Petitioners claim in Florida

2019Also looking to dictionary definitions, the Supreme Court of Wyoming defined “efficient” in this context as “productive without waste.” Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1258 -59 (quoting Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1994)); see also Edgewood Independent Sch.

2019Also looking to dictionary definitions, the Supreme Court of Wyoming defined “efficient” in this context as “productive without waste.” Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1258 -59 (quoting Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1994)); see also Edgewood Independent Sch.

2019The original trial judge recognized that Petitioners sought “system-wide declaratory and supplemental relief.” The trial judge who later rendered Final Judgment recognized that Petitioners “have ‘made a blanket assertion that the entire system is constitutionally inadequate.’ ” (Quoting Coalition, 680 So. 2d at 406 .) And the First District recognized that Petitioners “assert[ed] that the State’s entire K-12 public education system . . . is in violation of the Florida Constitution.” Citizens, 232 So. 3d at 1165.

2019The original trial judge recognized that Petitioners sought "system-wide declaratory and supplemental relief." The trial judge who later rendered Final Judgment recognized that Petitioners "have 'made a blanket assertion that the entire system is constitutionally inadequate.' " (Quoting Coalition , 680 So.2d at 406 .) And the First District recognized that Petitioners "assert[ed] that the State's entire K-12 public education system ... is in violation of the Florida Constitution." Citizens , 232 So.3d at 1165 .

2019The trial court pointed to language in Holmes that noted that the 1998 amendments had been drafted “to provide standards by which to measure the adequacy of the public school education provided by the state.” (Quoting Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 403 .) The trial court thus permitted Petitioners’ claim “seek[ing] system-wide declaratory and supplemental relief” to proceed.

2019The trial court pointed to language in Holmes that noted that the 1998 amendments had been drafted "to provide standards by which to measure the adequacy of the public school education provided by the state." (Quoting Holmes , 919 So.2d at 403 .) The trial court thus permitted Petitioners' claim "seek[ing] system-wide declaratory and supplemental relief" to proceed.

2004Although it is impossible to give a precise definition of "attorney work product" that can be applied to all situations, it can be generally defined as "[p]ersonal views of the attorneys as to how and when to present evidence, his evaluation of its relative importance, his knowledge of which witness will give certain testimony, personal notes and records as to witnesses, jurors, legal citations, proposed arguments, jury instructions, diagrams and charts he may refer to at trial for his convenience, but not to be used as evidence." Bishop v. Polles, 872 So.2d 272 , 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoti

2004Although it is impossible to give a precise definition of “attorney work product” that can be applied to all situations, it can be generally defined as “[pjersonal views of the attorneys as to how and when to present evidence, his evaluation of its relative importance, his knowledge of which witness will give certain testimony, personal notes and records as to witnesses, jurors, legal citations, proposed arguments, jury instructions, diagrams and charts he may refer to at trial for his convenience, but not to be used as evidence.” Bishop v. Polles, 872 So.2d 272 , 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (quoti

2023Cf. Wellings Auto., LLC v. Dennis Saviano Tr., dated 5/18/1993, 183 So. 3d 412 , 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (dismissing an appeal as moot because the temporary injunction expired by its own terms after thirty days had passed); Georgiades v. Georgiades, 186 So. 2d 810, 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (dismissing as moot a petition for writ of certiorari to review an order denying a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction because the trial court had subsequently entered an order dissolving the injunction).

2019Respondents' Petition for a Writ of Prohibition Respondents-continuing to rely on Coalition -next petitioned the First District for a writ of prohibition, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the political questions presented by the case. *131 Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. , 81 So.3d 465 , 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

2019The trial court declined to do so. 4 See, e.g., Armand v. Miami-Dade County, 258 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (table). 4 Petitioners now seek to have this Court, by certiorari, quash the trial court’s order denying Petitioners’ motion to lift the stay; or, in the alternative, require the trial court to dismiss their case again.

2017It is this new procedure that the petitioners challenge, asking this court to require the judicial officers to be physically present for the hearings “as required by law.” Id. at 156 . (majority) Ultimately, the Second District held: In sum, while we question the wisdom of holding these hearings remotely, we conclude that the decision to preside over a Baker Act hearing remotely via videoconference equipment is within the discretion of the court.

2016Approving the First District Court’s opinion in Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass’n v. Bernard, 140 So.3d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 157 So.3d 1041 (Fla.2014), the Second District held as follows: We agree with the analysis and the holding in Bernard .

2011Id. at 212 .

2009Nevertheless, the circuit court’s order authorized the Bank to depose Mrs. Rappaport concerning her personal finances and to require her to produce virtually all of her personal financial records for a period exceeding four years. “[Personal finances are among those private matters kept secret by most people.” Woodward v. Berbery, 714 So.2d 1027, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla.1985)).

1998See Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.1993) (noting that rezoning actions with limited impact generally are quasi-judicial and reviewable by certiorari); Turner v. Sumter County, Bd. of County Comm'rs, 649 So.2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (affirming in part and reversing in part circuit court's dismissal of petition for certiorari from county's decision to award mining license; to extent claimant's challenge was that issuance was contrary to local comprehensive development plan, claimant should have pursued case under section 163.3215; but to extent clai

1998See Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.1993) (noting that rezoning actions with limited impact generally are quasi-judicial and reviewable by certiorari); Turner v. Sumter County, Bd. of County Comm'rs, 649 So.2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (affirming in part and reversing in part circuit court's dismissal of petition for certiorari from county's decision to award mining license; to extent claimant's challenge was that issuance was contrary to local comprehensive development plan, claimant should have pursued case under section 163.3215; but to extent clai

1995Section 768.72, Florida Statutes, provides that "... no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing ... which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages." Additionally, upon such a showing, a claimant may then "move to amend his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages... ." Recently, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1995), the supreme court recognized that certiorari review is appropriate to determine whether the trial court has conducted the evidentiary hearing required by section 768.72 prior to authorizing

1995Section 768.72, Florida Statutes, provides that "... no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing ... which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages." Additionally, upon such a showing, a claimant may then "move to amend his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages... ." Recently, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1995), the supreme court recognized that certiorari review is appropriate to determine whether the trial court has conducted the evidentiary hearing required by section 768.72 prior to authorizing

1986Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DC A 1984), and the other cases summarized above regarding the applicable standards in a rule challenge case, the Petitioners’ challenge to the March 1981 amendments to Rule 21GG-6.01(1), (2), (3), and (4) must be dismissed. 38.