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20 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co.green2 sentences2024Co., 126 N.J. 2009Whether the requisite connection or degree of relationship exists depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. [Id. at 38, 312 A2d 664 (citation omitted).] The almost universal utility of the substantial nexus test in the area of insurance coverage questions is evident from the breadth of contexts to which it has been applied. | 1 | 2 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkampred2 sentences2010However, for Commerce Clause purposes, the nexus requirement reflects “structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy,” rather than the due process concern that fundamental fairness to the individual requires state power to be exercised only upon “ ‘notice’ or ‘fair warning.’ ” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 , 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1913 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91, 106 (1992). 2010However, for Commerce Clause purposes, the nexus requirement reflects “structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy,” rather than the due process concern that fundamental fairness to the individual requires state power to be exercised only upon “ ‘notice’ or ‘fair warning.’ ” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 , 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1913 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91, 106 (1992). | 1 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.green1 sentence2023Although physical presence ‘frequently will enhance’ a business’ connection with a State, ‘it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted . . . [with no] need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.’ [South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018) (internal citations omitted.] Here, plaintiff initially contends that its activities are insulated from state taxation under P.L. 86-272. | 1 | 1 |
Jacquelin Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC.green1 sentence2016Super. at 603-04 (reiterating the nexus requirement); Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC, 433 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hillsgreen1 sentence1970See Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 441-443 (1958)." Beyond that, Planning Board impositions, although purportedly authorized by the Planning Act or the local ordinance, amount to impermissible exactions. [4] The constitutional basis of the nexus requirement is illustrated by Grosso v. Board of Adjustment of Millburn Township, 137 N.J.L. 630 ( Sup. Ct. 1948), a case analogous to the instant situation. | 1 | 1 |
Grosso v. Board of Adjustment of Millburn Twp.green2 sentences1970See Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N. J. 423, 441-443 (1958).” Beyond that, Planning Board impositions, although purportedly authorized by the Planning Act or the local ordinance, amount to impermissible exactions. 4 The constitutional basis of the nexus requirement is illustrated by Grosso v. Board of Adjustment of Millburn Township, 137 N.J.L. 630 (Sup. Ct. 1948), a case analogous to the instant situation. 1970See Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 441-443 (1958)." Beyond that, Planning Board impositions, although purportedly authorized by the Planning Act or the local ordinance, amount to impermissible exactions. [4] The constitutional basis of the nexus requirement is illustrated by Grosso v. Board of Adjustment of Millburn Township, 137 N.J.L. 630 ( Sup. Ct. 1948), a case analogous to the instant situation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lindstrom v. Hanover Insurance
green
2 sentences1995Co., supra, 138 N.J. at 249 , 649 A. 2d 1272 .] *309 The Court went on to note that when applying the substantial nexus test to PIP coverage, the injury producing act need not have been one of negligence. 1995Co., supra, 138 N.J. at 249 , 649 A. 2d 1272 .] *309 The Court went on to note that when applying the substantial nexus test to PIP coverage, the injury producing act need not have been one of negligence. | 2 | 1995–1999 |
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue
green
2 sentences1982Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 , 58 S.Ct. 546 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938); Wisconsin v. J. 1982Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 , 58 S.Ct. 546 , 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938); Wisconsin v. J. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Smaul v. Irvington General Hospital
green
1 sentence2024The substantial nexus test "does not require that the injury be directly or proximately caused by the automobile itself or by its motion or operation." Smaul, 108 N.J. at 477 (quoting Westchester Fire Ins. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection & Acting Administrator v. Dimant
green
2 sentences2014The nexus requirement concerns “the distinctly separate question about holding liable a party who was not directly responsible for the discharge that had occurred, but who nevertheless had some control over the direct discharger in each matter.” Id. at 176 , 51 A.3d 816 . 2014The nexus requirement concerns “the distinctly separate question about holding liable a party who was not directly responsible for the discharge that had occurred, but who nevertheless had some control over the direct discharger in each matter.” Id. at 176 , 51 A.3d 816 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brenner
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 318-19 , 795 A.2d 286 (reciting factual allegations; quoting reasoning of trial judge). 2010Id. at 318-19 , 795 A.2d 286 (reciting factual allegations; quoting reasoning of trial judge). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
American Home Assur. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2009The panel referenced the substantial nexus test applied in American Home Assurance Co. v. Hartford Insurance Co., 190 N.J.Super. 477 , 464 A.2d 1128 (App.Div.1983), in respect of coverage for injuries caused in the “maintenance ... of a motor vehicle!,]” and determined that “Arians’[s] injuries were directly connected with the maintenance of Costa’s pickup!,]” Penn Nat’l Ins. 2009The panel referenced the substantial nexus test applied in American Home Assurance Co. v. Hartford Insurance Co., 190 N.J.Super. 477 , 464 A.2d 1128 (App.Div.1983), in respect of coverage for injuries caused in the “maintenance ... of a motor vehicle!,]” and determined that “Arians’[s] injuries were directly connected with the maintenance of Costa’s pickup!,]” Penn Nat’l Ins. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Penn National Ins. Co. v. Costa
neutral
2 sentences2009Co., supra, 400 N.J.Super. at 153 , 946 A2d 592 . 2009Co., supra, 400 N.J.Super. at 153 , 946 A2d 592 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2009The United States Supreme Court found that physical presence is necessary to satisfy the substantial nexus standard in the sales and use tax context in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967). 2009The United States Supreme Court found that physical presence is necessary to satisfy the substantial nexus standard in the sales and use tax context in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 , 87 S.Ct. 1389 , 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wakefern Food Corp. v. General Accident Group
green
2 sentences2009Echoing circumstances and considerations similar to the ones presented here, it explains that “[w]hen an accident ... is occasioned by negligent maintenance of the premises and the only connection to that event is the fact that the motor vehicle [is] present ..., no realistic social or public policy is served by straining to shift coverage.” Wakefern, supra, 188 N.J.Super. at 87 , 455 A.2d 1160 . 2009Echoing circumstances and considerations similar to the ones presented here, it explains that “[w]hen an accident ... is occasioned by negligent maintenance of the premises and the only connection to that event is the fact that the motor vehicle [is] present ..., no realistic social or public policy is served by straining to shift coverage.” Wakefern, supra, 188 N.J.Super. at 87 , 455 A.2d 1160 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
A & F TRADEMARK, INC. v. Tolson
green
1 sentence2005A & F Trademark, supra, 605 S.E. 2d at 194-95 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Westchester Fire Insurance v. Continental Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1998Id. (finding the insurance policy covered a bicyclist struck and killed by a stick thrown by a passenger in a moving car because such injuries were not uncommon and could be anticipated by parties to the insurance contract). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
181 Incorporated v. Salem Cty. Planning Bd.
green
1 sentence1994While it is true that road appropriations are made on an annual basis[,] it is also true that plans for road work involve "lead time." If the county does not intend to use the land proposed to be taken within such "lead time," to take it without compensation merely because opportunity presents itself runs afoul of the Constitution. [ Ibid. ] Judge Miller explained the basis of the rational nexus test used in Harris . [F]or the nexus test to apply, thus making a compulsory dedication constitutionally valid, the nexus must be rational. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel
green
2 sentences1991Cf. Holmdel Builders Ass’n, supra, 121 N.J. at 572 , 583 A.2d 277 (refusing to apply strict rational nexus standard to affordable-housing development fees because there was sound basis to support legislative judgment that reasonable relationship exists between unrestrained nonresidential development and need for such housing). 1991Cf. Holmdel Builders Ass’n, supra, 121 N.J. at 572 , 583 A.2d 277 (refusing to apply strict rational nexus standard to affordable-housing development fees because there was sound basis to support legislative judgment that reasonable relationship exists between unrestrained nonresidential development and need for such housing). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt.
green
2 sentences1990Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 , 100 S.Ct. 1223 , 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980). 1990Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 , 100 S.Ct. 1223 , 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation
green
2 sentences1985Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, supra; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Taxation Div. Dir., supra, 50 N.J. at 483 , 236 A. 2d 577 . 1985Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, supra; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Taxation Div. Dir., supra, 50 N.J. at 483 , 236 A. 2d 577 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.