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14 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Henry v. Cherokee Construction & Supply Company, Inc.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 540 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 bars not just negligence claims, but a nuisance claim arising from deficient construction); Henry, 301 S.W.3d at 266-76 (holding that an action couched as a negligent misrepresentation was in fact an action arising from construction of an improvement to real property and therefore barred by the statute of repose); Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 barred a claim for fraud). 2015See, e.g., Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 540 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 bars not just negligence claims, but a nuisance claim arising from deficient construction); Henry, 301 S.W.3d at 266-76 (holding that an action couched as a negligent misrepresentation was in fact an action arising from construction of an improvement to real property and therefore barred by the statute of repose); Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 barred a claim for fraud). | 3 | 3 |
Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 540 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 bars not just negligence claims, but a nuisance claim arising from deficient construction); Henry, 301 S.W.3d at 266-76 (holding that an action couched as a negligent misrepresentation was in fact an action arising from construction of an improvement to real property and therefore barred by the statute of repose); Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 barred a claim for fraud). 2015See, e.g., Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 540 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 bars not just negligence claims, but a nuisance claim arising from deficient construction); Henry, 301 S.W.3d at 266-76 (holding that an action couched as a negligent misrepresentation was in fact an action arising from construction of an improvement to real property and therefore barred by the statute of repose); Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 barred a claim for fraud). | 2 | 2 |
Chrisman v. Hill Home Development, Inc.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 540 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 bars not just negligence claims, but a nuisance claim arising from deficient construction); Henry, 301 S.W.3d at 266-76 (holding that an action couched as a negligent misrepresentation was in fact an action arising from construction of an improvement to real property and therefore barred by the statute of repose); Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 barred a claim for fraud). 2015See, e.g., Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 540 (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 bars not just negligence claims, but a nuisance claim arising from deficient construction); Henry, 301 S.W.3d at 266-76 (holding that an action couched as a negligent misrepresentation was in fact an action arising from construction of an improvement to real property and therefore barred by the statute of repose); Lonning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 682, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-202 barred a claim for fraud). | 2 | 2 |
Riley v. Whybrewgreen2 sentences2014For example, in Riley v. Whybrew, 185 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), this Court concluded that a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim that accompanied a nuisance claim was not a stand-alone claim, and therefore the Camper expert proof requirement was inapplicable, despite the appellee’s contention that expert proof was required in the absence of an accompanying physical injury. 2013See Riley, 185 S.W.3d at 401 (NIED damages are related to the damages recoverable in the nuisance claim). | 2 | 2 |
Lane v. WJ. Curry & Sonsgreen1 sentence2019See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 365 ; Caldwell, 391 S.W.2d at 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Laschinski T. Emerson v. Oak Ridge Research, Inc. a/k/a Oak Ridge Realty Holding, Inc. and Nathaniel Revisgreen1 sentence2008On remand, the trial court should apply the Hodges factors and make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in approving or decreasing the award of punitive damages, if the court deems appropriate, based on the nuisance theory.7 See generally Emerson v. Oak Ridge Research, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 364, 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“Since the Trial Court failed to make such findings and did not conduct the proper analysis in this case, the issue of punitive damages is remanded and the Trial Court is directed to 7 Construction Company does not raise issue with the award of compensatory damages | 1 | 1 |
Whiteside Estates, Inc. v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C.green2 sentences2007Substantial simply means a significant harm to the plaintiff and unreasonably means that it would not be reasonable to permit the defendant to cause such an amount of harm intentionally without compensating for it.’ ” Whiteside Estates, Inc. v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C., 146 N.C.App. 449 , 553 S.E.2d 431, 437 (2001). 2007Substantial simply means a significant harm to the plaintiff and unreasonably means that it would not be reasonable to permit the defendant to cause such an amount of harm intentionally without compensating for it.’ ” Whiteside Estates, Inc. v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C., 146 N.C.App. 449 , 553 S.E.2d 431, 437 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Kind v. Johnson Citygreen2 sentences1998Kind v. Johnson City, 63 Tenn.App. 666, 672 , 478 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1970). 7 . 1998Kind v. Johnson City, 63 Tenn.App. 666, 672 , 478 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1970). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Caldwell v. Knox Concrete Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 365 ; Caldwell, 391 S.W.2d at 9 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Shelby v. Shelby
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt University
green
1 sentence2013In other words, the Plaintiffs’ emotional injuries are “a ‘parasitic’ consequence of negligent conduct that results in multiple types of damages.” Estate of Amos, 62 S.W.3d at 136 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Granberry v. Jones
green
2 sentences2002Granberry v. Jones In finding that the plaintiffs only remedy was self-help and that a nuisance claim cannot be brought for harm caused by encroaching tree branches and roots, both lower courts relied on this Court’s decision in Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51 , 216 S.W.2d 721 (1949). 2002Granberry v. Jones In finding that the plaintiffs only remedy was self-help and that a nuisance claim cannot be brought for harm caused by encroaching tree branches and roots, both lower courts relied on this Court’s decision in Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51 , 216 S.W.2d 721 (1949). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority
green
1 sentence1981We therefore decline to engraft solely for plaintiff’s benefit the nuisance exception to the immunity previously accorded the Kansas turnpike authority under our law as it existed prior to Carroll. 472 P.2d at 222 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wayman v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence1981In Wayman v. Board of Education, 5 Ohio St. 248 , 215 N.E.2d 394 (1966), cited in the footnote of West Park Shopping Center v. Masheter, supra, there was a suit to enjoin a nuisance consisting of a negligently and unskillfully created and maintained parking lot. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Conelly v. Nashville
neutral
1 sentence1952In the petition to rehear counsel cites Saulman v. Mayor of Nashville, 131 Tenn. 427 , 175 S.W. 532 , L.R.A. 1915E, 316 ; Conelly v. City of Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262 , 46 S.W. 565 , and Mayor etc., of City of Memphis v. Kimbrough, 59 Tenn. 133, 134 , which were not cited in the original opinion. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Saulman v. Mayor of Nashville
green
2 sentences1952In the petition to rehear counsel cites Saulman v. Mayor of Nashville, 131 Tenn. 427 , 175 S.W. 532 , L.R.A. 1915E, 316 ; Conelly v. City of Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262 , 46 S.W. 565 , and Mayor etc., of City of Memphis v. Kimbrough, 59 Tenn. 133, 134 , which were not cited in the original opinion. 1952In the petition to rehear counsel cites Saulman v. Mayor of Nashville, 131 Tenn. 427 , 175 S. W. 532 , L. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Mayor of Memphis v. Kimbrough
green
1 sentence1952In the petition to rehear counsel cites Saulman v. Mayor of Nashville, 131 Tenn. 427 , 175 S.W. 532 , L.R.A. 1915E, 316 ; Conelly v. City of Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262 , 46 S.W. 565 , and Mayor etc., of City of Memphis v. Kimbrough, 59 Tenn. 133, 134 , which were not cited in the original opinion. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Burnett v. Rudd
green
2 sentences1943Thus it has been held that a city or town is not liable for injuries to a traveler on the highway who is run down by the obstruction or other dangers negligently placed in a highway by members of the fire department, or to a citizen who is injured by the defective condition of a fire engine house.” “Nor is it' material that the firemen were not actually engaged in the extinguishment of a fire when the injury occurred, or that the officials of the city had knowledge of the incompetence and recklessness of the fireman who caused • the injury. ’ ’ There are many cases in which municipalities have 1943Thus it has been held that a city or town is not liable for injuries to a traveler on the highway who is run down by the obstruction or other dangers negligently placed in a highway by members of the fire department, or to a citizen who is injured by the defective condition of a fire engine house.” “Nor is it' material that the firemen were not actually engaged in the extinguishment of a fire when the injury occurred, or that the officials of the city had knowledge of the incompetence and recklessness of the fireman who caused • the injury. ’ ’ There are many cases in which municipalities have | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.