nexus requirement in Illinois

2000There, our supreme court analyzed the substantial nexus requirement in light of a New York case, Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 178 , 654 N.E.2d 954, 960-61 , 630 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686-87 (1995), which stated that a substantial nexus requires a physical presence in the taxing state that “ ‘must be demonstrably more than a “slightest presence” [citation].’ ” Brown’s Furniture, 171 Ill. 2d at 424 , quoting Orvis, 86 N.Y.2d at 178 , 654 N.E.2d at 961 , 630 N.Y.S.2d at 687 .

2000There, our supreme court analyzed the substantial nexus requirement in light of a New York case, Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 178 , 654 N.E.2d 954, 960-61 , 630 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686-87 (1995), which stated that a substantial nexus requires a physical presence in the taxing state that “ ‘must be demonstrably more than a “slightest presence” [citation].’ ” Brown’s Furniture, 171 Ill. 2d at 424 , quoting Orvis, 86 N.Y.2d at 178 , 654 N.E.2d at 961 , 630 N.Y.S.2d at 687 .

2000There, our supreme court analyzed the substantial nexus requirement in light of a New York case, Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 178 , 654 N.E.2d 954, 960-61 , 630 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686-87 (1995), which stated that a substantial nexus requires a physical presence in the taxing state that “ ‘must be demonstrably more than a “slightest presence” [citation].’ ” Brown’s Furniture, 171 Ill. 2d at 424 , quoting Orvis, 86 N.Y.2d at 178 , 654 N.E.2d at 961 , 630 N.Y.S.2d at 687 .

2000The court reasoned, in finding that Brown’s Furniture satisfied the substantial nexus requirement, that “[t]hrough its deliveries, Brown’s Furniture is physically present in Illinois on an almost continuous basis, directly competing with in-state retailers in establishing and maintaining a market for its furniture sales in Illinois.” Brown’s Furniture, 171 Ill. 2d at 425 .

2021See, e.g., Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services v. Parsons, 61 A.3d 336, 346 (Pa. Commw.

2019See, e.g., Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services v. Parsons, 61 A.3d 336, 346 (Pa. Commw.

2015DiFiore, 313 Ill.

2015DiFiore, 313 Ill.

2024Physical Presence ¶ 31 In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, 170 (2018), the Supreme Court overruled Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992), which had held that a taxpayer must have a physical presence in a state to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto.

2009With respect to the taxpayer’s physical presence within the state, Illinois courts have consistently held that to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement, physical presence inside the taxing state need not be substantial, but must be more than “slight.” See Brown’s Furniture, Inc., 171 Ill. 2d at 423-24, citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08 , 119 L.

2010The supreme court in Devoney found that the nexus requirement was satisfied because “ ‘but for the fact that Devoney was a Police Officer of high rank,’ he ‘would not have been in a position or selected to participate in the scheme to defraud.’ ” Devoney, 199 Ill. 2d at 423 .

2010The supreme court in Devoney found that the nexus requirement was satisfied because "but for the fact that Devoney was a Police Officer of high rank, he would not have been in a position or selected to participate in the scheme to defraud." Devoney, 199 Ill. 2d at 423 .

2024Physical Presence ¶ 31 In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. 162, 170 (2018), the Supreme Court overruled Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992), which had held that a taxpayer must have a physical presence in a state to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto.

2024Wayfair, Inc., 585 U.S. at 178 , made “physical presence *** not necessary to create a substantial nexus.” Rather, all that is required under the first element of Complete Auto to establish a substantial nexus is whether the taxpayer “ ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” Id. at 188 . ¶ 32 Here, the parties had agreed before the Tribunal that Wayfair’s substantial-privilege-of- carrying-on-business test did not apply outside the remote seller context.

2016Unlike the broader rule of Hawkins, which traces its lineage to Murchison and other constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court (see Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d at 50-51 ), the nexus test as expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Fair merely traces back to Titone, 151 Ill. 2d at 30-31 , which in turn cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Shaw, 580 A.2d 1379, 1381 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990), which in turn cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Hewett, 551 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1988) and Johnson v. Johnson, 424 - 20 - No. 1-13- 3492 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967). ¶ 46 The United States Supr

2016In Fair, the court held, "a petitioner who alleges that his trial judge's corruption violated his right to a fair trial must establish (1) a 'nexus' between the judge's corruption or criminal conduct in other cases and the judge's conduct at petitioner's trial; and (2) actual bias resulting from the judge's extrajudicial conduct." Id. at 261 (quoting People v. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d 19, 30-31 (1992)).

2016Compare Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 261 (proof of actual bias is necessary for successful judicial bias claim) with Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883 (proof of actual bias is not required). ¶ 47 Under any interpretation, a correct application of the nexus test mandates reversal.

2016In lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on appellate review of the judge's determination respecting actual bias, the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias." [Citations.] In defining these standards the Court has asked whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice - 22 - No. 1-13-3492 must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.' " Caperton, 556 U.S. at 8

2016See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535 . ¶ 48 The majority attaches some importance to the fact that Gacho has been unable to single out any incorrect evidentiary rulings made by Judge Maloney.

2016Unlike the broader rule of Hawkins, which traces its lineage to Murchison and other constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court (see Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d at 50-51 ), the nexus test as expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Fair merely traces back to Titone, 151 Ill. 2d at 30-31 , which in turn cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Shaw, 580 A.2d 1379, 1381 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990), which in turn cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Hewett, 551 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1988) and Johnson v. Johnson, 424 - 20 - No. 1-13- 3492 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967). ¶ 46 The United States Supr

2016Unlike the broader rule of Hawkins, which traces its lineage to Murchison and other constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court (see Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d at 50-51 ), the nexus test as expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Fair merely traces back to Titone, 151 Ill. 2d at 30-31 , which in turn cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Shaw, 580 A.2d 1379, 1381 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990), which in turn cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Hewett, 551 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1988) and Johnson v. Johnson, 424 - 20 - No. 1-13- 3492 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967). ¶ 46 The United States Supr

2016While we now must consider the case under the different standards applicable to our review following a third-stage evidentiary hearing, this court's earlier characterization remains no less accurate even in light of the evidence adduced at that hearing. ¶ 44 This case requires us to apply the nexus rule established by People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256 (2000), to an unusual set of facts which the Fair court had no occasion to consider.

2016Compare Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 261 (proof of actual bias is necessary for successful judicial bias claim) with Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883 (proof of actual bias is not required). ¶ 47 Under any interpretation, a correct application of the nexus test mandates reversal.

2009Ed. 2d at 102-04 , 112 S. Ct. at 1909-10 , and quoting Orvis Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 178 , 654 N.E.2d at 960-61 , 630 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87 (rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the physical connection to the state must be substantial and holding that instead the physical presence must be “ ‘demonstrably more than a “slightest presence” ’ ”); see also Bower, 351 Ill.

2009See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co., 419 U.S. at 562 , 42 L.

2009See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co., 419 U.S. at 562 , 42 L.

2008Romano, 384 Ill.