ibid.; see also El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [“Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim”].) “Whether or not a use in itself lawful constitute | 1 | 2 |
County of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co.green2 sentences2004Grace Co. (D.N.H. 1984) 617 F.Supp. 126, 133 , Johnson County, Tenn. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (E.D.Tenn. 1984) 580 F.Supp. 284, 294 [stating that allowing such a nuisance action “ ‘would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim’ ”].) The court concluded this was “a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action” (City of San Diego, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 586-587), and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants (id. at p. 590). 1994Johnson County, Tenn. v. U.S. Gypsum, supra, 580 F.Supp. 284, 294 , stated that allowing a nuisance action under these circumstances “would convert almost every product liability action into a nuisance claim.” Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corporation, supra, 493 N.W.2d 513, 521 , observed that all courts that have considered this question have rejected a nuisance claim as a theory of recovery for asbestos contamination. | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kumaraperu v. Feldsted CA2/1green | 1 | 1 |
| Coltrain v. Shewaltergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Field-Escandon v. DeManngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santisas v. Goodingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners CA4/1green | 1 | 1 |
| Preston v. Goldmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia v. Robertsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Starrh and Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hurwitz v. City of Orangegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stoiber v. Honeychuckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| PAMELA W. v. Millsomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lane v. City of Redondo Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Ass'n v. County of Orange
green
2 sentences2023This alleged conduct is not close, for example, to that alleged in Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036 (Koll-Irvine), wherein the plaintiff, an association of owners of commercial properties adjacent to the county airport, complained the county had approved the construction of “three 300,000 gallon above-ground fuel storage tanks located in the northwest quadrant of the airport 500 feet from the edge of the main runway,” despite “studies done on behalf of the county recognizing the potential disaster in the event of an aircraft accident.” (Id 2018(See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247 , 254, 172 P.2d 758 ["mere apprehension of injury from a dangerous condition may constitute a nuisance where it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of property"].) *805 Edison's reliance on Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , for the proposition that fear of a future injury is insufficient to support a nuisance claim is misplaced. | 4 | 1999–2023 |
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2019In Covalt , the California Supreme Court established the test to determine whether an action is barred by section 1759. ( Id. at pp. 923, 926, 925, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) There, the plaintiffs filed an action to obtain damages and injunctive relief from an electric company for alleged harm caused by electromagnetic radiation *284 (EMFs) emitted from power lines based on trespass and nuisance theories. ( Id. at p. 910-912, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) The Covalt court concluded that the CPUC had exclusive jurisdiction over the nuisance claim, in large part because the plai 2019In Covalt , the California Supreme Court established the test to determine whether an action is barred by section 1759. ( Id. at pp. 923, 926, 925, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) There, the plaintiffs filed an action to obtain damages and injunctive relief from an electric company for alleged harm caused by electromagnetic radiation *284 (EMFs) emitted from power lines based on trespass and nuisance theories. ( Id. at p. 910-912, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) The Covalt court concluded that the CPUC had exclusive jurisdiction over the nuisance claim, in large part because the plai | 4 | 2015–2019 |
City of San Diego v. United States Gypsum Co.
green
2 sentences2021(Id. at p. 1348.) The court explained that the definition of nuisance is “so broad that it could condition.” (See Preston, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 113, fn. 1 , italics added.) Restatement section 353 provides that a vendor “who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition . . . which involves unreasonable risk” remains liable “for physical harm caused by the condition.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 353, subd. (1), italics added.) 8 Of course, if Appellants’ removal of the pipe was in fact the cause of the spill, Gulf’s alleged concealment of slope instability or some other problem with the pi 2014(Id. at pp. 1344-1348.) Relying on one of its earlier opinions, City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 575 , in which a city sued for nuisance based on asbestos contamination in its buildings, Division Six of this district 9 concluded that the nuisance claim for the defective condition of property is merely a “clone” of the negligence claim. | 3 | 2007–2021 |
Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018The court concluded that the city could not maintain an action based on nuisance where it is seeking recovery for a defective product, because it would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the summary adjudication in favor of the defendants because it was " 'a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action' [citation]." ( Ibid. ) We agreed with that conclusion, expressing the view that the law of nuisance "is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability." ( Ibid . fn. omitted.) We then proceeded 2018The court concluded that the city could not maintain an action based on nuisance where it is seeking recovery for a defective product, because it would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the summary adjudication in favor of the defendants because it was " 'a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action' [citation]." ( Ibid. ) We agreed with that conclusion, expressing the view that the law of nuisance "is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability." ( Ibid . fn. omitted.) We then proceeded | 3 | 2018–2018 |
City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018The court concluded that the city could not maintain an action based on nuisance where it is seeking recovery for a defective product, because it would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the summary adjudication in favor of the defendants because it was " 'a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action' [citation]." ( Ibid. ) We agreed with that conclusion, expressing the view that the law of nuisance "is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability." ( Ibid . fn. omitted.) We then proceeded 2018The court concluded that the city could not maintain an action based on nuisance where it is seeking recovery for a defective product, because it would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the summary adjudication in favor of the defendants because it was " 'a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action' [citation]." ( Ibid. ) We agreed with that conclusion, expressing the view that the law of nuisance "is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability." ( Ibid . fn. omitted.) We then proceeded | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018The court concluded that the city could not maintain an action based on nuisance where it is seeking recovery for a defective product, because it would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the summary adjudication in favor of the defendants because it was " 'a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action' [citation]." ( Ibid. ) We agreed with that conclusion, expressing the view that the law of nuisance "is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability." ( Ibid . fn. omitted.) We then proceeded 2018The court concluded that the city could not maintain an action based on nuisance where it is seeking recovery for a defective product, because it would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) The court affirmed the summary adjudication in favor of the defendants because it was " 'a products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action' [citation]." ( Ibid. ) We agreed with that conclusion, expressing the view that the law of nuisance "is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability." ( Ibid . fn. omitted.) We then proceeded | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Leyva v. Nielsen
green
2 sentences2024However, section 3482 confers a statutory immunity that is a complete defense to a nuisance claim. (§ 3482.) Because a demurrer may be sustained on the basis of statutory immunity (e.g., Leyva v. Nielsen (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065-1066 ), the viability of Norwalk’s claim turns on the following question: Does section 3482 apply? 2024However, section 3482 confers a statutory immunity that is a complete defense to a nuisance claim. (§ 3482.) Because a demurrer may be sustained on the basis of statutory immunity (e.g., Leyva v. Nielsen (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065-1066 ), the viability of Norwalk’s claim turns on the following question: Does section 3482 apply? | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Juge v. County of Sacramento
green
2 sentences2024I realize that–I don’t think it was cited by either side, but I was trying to understand the nuisance claim in the context of this case.” 18 court’s decision was correct.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 70-71 .) Such is our difficulty. 2024I realize that–I don’t think it was cited by either side, but I was trying to understand the nuisance claim in the context of this case.” 18 court’s decision was correct.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 70-71 .) Such is our difficulty. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp.
green
2 sentences2023The undisputed evidence showed the ponding was limited in scope, and could be abated “at a reasonable cost by reasonable means.” (See Mangini, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 1103 .) Newsom initially testified about a drainage plan that would not exceed $8,000, while Coffey agreed the hole-drilling plan provided somewhere for the water to go. 2014California law distinguishes between continuing and permanent nuisances.” (McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56, 84 .) “‘[T]he crucial test of the permanency of a . . . nuisance is whether the . . . nuisance can be discontinued or abated.’ [Citation.]” (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1087, 1097 .) “‘[A]batable’ means that the nuisance can be remedied at a reasonable cost by reasonable means.” (Id. at p. 1103.) “If a nuisance is permanent, ‘the plaintiff must bring one action for past, present and future damage within three years after the creation of the permanent n | 2 | 2014–2023 |
Goncharov v. Uber Techs., Inc.
green
2 sentences2019In Covalt , the California Supreme Court established the test to determine whether an action is barred by section 1759. ( Id. at pp. 923, 926, 925, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) There, the plaintiffs filed an action to obtain damages and injunctive relief from an electric company for alleged harm caused by electromagnetic radiation *284 (EMFs) emitted from power lines based on trespass and nuisance theories. ( Id. at p. 910-912, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 , 920 P.2d 669 .) The Covalt court concluded that the CPUC had exclusive jurisdiction over the nuisance claim, in large part because the plai 2019Specifically, the CPUC is considering whether it should establish a website portal for the TNC data and whether the CPUC should directly share TNC trip data with interested California government entities. 5 In support of its argument, Uber cites Goncharov , supra , 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157 , 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 3 , which considered the scope of section 1759 in the putative class action lawsuit brought by taxi drivers challenging Uber's alleged failure to comply with CPUC licensing requirements for transportation charter-party carriers (TCPs). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences2018An Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy Does Not Have To Be Physical "Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something." ( Fibreboard , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) "The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably, many." ( Martin Marietta , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) " 'Invasion of the right of private occupancy' resembles the definition of nuisance, an ' "interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land." ' [Citation.] 'The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an act 2018An Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy Does Not Have To Be Physical "Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something." ( Fibreboard , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) "The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably, many." ( Martin Marietta , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) " 'Invasion of the right of private occupancy' resembles the definition of nuisance, an ' "interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land." ' [Citation.] 'The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an act | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Rancho Viejo v. TRES AMIGOS VIEJOS
green
2 sentences2018An Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy Does Not Have To Be Physical "Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something." ( Fibreboard , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) "The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably, many." ( Martin Marietta , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) " 'Invasion of the right of private occupancy' resembles the definition of nuisance, an ' "interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land." ' [Citation.] 'The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an act 2018An Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy Does Not Have To Be Physical "Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something." ( Fibreboard , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) "The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably, many." ( Martin Marietta , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) " 'Invasion of the right of private occupancy' resembles the definition of nuisance, an ' "interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land." ' [Citation.] 'The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an act | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences2018An Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy Does Not Have To Be Physical "Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something." ( Fibreboard , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) "The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably, many." ( Martin Marietta , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) " 'Invasion of the right of private occupancy' resembles the definition of nuisance, an ' "interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land." ' [Citation.] 'The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an act 2018An Invasion of the Right of Private Occupancy Does Not Have To Be Physical "Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something." ( Fibreboard , supra , 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 515 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 .) "The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably, many." ( Martin Marietta , supra , 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) " 'Invasion of the right of private occupancy' resembles the definition of nuisance, an ' "interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land." ' [Citation.] 'The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an act | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co.
green
2 sentences2018In a published decision ( Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123 , 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ( Wilson I ), we found there was insufficient evidence to *790 support the negligence and IIED claims or the punitive damages award, and found that the jury relied upon irrelevant evidence when determining the nuisance claim. ( Id. at p. 130, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 .) We reversed the judgment, ordered judgment entered in favor of Edison on the negligence and IIED claims, and remanded to the trial court for a retrial on the nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) On retrial the trial court, over Edi 2018In a published decision ( Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123 , 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ( Wilson I ), we found there was insufficient evidence to *790 support the negligence and IIED claims or the punitive damages award, and found that the jury relied upon irrelevant evidence when determining the nuisance claim. ( Id. at p. 130, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 .) We reversed the judgment, ordered judgment entered in favor of Edison on the negligence and IIED claims, and remanded to the trial court for a retrial on the nuisance claim. ( Ibid. ) On retrial the trial court, over Edi | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Varjabedian v. City of Madera
green
2 sentences2015A requirement of ‘express’ authorization embodied in the statute itself insures that an unequivocal legislative intent to sanction a nuisance will be effectuated, while avoiding the uncertainty that would result were every generally worded statute a source of undetermined immunity from nuisance liability.” (Id. at p. 291.) Applying this standard in the case before it, which involved a nuisance claim based upon odors emitted from the defendant city’s operation *158 of a waste water treatment plant, the Supreme Court rejected the city’s argument that “the general authorization of municipal const 1993(Id. at p. 363.) In Harding , as in the case before us, plaintiffs cited Varjabedian v. City of Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d 285 and Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 26 Cal.3d 86, in support of their argument section 3482 did not bar the nuisance claim. | 2 | 1993–2015 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.