Petitioners motion in West Virginia

2015The Respondents voluntarily dismissed Prestige and Ms. Boss from the instant action. 4 On May 2, 2014, the Respondents filed their opposition to the Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, relying upon syllabus point two of Abbott v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 191 W.Va. 198 , 444 S.E.2d 285 (1994), which provides: “The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is available to courts of record in this State.

2015The Respondents voluntarily dismissed Prestige and Ms. Boss from the instant action. 4 On May 2, 2014, the Respondents filed their opposition to the Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, relying upon syllabus point two of Abbott v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 191 W.Va. 198 , 444 S.E.2d 285 (1994), which provides: “The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is available to courts of record in this State.

2015Given the circuit court’s failure to properly evaluate the Petitioners’ motion to dismiss in a manner that comports with West Virginia Code § 56-1-la, upon remand, the circuit court should re-evaluate forum non conveniens in the manner set forth in the statute, as well as in this Court’s decisions in Mace v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 227 W.Va. 666 , 714 S.E.2d 223 (2011), and Mylan.

2015Given the circuit court’s failure to properly evaluate the Petitioners’ motion to dismiss in a manner that comports with West Virginia Code § 56-1-la, upon remand, the circuit court should re-evaluate forum non conveniens in the manner set forth in the statute, as well as in this Court’s decisions in Mace v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 227 W.Va. 666 , 714 S.E.2d 223 (2011), and Mylan.

2025As to these exceptions, we find that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Petitioners did not “substantially prevail” at the trial below, based 2 For clarification purposes, Petitioners will be referred to as “Petitioners” throughout this decision, even when this Court is discussing the issue raised by Erie on appeal. 3 See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 177 W.

2024The circuit court found, based on West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5) and this Court’s decision in Syllabus point 4 of Albert, 238 W.

2024Va. 129 , 792 S.E.2d 628 , that the Commission had no statutory immunity from Ms. Stewart’s vicarious liability claim.14 Therefore, the circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss as to Count III.

2024It is true that the circuit court’s order referenced this Court’s decision in A.B., 234 W.

2023The Chafin Petitioners appear to frame this appeal as direct appeals of the order striking Petitioners’ standard of care expert and subsequent order 12 granting summary judgment in favor the Boal Respondents. 17 As such, the Boal Respondents argue, the appeals were untimely filed and should be dismissed. 18 Despite 17 Specifically, the Chafin Petitioners neither cite to nor analyze the standards of review for Rules 59(e) or 60(b) in their brief and, indeed, indicate that they are appealing “the Circuit Court’s rulings regarding the exclusion of their expert and the resultant grant of summary j

2023Va. 562 , 401 S.E.2d 908 (1991) (some alterations in original).

2022Specifically, the circuit court’s Order required Petitioners to: (1) alter the manner in which they pay royalties to Respondents so that it is consistent with the court’s opinion; (2) alter their royalty accounting practices to prevent royalty payments to Respondents from bearing post-production costs incurred or assessed prior to the (a) TETCO M2-region market for residue gas, (b) the Williams Plant tailgate market for NGLs and condensate coming through the plant system, and (c) the field market for skim oil that does not go through the plant system; and (3) prepare an accounting as contempla

2022Va. at 133 , 690 S.E.2d at 327 , syl. pt. 4, in part. 22 Id. 12 The circuit court stated that “Mr. Journay, not having been a party to the contract, would not be able to require” Tri-State “to bring suit against him individually anywhere else.” But a party being a non-signatory to an agreement is insufficient, standing alone, to preclude enforcement of a forum-selection clause.

2022“The third query asks whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum-selection clause.” 22 In its brief to this Court, Tri-State makes no argument on this point, but we address it briefly as to Mr. Journay because the circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss with regard to him, in part, on that basis. 21 Caperton, 225 W.

2022But as we concluded above, the West Virginia law of negligent entrustment applies to the claim, so we consider Petitioners’ argument in view of the standard established in Syllabus Points 11 and 12 of Payne. 49 Robertson v. LeMaster, 171 W.

2020We find the petitioners have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and, therefore, permit the claims to be developed below. 11 11 This Court has found that “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.” Syl. pt. 5, Courtney v. Courtney, 186 W.

2020Va. 597 , 413 S.E.2d 418 (1991).

2019According to Mr. Blankenship, the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis that the “closely related” requirement was adequately pled because coal miners are more than 8 co-workers, they are “members of a close-knit coal mining ‘family’ that transcends blood ties.” Under this State’s law, “[i]n order to prove actionable negligence there must be shown a duty on the part of the person charged with negligence and a breach of such duty.” Syl. pt. 2, Atkinson v. Harman, 151 W.

2019Pt. 2, Dorsey v. Dorsey , 109 W.Va. 111 , 153 S.E. 146 (1930) ). 40 It is apparent from the briefing and the circuit court's order that both the Respondents and the circuit court may have confused the Petitioners' intention to seek an alternative implied easement across Lot 88, as both reference the New Property (Lots 84-87 and 130-133) when discussing the Petitioners' claim for an implied easement.

2019Pt. 2, Dorsey v. Dorsey , 109 W.Va. 111 , 153 S.E. 146 (1930) ). 40 It is apparent from the briefing and the circuit court's order that both the Respondents and the circuit court may have confused the Petitioners' intention to seek an alternative implied easement across Lot 88, as both reference the New Property (Lots 84-87 and 130-133) when discussing the Petitioners' claim for an implied easement.

2019Va. Dep’t of Transp., Div. of Highways v. Robertson, 217 W.

2018In Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Front , 231 W.Va. 518 , 745 S.E.2d 556 (2013), we held that "[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine." Id. at 519 , 745 S.E.2d at 557 , syl. pt. 1.

2018In Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Front , 231 W.Va. 518 , 745 S.E.2d 556 (2013), we held that "[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine." Id. at 519 , 745 S.E.2d at 557 , syl. pt. 1.

2018Therefore, under our holding in Cross , that "expert medical testimony would ordinarily be required to establish certain matters including: (1) the risks involved concerning a particular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of treatment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains untreated[,]" id. , expert testimony would be required. 24 See supra note 7. 25 It appears from the deposition excerpts in the appendix record that these witnesses are former Pfizer employees. 26 Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc. ,

2018Therefore, under our holding in Cross , that "expert medical testimony would ordinarily be required to establish certain matters including: (1) the risks involved concerning a particular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of treatment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains untreated[,]" id. , expert testimony would be required. 24 See supra note 7. 25 It appears from the deposition excerpts in the appendix record that these witnesses are former Pfizer employees. 26 Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc. ,

2018Therefore, under our holding in Cross , that "expert medical testimony would ordinarily be required to establish certain matters including: (1) the risks involved concerning a particular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of treatment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains untreated[,]" id. , expert testimony would be required. 24 See supra note 7. 25 It appears from the deposition excerpts in the appendix record that these witnesses are former Pfizer employees. 26 Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc. ,

2015In Mountain America, LLC, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s order that affirmed the assessments. 224 W.Va. 669 , 687 S.E.2d 768 .

2015In Mountain America, LLC, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s order that affirmed the assessments. 224 W.Va. 669 , 687 S.E.2d 768 .

2013While the Petitioners' brief succinctly quotes the case of Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190 , 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986), wherein this Court addressed an insurer's duty to defend, an isolated case reference, without supporting argument, is not sufficient to preserve this issue for appellate consideration.

2013While the Petitioners' brief succinctly quotes the case of Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190 , 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986), wherein this Court addressed an insurer's duty to defend, an isolated case reference, without supporting argument, is not sufficient to preserve this issue for appellate consideration.

2013When asked to review a circuit court’s construction of a policy of insurance, we previously have held that “[determination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.” Syl. pt. 1, Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W.Va. 703 , 568 S.E.2d 10 (2002).

2013When asked to review a circuit court’s construction of a policy of insurance, we previously have held that “[determination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.” Syl. pt. 1, Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W.Va. 703 , 568 S.E.2d 10 (2002).