nuisance claim in Wisconsin

2025A private nuisance is “broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232 , 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). “[T]here are no per se exceptions to nuisance claims in Wisconsin; nuisance claims may arise from any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14 , 342 Wis. 2d 162 , 816 N.W.2d 914 (rejecting argument that a nuisance claim can never be based on an obstruction to a party’s view from the party’s property). ¶43 “The activity complained of … must be offensive to a person of ordinary an

2025A private nuisance is “broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232 , 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). “[T]here are no per se exceptions to nuisance claims in Wisconsin; nuisance claims may arise from any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14 , 342 Wis. 2d 162 , 816 N.W.2d 914 (rejecting argument that a nuisance claim can never be based on an obstruction to a party’s view from the party’s property). ¶43 “The activity complained of … must be offensive to a person of ordinary an

1996Co-op., 195 Wis. 2d 198 , 536 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1995), the nuisance claim was insufficient because Northridge "invited" the contaminants on its properties.

1996Co-op., 195 Wis. 2d 198 , 536 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1995), the nuisance claim was insufficient because Northridge "invited" the contaminants on its properties.

1965In McCann v. Strang (1897), 97 Wis. 551 , 72 N. W. 1117 , this court stated that a lawful trade carried on in close proximity to a dwelling house could constitute a nuisance and that the test was whether the particular trade was of such a character as would be likely to be physically annoying to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

1965In McCann v. Strang (1897), 97 Wis. 551 , 72 N. W. 1117 , this court stated that a lawful trade carried on in close proximity to a dwelling house could constitute a nuisance and that the test was whether the particular trade was of such a character as would be likely to be physically annoying to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

1965In McCann v. Strang (1897), 97 Wis. 551 , 72 N. W. 1117 , this court stated that a lawful trade carried on in close proximity to a dwelling house could constitute a nuisance and that the test was whether the particular trade was of such a character as would be likely to be physically annoying to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

1965In McCann v. Strang (1897), 97 Wis. 551 , 72 N. W. 1117 , this court stated that a lawful trade carried on in close proximity to a dwelling house could constitute a nuisance and that the test was whether the particular trade was of such a character as would be likely to be physically annoying to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

1965The distinction between nuisances per se and other nuisances was pointed out in Rogers v. John Week Lumber Co. (1903), 117 Wis. 5 , 93 N. W. 821 .

1965The distinction between nuisances per se and other nuisances was pointed out in Rogers v. John Week Lumber Co. (1903), 117 Wis. 5 , 93 N. W. 821 .

2025Randall, 212 Wis. at 376-77 .

2025A private nuisance is “broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232 , 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). “[T]here are no per se exceptions to nuisance claims in Wisconsin; nuisance claims may arise from any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14 , 342 Wis. 2d 162 , 816 N.W.2d 914 (rejecting argument that a nuisance claim can never be based on an obstruction to a party’s view from the party’s property). ¶43 “The activity complained of … must be offensive to a person of ordinary an

2025A private nuisance is “broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232 , 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). “[T]here are no per se exceptions to nuisance claims in Wisconsin; nuisance claims may arise from any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14 , 342 Wis. 2d 162 , 816 N.W.2d 914 (rejecting argument that a nuisance claim can never be based on an obstruction to a party’s view from the party’s property). ¶43 “The activity complained of … must be offensive to a person of ordinary an

2025STAT. §] 893.80(4) was a viable defense to a nuisance claim.” (Formatting altered.) In Hillcrest, this court stated that “[t]he creation and maintenance of private nuisances are simply not recognized as legislative acts subject to protection under [§] 893.80(4).” Hillcrest, 135 Wis. 2d at 439-40 . 15 No. 2024AP335 ¶36 Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District overruled Hillcrest.

2025Neither of these cases, however, discussed whether each instance of a continuing nuisance constitutes a new transaction for purposes of claim preclusion. ¶14 To determine whether an identity exists between the causes of action in two lawsuits, Wisconsin has adopted a transactional approach in which “all claims arising out of one transaction or factual situation are treated as being part of a single cause of action, and they are required to be litigated together.” Parks v. City of Madison, 171 Wis. 2d 730, 735 , 492 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1992).

2025Neither of these cases, however, discussed whether each instance of a continuing nuisance constitutes a new transaction for purposes of claim preclusion. ¶14 To determine whether an identity exists between the causes of action in two lawsuits, Wisconsin has adopted a transactional approach in which “all claims arising out of one transaction or factual situation are treated as being part of a single cause of action, and they are required to be litigated together.” Parks v. City of Madison, 171 Wis. 2d 730, 735 , 492 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1992).

2025A private nuisance is “broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232 , 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). “[T]here are no per se exceptions to nuisance claims in Wisconsin; nuisance claims may arise from any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14 , 342 Wis. 2d 162 , 816 N.W.2d 914 (rejecting argument that a nuisance claim can never be based on an obstruction to a party’s view from the party’s property). ¶43 “The activity complained of … must be offensive to a person of ordinary an

2025A private nuisance is “broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232 , 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). “[T]here are no per se exceptions to nuisance claims in Wisconsin; nuisance claims may arise from any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.” Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14 , 342 Wis. 2d 162 , 816 N.W.2d 914 (rejecting argument that a nuisance claim can never be based on an obstruction to a party’s view from the party’s property). ¶43 “The activity complained of … must be offensive to a person of ordinary an

2023“Accrual requires that plaintiffs discover, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, ‘not only the fact of injury but also that the injury was probably caused by the defendant’s conduct.’” Gumz v. 14 No. 2021AP989 Northern States Power Co., 2007 WI 135, ¶26 , 305 Wis. 2d 263 , 742 N.W.2d 271 (citation omitted; formatting altered). ¶33 Whether a nuisance claim is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations depends on whether the alleged nuisance is considered permanent or continuing.

2023“Accrual requires that plaintiffs discover, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, ‘not only the fact of injury but also that the injury was probably caused by the defendant’s conduct.’” Gumz v. 14 No. 2021AP989 Northern States Power Co., 2007 WI 135, ¶26 , 305 Wis. 2d 263 , 742 N.W.2d 271 (citation omitted; formatting altered). ¶33 Whether a nuisance claim is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations depends on whether the alleged nuisance is considered permanent or continuing.

2020In Schultz v. Trascher, 2002 WI App 4, ¶30 , 249 Wis. 2d 722 , 640 N.W.2d 130 (2001), this court rejected an argument that a fence not exceeding six feet could not constitute a nuisance under the statute.

2020In Schultz v. Trascher, 2002 WI App 4, ¶30 , 249 Wis. 2d 722 , 640 N.W.2d 130 (2001), this court rejected an argument that a fence not exceeding six feet could not constitute a nuisance under the statute.

2018Private Use and Enjoyment of Land, and Harm. ¶84 The elements for the cause of action of private nuisance require that there be an "invasion" of the landowners' "interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." As will be seen, and as is relevant to the consideration of the landowners' complaint, the invasion may be an act that does not physically occupy the landowners' property, the required disturbance of the *169 landowners' interest may be any disturbance, and the harm need only be "more than slight inconvenience or petty annoyance." ¶85 "Physical occupation of the property of another i

2018Private Use and Enjoyment of Land, and Harm. ¶84 The elements for the cause of action of private nuisance require that there be an "invasion" of the landowners' "interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." As will be seen, and as is relevant to the consideration of the landowners' complaint, the invasion may be an act that does not physically occupy the landowners' property, the required disturbance of the *169 landowners' interest may be any disturbance, and the harm need only be "more than slight inconvenience or petty annoyance." ¶85 "Physical occupation of the property of another i

2008The standard we use to review the trial court's grant of NL Industries' motion to dismiss the City's nuisance claim based on reckless conduct was recently set forth by our supreme court in Berner Cheese Corp. v. Krug, 2008 WI 95, ¶ 36 , 312 Wis. 2d 251 , 752 N.W.2d 800 .

2008The standard we use to review the trial court's grant of NL Industries' motion to dismiss the City's nuisance claim based on reckless conduct was recently set forth by our supreme court in Berner Cheese Corp. v. Krug, 2008 WI 95, ¶ 36 , 312 Wis. 2d 251 , 752 N.W.2d 800 .

2008Likewise, in Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 129 Wis. 2d 129, 136 , 384 N.W.2d 692 (1986), where an automobile dealership brought an action alleging private nuisance against an adjoining landowner, our supreme court described the issue before it as follows: "[The adjoining landowner] requests this court to review the court of appeals' determination that its conduct was unreasonable." There, in the context of considering whether a social utility analysis was required pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826, the court stated: "[A] fact finder must still determ

2008Likewise, in Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 129 Wis. 2d 129, 136 , 384 N.W.2d 692 (1986), where an automobile dealership brought an action alleging private nuisance against an adjoining landowner, our supreme court described the issue before it as follows: "[The adjoining landowner] requests this court to review the court of appeals' determination that its conduct was unreasonable." There, in the context of considering whether a social utility analysis was required pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826, the court stated: "[A] fact finder must still determ

2006We further explained, citing our prior ruling in Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537 , 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956), that "when a nuisance is premised on negligent conduct, failing to allow [a] defendant the same defenses as he would have in a negligence action would render liability dependent on the label the plaintiff used on the pleading and not the defendant's underlying conduct." Milwaukee Metro., 277 Wis.2d 635, ¶ 48 , 691 N.W.2d 658 . ¶ 32 The plaintiffs assume the existence of a nuisance when they claim that the use and enjoyment of their property is invaded by the flooding waters of t

2006We further explained, citing our prior ruling in Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537 , 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956), that "when a nuisance is premised on negligent conduct, failing to allow [a] defendant the same defenses as he would have in a negligence action would render liability dependent on the label the plaintiff used on the pleading and not the defendant's underlying conduct." Milwaukee Metro., 277 Wis.2d 635, ¶ 48 , 691 N.W.2d 658 . ¶ 32 The plaintiffs assume the existence of a nuisance when they claim that the use and enjoyment of their property is invaded by the flooding waters of t

2005Id. at 344 . ¶21 The question is thus whether the easement holder can use the easement as intended or whether the obstruction at issue unreasonably interferes with or substantially impairs that right.

1999Schultz contends that as a result of our subsequent decision in State v. Schultz, 218 Wis. 2d 798 , 582 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1998) (Schultz I), his lack of knowledge is now a defense to the State's claim.

1999Id. *505 Here, Schultz made a justifiable and excusable mistake based upon his understanding of then existing law that an owner's knowledge of acts of prostitution occurring on his premises is irrelevant to the State's nuisance claim.