18 Colorado opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wimberly v. Ettenberggreen2 sentences1981The petitioners challenge the court of appeals’ departure from the standing test established by this court in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535 (1977), and reaffirmed in Dodge v. Department of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379 , 600 P.2d 70 (1979). 1981The petitioners challenge the court of appeals’ departure from the standing test established by this court in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535 (1977), and reaffirmed in Dodge v. Department of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379 , 600 P.2d 70 (1979). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Title for 2009-2010, No. 24green1 sentence2016See In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2009-2010 #24, 218 P.3d 350, 355 (Colo.2009). | 1 | 1 |
Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magnessgreen1 sentence2015As we have made clear, "we will not infer a private right of action based on a statutory violation unless we discern a clear legislative intent to create such a cause of action." Gerrity Oil, 946 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Proposed Initiated Const. Amend.green1 sentence2014In re Proposed Initiated Constitutional Amendment Concerning the Fair Treatment of Injured Workers Amendment, 873 P.2d 718, 720-21 (Colo.1994). 125 Relatedly, we also disagree with Petitioners' claim that the Titles omit key terms. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Farmers Insurance Exchangegreen1 sentence2001Exch., 857 P.2d 532, 534 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) ("[A]n order compelling arbitration, because it is merely an interlocutory order and is not listed as such in § 13-22-221, is not an appealable order."); Associated Natural Gas, Inc. v. Nordic Petroleums, Inc., 807 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Colo.Ct.App.1990) ("An order compelling parties to arbitrate is not appealable and thus is interlocutory in nature."); Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 663 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Colo.Ct.App.1983) ("Section 13-22-204,... entitled "Appeals," specifies those orders from which an appeal may be taken under the [UAA]. | 1 | 1 |
Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Bouldergreen1 sentence2001Exch., 857 P.2d 532, 534 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) ("[A]n order compelling arbitration, because it is merely an interlocutory order and is not listed as such in § 13-22-221, is not an appealable order."); Associated Natural Gas, Inc. v. Nordic Petroleums, Inc., 807 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Colo.Ct.App.1990) ("An order compelling parties to arbitrate is not appealable and thus is interlocutory in nature."); Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 663 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Colo.Ct.App.1983) ("Section 13-22-204,... entitled "Appeals," specifies those orders from which an appeal may be taken under the [UAA]. | 1 | 1 |
Associated Natural Gas, Inc. v. Nordic Petroleums, Inc.green1 sentence2001Exch., 857 P.2d 532, 534 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) ("[A]n order compelling arbitration, because it is merely an interlocutory order and is not listed as such in § 13-22-221, is not an appealable order."); Associated Natural Gas, Inc. v. Nordic Petroleums, Inc., 807 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Colo.Ct.App.1990) ("An order compelling parties to arbitrate is not appealable and thus is interlocutory in nature."); Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 663 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Colo.Ct.App.1983) ("Section 13-22-204,... entitled "Appeals," specifies those orders from which an appeal may be taken under the [UAA]. | 1 | 1 |
David v. Powder Mountain Ranchgreen1 sentence2000See generally Risbry v. Swan, 124 Colo. 567, 577-78 , 239 P.2d 600, 606 (1951) (stating that although administrator of estate is a necessary party to the action, he is not a party to the issue and has no personal interest in the result of the controversy); David v. Powder Mountain Ranch, 656 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Colo.App.1982) (holding that in a quiet title action, where all parties who have an interest in a property must be named, fact that all those named as defendants might be necessary parties does not make them parties to the issue and thus preclude their testimony under the Dead Man’s Statu | 1 | 1 |
Lehman v. Lindenmeyergreen2 sentences2000TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY Underlying Colorado’s law of wills is the fundamental concept of freedom of testation; namely that a testator “may dispose of his property as he pleases, and that [he] may indulge his prejudice against his relations and in favor of strangers, and that, if he does so, it is no objection to his will.” Lehman v. Lindenmeyer, 48 Colo. 305, 313 , 109 P. 956, 959 (1909). 2000TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY Underlying Colorado’s law of wills is the fundamental concept of freedom of testation; namely that a testator “may dispose of his property as he pleases, and that [he] may indulge his prejudice against his relations and in favor of strangers, and that, if he does so, it is no objection to his will.” Lehman v. Lindenmeyer, 48 Colo. 305, 313 , 109 P. 956, 959 (1909). | 1 | 1 |
Risbry v. Swangreen2 sentences2000See generally Risbry v. Swan, 124 Colo. 567, 577-78 , 239 P.2d 600, 606 (1951) (stating that although administrator of estate is a necessary party to the action, he is not a party to the issue and has no personal interest in the result of the controversy); David v. Powder Mountain Ranch, 656 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Colo.App.1982) (holding that in a quiet title action, where all parties who have an interest in a property must be named, fact that all those named as defendants might be necessary parties does not make them parties to the issue and thus preclude their testimony under the Dead Man’s Statu 2000See generally Risbry v. Swan, 124 Colo. 567, 577-78 , 239 P.2d 600, 606 (1951) (stating that although administrator of estate is a necessary party to the action, he is not a party to the issue and has no personal interest in the result of the controversy); David v. Powder Mountain Ranch, 656 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Colo.App.1982) (holding that in a quiet title action, where all parties who have an interest in a property must be named, fact that all those named as defendants might be necessary parties does not make them parties to the issue and thus preclude their testimony under the Dead Man’s Statu | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Pitoniakgreen2 sentences2000A. The Dead Man’s Statute Under section 13-90-101, 5 C.R.S. (1999), all persons with an interest in a cause of action are presumed competent to testify. *1175 See Patterson v. Pitoniak, 173 Colo. 454, 457 , 480 P.2d 579, 580 (1971). 2000A. The Dead Man’s Statute Under section 13-90-101, 5 C.R.S. (1999), all persons with an interest in a cause of action are presumed competent to testify. *1175 See Patterson v. Pitoniak, 173 Colo. 454, 457 , 480 P.2d 579, 580 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc.green2 sentences1990In Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 776 P.2d 362, 365-66 (Colo.1989), we held that section 5-12-102(l)(b) is to be given a broad liberal construction in order to effectuate the legislative purpose of compensating parties for the loss of money or property to which they are entitled. 1990In Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., 776 P.2d 362, 365-66 (Colo. 1989), we held that section 5-12-102(1)(b) is to be given a broad liberal construction in order to effectuate the legislative purpose of compensating parties for the loss of money or property to which they are entitled. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)green2 sentences1980See Wimberly v. Ettenberg, supra, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 ; Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action, supra, at 431-32; C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5); see also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 , 93 S.Ct. 2405 , 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (discovery and summary judgment, not dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12, are the appropriate procedures for disposing of well-pled but unproven allegations of injury and causation). *1057 The standing doctrines formulated in Wimberly guide us here: we must ascertain whether the petitioners’ complaint that the Commi 1980See Wimberly v. Ettenberg, supra, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 ; Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action, supra, at 431-32; C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5); see also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 , 93 S.Ct. 2405 , 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (discovery and summary judgment, not dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12, are the appropriate procedures for disposing of well-pled but unproven allegations of injury and causation). *1057 The standing doctrines formulated in Wimberly guide us here: we must ascertain whether the petitioners’ complaint that the Commi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colorado School Districts Self Insurance Pool v. J.P. Meyer Trucking and Construction, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Id. 2001Id. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
In Re the Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause Adopted April 4, 1990, Pertaining to the Proposed Initiative on Parental Notification of Abortions for Minors
green
2 sentences1992Based on Parental Notification of Abortions for Minors, 794 P.2d 238 (Colo.1990), the petitioners claim that the voters are entitled to know of the new standard and the fact that it does not apply to cities where limited gaming is currently permitted. 1992Based on Parental Notification of Abortions for Minors, 794 P.2d 238 (Colo.1990), the petitioners claim that the voters are entitled to know of the new standard and the fact that it does not apply to cities where limited gaming is currently permitted. | 2 | 1992–1992 |
In Re: Second Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting Rights of the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees of 1980
green
2 sentences1982In re Second Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting the Rights of the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees of 1980, supra. See Part III, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Initiative Title Setting Review Board denying the Petitioners’ motion for rehearing. 1982In re Second Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting the Rights of the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees of 1980, supra. See Part III, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Initiative Title Setting Review Board denying the Petitioners' motion for rehearing. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Fabec v. Beck
green
1 sentence2018See § 1-1-103(3) ("Substantial compliance with the provisions or intent of [the Election Code] shall be all that is required...."); Fabec v. Beck , 922 P.2d 330 , 341 (Colo. 1996) (holding a court should consider the following factors in determining whether a party has substantially complied with statutory requirements: "(1) the extent of noncompliance, (2) the purpose of the applicable provision and whether that purpose is substantially achieved despite the noncompliance, and (3) whether there was a good-faith effort to comply or whether noncompliance is based on a conscious decision to misle | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc
green
2 sentences2015Id. at I 8, 388 P.8d at 1006. €13 The petitioners claim that the Governor's opt-out decision has caused their members 4 to suffer various injuries, includ ing harm to their medical licenses and reputations, decreased income, and harm to their ability to adequately serve patients. 2015Although the Governor argues that these alleged injuries are too nebulous to confer individual standing, we conclude that they do not create the same sort of concerns that we have identified in the past-namely, that "the alleged injury is indirect and incidental to the defendant's conduct." Hickenlooper, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d at 1009 . 14 In our recent Hickenlooper decision, for example, we concluded that the plaintiffs lacked individual standing to challenge the *1137 Governor's proclamation recognizing the Colorado Day of Prayer where they failed to allege "that they suffered any negative consequen | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Dougherty, Dawkins, Strand & Bigelow Inc.
green
2 sentences2006In Dougherty , the court of appeals examined whether a lease-purchase agreement for a road grader between the county of Boulder and an investment banking firm constituted a “multiple-fiscal year direct or indirect district debt or other financial obligation” under Amendment 1. 890 P.2d at 201 . 2006In Dougherty , the court of appeals examined whether a lease-purchase agreement for a road grader between the county of Boulder and an investment banking firm constituted a "multiple-fiscal year direct or indirect district debt or other financial obligation" under Amendment 1. 890 P.2d at 201 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Perlmutter v. Blessing
green
2 sentences1993In Perlmutter v. Blessing, 706 P.2d 772 (Colo.1985), we addressed the phrase “claim against the others” in subsection (l)(a) and held that it was ambiguous. 1993In Perlmutter v. Blessing, 706 P.2d 772 (Colo.1985), we addressed the phrase "claim against the others" in subsection (1)(a) and held that it was ambiguous. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dodge v. Department of Social Services
green
2 sentences1981The petitioners challenge the court of appeals’ departure from the standing test established by this court in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535 (1977), and reaffirmed in Dodge v. Department of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379 , 600 P.2d 70 (1979). 1981The petitioners challenge the court of appeals’ departure from the standing test established by this court in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163 , 570 P.2d 535 (1977), and reaffirmed in Dodge v. Department of Social Services, 198 Colo. 379 , 600 P.2d 70 (1979). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Rivera
green
2 sentences1979They argue that under this court's decision in People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24 , 525 P.2d 431 (1974), they were entitled to an instruction on their "theory of the case." In Rivera we dealt with instructions on lesser offenses in criminal trials. 1979They argue that under this court's decision in People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24 , 525 P.2d 431 (1974), they were entitled to an instruction on their "theory of the case." In Rivera we dealt with instructions on lesser offenses in criminal trials. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.