Petitioners claim in South Carolina

2010See Yarbrough, 301 S.C. at 341-42 , 391 S.E.2d at 875 (concluding property claimant’s action to quiet title brought seven years after title clearance action was barred by section 15-67-90 but implicitly recognizing that extrinsic fraud, if proven, could operate to preclude application of the three-year statute of limitations). 8 *370 In view of our conclusion, the question becomes whether Petitioners’ submission of the affidavits is sufficient to withstand Respondent’s motion for summary judgment based on Petitioners’ claim of extrinsic fraud.

2010See Yarbrough, 301 S.C. at 341-42 , 391 S.E.2d at 875 (concluding property claimant’s action to quiet title brought seven years after title clearance action was barred by section 15-67-90 but implicitly recognizing that extrinsic fraud, if proven, could operate to preclude application of the three-year statute of limitations). 8 *370 In view of our conclusion, the question becomes whether Petitioners’ submission of the affidavits is sufficient to withstand Respondent’s motion for summary judgment based on Petitioners’ claim of extrinsic fraud.

2010See Yarbrough, 301 S.C. at 341-42 , 391 S.E.2d at 875 (concluding property claimant’s action to quiet title brought seven years after title clearance action was barred by section 15-67-90 but implicitly recognizing that extrinsic fraud, if proven, could operate to preclude application of the three-year statute of limitations). 8 In view of our conclusion, the question becomes whether Petitioners’ submission of the affidavits is sufficient to withstand Respondent’s motion for summary judgment based on Petitioners’ claim of extrinsic fraud. *655 “A judgment may be set aside on the ground of frau

2010See Yarbrough, 301 S.C. at 341-42 , 391 S.E.2d at 875 (concluding property claimant’s action to quiet title brought seven years after title clearance action was barred by section 15-67-90 but implicitly recognizing that extrinsic fraud, if proven, could operate to preclude application of the three-year statute of limitations). 8 In view of our conclusion, the question becomes whether Petitioners’ submission of the affidavits is sufficient to withstand Respondent’s motion for summary judgment based on Petitioners’ claim of extrinsic fraud. *655 “A judgment may be set aside on the ground of frau

2025See Edwards v. SunCom, 369 S.C. 91, 94 , 631 S.E.2d 529, 530 (2006) ("Orders affecting a substantial right 'discontinue an action, prevent an appeal, grant or refuse a new trial, or strike out an action or defense'" and are immediately appealable (quoting Mid-State Distribs., Inc., 310 S.C. at 335 n.4, 426 S.E.2d at 780 n.4)).

2025See Edwards v. SunCom, 369 S.C. 91, 94 , 631 S.E.2d 529, 530 (2006) ("Orders affecting a substantial right 'discontinue an action, prevent an appeal, grant or refuse a new trial, or strike out an action or defense'" and are immediately appealable (quoting Mid-State Distribs., Inc., 310 S.C. at 335 n.4, 426 S.E.2d at 780 n.4)).

2025See Edwards v. SunCom, 369 S.C. 91, 94 , 631 S.E.2d 529, 530 (2006) ("Orders affecting a substantial right 'discontinue an action, prevent an appeal, grant or refuse a new trial, or strike out an action or defense'" and are immediately appealable (quoting Mid-State Distribs., Inc., 310 S.C. at 335 n.4, 426 S.E.2d at 780 n.4)).

2025See Edwards v. SunCom, 369 S.C. 91, 94 , 631 S.E.2d 529, 530 (2006) ("Orders affecting a substantial right 'discontinue an action, prevent an appeal, grant or refuse a new trial, or strike out an action or defense'" and are immediately appealable (quoting Mid-State Distribs., Inc., 310 S.C. at 335 n.4, 426 S.E.2d at 780 n.4)).

2023Finally, the [character of the] governmental action [(i.e., the merger ordinance)] was a reasonable land-use regulation, enacted as part of a coordinated federal, state, and local effort to preserve the river and surrounding land. 137 S. Ct. at 1947–48, 1949–50 (internal citations omitted); see also Quinn, 862 F.3d at 441, 443, 445 (reaching a similar holding for similar reasons: "Local governments require flexibility to expand services like sewer in response to community needs; those governments also must be able to control the density of development in order to prevent overcrowding in school

2014See 11A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 32:116 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp.2014) (“In awarding attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings, it is the reasonableness of the fee, and not the arrangement the attorney and his or her client may have agreed upon, which is controlling.” (footnote omitted)); Jackson, 326 S.C. at 308 , 486 S.E.2d at 759 (“When determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees under a statute mandating the award of attorney fees, the contract between the client and his counsel does not control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate.”).

2014See 11A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 32:116 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp.2014) (“In awarding attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings, it is the reasonableness of the fee, and not the arrangement the attorney and his or her client may have agreed upon, which is controlling.” (footnote omitted)); Jackson, 326 S.C. at 308 , 486 S.E.2d at 759 (“When determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees under a statute mandating the award of attorney fees, the contract between the client and his counsel does not control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate.”).

2013See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

2013See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).