Petitioners brief in Alabama

2016Ryan, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to address the sovereign-immunity defenses at the summary-judgment stage of the litigation.’ “6 So.3d at 484 (emphasis added).

2015However, by delaying until trial its determination of the sovereign-immunity defenses asserted by the petitioners, the trial court has effectively denied the petitioners their privilege of not being subjected to suit and their right to not stand trial and face the burdens of litigation should their immunity defenses prove dispositive, Ryan, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to address the sovereign-immunity defenses at the summary-judgment stage of the litigation.” 6 So.3d at 484 (emphasis added).

1993Specifically regarding the issue of standing under § 11-52-81 , in Crowder v. Zoning Board of Adjustment , 406 So.2d 917 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied , 406 So.2d 919 (Ala. 1981), the Court of Civil Appeals held: "In order for a party to have standing to challenge the decision of a zoning board of adjustment he must be a 'party aggrieved.' To establish himself as a 'party aggrieved' he must present 'proof of the adverse effect the changed status of the rezoned property has, or could have, on the use, enjoyment and value' of his own property." 406 So.2d at 918 (quoting in part Cox v. Poer , 45 A

1993Specifically regarding the issue of standing under § 11-52-81, in Crowder v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 406 So.2d 917 (Ala.Civ.App.), ce rt. denied, 406 So.2d 919 (Ala.1981), the Court of Civil Appeals held: “In order for a party to have standing to challenge the decision of a zoning board of adjustment he must be a ‘party aggrieved.’ To establish himself as a ‘party aggrieved’ he must present ‘proof of the adverse effect the changed status of the rezoned property has, or could have, on the use, enjoyment and value’ of his own property.” 406 So.2d at 918 (quoting in part Cox v. Poer, 45 Ala.A

1993Specifically regarding the issue of standing under § 11-52-81 , in Crowder v. Zoning Board of Adjustment , 406 So.2d 917 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied , 406 So.2d 919 (Ala. 1981), the Court of Civil Appeals held: "In order for a party to have standing to challenge the decision of a zoning board of adjustment he must be a 'party aggrieved.' To establish himself as a 'party aggrieved' he must present 'proof of the adverse effect the changed status of the rezoned property has, or could have, on the use, enjoyment and value' of his own property." 406 So.2d at 918 (quoting in part Cox v. Poer , 45 A

1993Specifically regarding the issue of standing under § 11-52-81, in Crowder v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 406 So.2d 917 (Ala.Civ.App.), ce rt. denied, 406 So.2d 919 (Ala.1981), the Court of Civil Appeals held: “In order for a party to have standing to challenge the decision of a zoning board of adjustment he must be a ‘party aggrieved.’ To establish himself as a ‘party aggrieved’ he must present ‘proof of the adverse effect the changed status of the rezoned property has, or could have, on the use, enjoyment and value’ of his own property.” 406 So.2d at 918 (quoting in part Cox v. Poer, 45 Ala.A

2008However, based on language in Boyd , in which this Court suggested that the legislature gave a limited judicial power to political parties to hear election contests, see Boyd, 246 Ala. at 126 , 19 So.2d at 387-88 , the petitioners challenge the second conclusion.

2008However, based on language in Boyd , in which this Court suggested that the legislature gave a limited judicial power to political parties to hear election contests, see Boyd, 246 Ala. at 126 , 19 So.2d at 387-88 , the petitioners challenge the second conclusion.

2008However, based on language in Boyd , in which this Court suggested that the legislature gave a limited judicial power to political parties to hear election contests, see Boyd, 246 Ala. at 126 , 19 So.2d at 387-88 , the petitioners challenge the second conclusion.

2008However, based on language in Boyd , in which this Court suggested that the legislature gave a limited judicial power to political parties to hear election contests, see Boyd, 246 Ala. at 126 , 19 So.2d at 387-88 , the petitioners challenge the second conclusion.

2007Core v. Green , 160 Ohio St. 175 , 181 , 115 N.E.2d 157 , 160-61 (1953) ("While the statute was in effect, the petitioners had the privilege to demand an election, but when the statute was repealed before the election was held, such privilege was taken away without any impairment of vested or contractual *Page 980 rights."); and Corn v. City of Oakland City , 415 N.E.2d 129 , 133 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981): "The question of whether or not an office holder or candidate or officer elect has any vested right to an office has been clearly settled contrary to Corn's position.

2002"Finally, as we made plain in Jones [v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)] last Term, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described.

2002"Finally, as we made plain in Jones [v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)] last Term, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described.

2002"Finally, as we made plain in Jones [v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)] last Term, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described.

1980The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.' Connolly v. Medalie , 58 F.2d 629 , 630 (CA2 1932).