Petitioners claim in Pennsylvania

2021This leaves Petitioners’ claim that the final title of the bill was deceptive because it did not put “reasonable persons on notice of the subject of the bill.” PAGE, 877 A.2d at 409 .

2021This leaves Petitioners’ claim that the final title of the bill was deceptive because it did not put “reasonable persons on notice of the subject of the bill.” PAGE, 877 A.2d at 409 .

2012Further, Petitioners’ claim ignores the fact that the Board possesses “legal authority to postpone a parole date until a satisfactory plan is arranged for the parolee and approved by the Board.” Nieves, 983 A.2d at 240 (citing 37 Pa.Code § 63.1).

2012Further, Petitioners' claim ignores the fact that the Board possesses "legal authority to postpone a parole date until a satisfactory plan is arranged for the parolee and approved by the Board." Nieves, 983 A.2d at 240 (citing 37 Pa.Code § 63.1).

2012Moreover, we reject Petitioners’ claim that our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fross v. County of Allegheny, 610 Pa. 421 , 20 A.3d 1193 (2011) is controlling here.

2012Moreover, we reject Petitioners' claim that our Supreme Court's recent decision in Fross v. County of Allegheny, ___ Pa. ___, 20 A.3d 1193 (2011) is controlling here.

2005This Court notes that “questions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by an appellate court.” Pennhurst Medical Group, P.C. v. Department of Public Welfare, 796 A.2d 423 , 425 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), citing Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa. 163 , 314 A.2d 270 (1974).

2005This Court notes that “questions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by an appellate court.” Pennhurst Medical Group, P.C. v. Department of Public Welfare, 796 A.2d 423 , 425 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), citing Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa. 163 , 314 A.2d 270 (1974).

2005This Court notes that "questions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by an appellate court." Pennhurst Medical Group, P.C. v. Department of Public Welfare, 796 A.2d 423 , 425 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), citing Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa. 163 , 314 A.2d 270 (1974).

2005This Court notes that “questions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by an appellate court.” Pennhurst Medical Group, P.C. v. Department of Public Welfare, 796 A.2d 423 , 425 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), citing Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa. 163 , 314 A.2d 270 (1974).

1994Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. National Apartment Leasing Co., 108 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 300, 529 A.2d 1157 (1987). .

1994Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. National Apartment Leasing Co., 108 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 300, 529 A.2d 1157 (1987). .

1985Addressing Petitioners’ second contention, our Supreme Court in Shenango Valley Osteopathic v. Department of Health, 499 Pa. 39, 48 , 451 A.2d 434, 438 (1982), in clarifying its plurality opinion in Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessments, 459 Pa. 268 , 328 A.2d 819 (1974), stated “tbe doctrine of exhaustion of remedies would not bar equitable intervention where there are both a substantial question of constitutionality and tbe absence of an adequate statutory remedy.” In tbe instant case, this Court has already decided tbe constitutionality of tbe marker fees, and Petitioners a

1985Addressing Petitioners’ second contention, our Supreme Court in Shenango Valley Osteopathic v. Department of Health, 499 Pa. 39, 48 , 451 A.2d 434, 438 (1982), in clarifying its plurality opinion in Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessments, 459 Pa. 268 , 328 A.2d 819 (1974), stated “tbe doctrine of exhaustion of remedies would not bar equitable intervention where there are both a substantial question of constitutionality and tbe absence of an adequate statutory remedy.” In tbe instant case, this Court has already decided tbe constitutionality of tbe marker fees, and Petitioners a

2024The Lee Court concluded that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders as cruel and unusual punishment did not extend to Lee who, despite her argument that her brain was 11 Moreover, the Lee Court observed: In Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa. Super. 2011), . . .

2023See Kane, 129 A.3d at 473 ; Rendell, 983 A.2d at 718 ; see also Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1289-90 .

2022However, Title 42 also includes Section 8303 as well as the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§7531-7541. “[T]he law is clear that sovereign immunity does not bar either mandamus or declaratory judgment actions.” Brimmeier v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 147 A.3d 954, 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 161 A.3d 253 (Pa. 2017).

2021The Supreme Court held that the remedy for the juvenile and those like him was resentencing where, if the sentencing court found an LWOP sentence to be inappropriate upon evaluation, the juvenile would be “subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by Section 1102(a) [of the Crimes Code], accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing, [thereby] striking the prohibition against paroling an individual sentenced to serve life in prison in Section 6137(a)(1) [of the Parole Code] as applied to th[o]se offenders.” Commonwealth

2021While we disagree with the dissent’s position on the nature of Petitioners’ challenge for the reasons stated, we also note the following regarding Petitioners’ eligibility for PCRA relief. 10 Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I), our Supreme Court first addressed the import of Miller in the context of a direct appeal from the imposition of a mandatory LWOP sentence upon a juvenile convicted of first degree murder prior to Miller’s holding.

2021The Supreme Court held that the remedy for the juvenile and those like him was resentencing where, if the sentencing court found an LWOP sentence to be inappropriate upon evaluation, the juvenile would be “subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by Section 1102(a) [of the Crimes Code], accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing, [thereby] striking the prohibition against paroling an individual sentenced to serve life in prison in Section 6137(a)(1) [of the Parole Code] as applied to th[o]se offenders.” Commonwealth

2018More specifically, objectors’ evidence ‘must show a high probability that the use will generate adverse impacts not normally generated by this type of use. . . . .’ Freedom Healthcare Servs., Inc. [v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the City of New Castle,] 983 A.2d [1286,] 1291 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)] (emphasis added). 19 Petitioners’ claim that the May and June proceedings were hearings at which testimony was given is belied by the fact that Ries expressly stated at the May meeting that was not the case. 14 The Board did not make any finding or reach a conclusion that the objectors demonstrated to ‘a hig

2018Zoning Hearing Bd., 102 A.3d 549 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), and, as such, represents the law of the case. ________________________________ PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge PAM - 2