nexus requirement in Colorado

2017The flaw in Torrez’s argument, however, is that there is no reason to think that this passage was essential to our explication of the substantial nexus test, such that it would undermine our reasoning in some way in that'regard; on the contrary, the passage appears in the introductory portion of Massey, not in the analysis, see id.

2017Again construing the 1979 statute, we returned to the substantial nexus test and, far from adopting the majority’s but-for test, we made Schubert’s suggested geographic limitation part of our rule. ¶74 In Massey, a defendant arrested on warrants from Mesa and Pitkin Counties sought credit in Pitkin County for his time spent confined in Mesa County while waiting to resolve the charges from both counties. 736 P.2d at 20 .

2016We need not resolve this apparent inconsistency because we determine that, even under the more expansive charge-or-conduct standard, Fransua is not entitled to PSCC for the March 1, 2014, to June 16, 2014, period of confinement. ¶ 11 Under Schubert , in determining whether a defendant should receive credit for a particular period of presentence confinement under the substantial nexus test, the court considers whether the confinement was actually caused by the charge or conduct for which the offender is to be sentenced. 698 P.2d at 795 ; Roy , 252 P.3d at 28 .

2012Id. ¶ 23 In creating the substantial nexus test, the court stated that the “obvious purpose” underlying the 1979 statute was to remedy the unequal treatment of indigent offenders who, due to their inability to post bail and the statutory discretion reposed in sentencing courts to grant or refuse -credit for presentence confinement, would serve longer periods in jail than their wealthier counterparts who were able to avoid presentence confinement by posting bail and thereby secure their presentence freedom.

2014See Barber, 196 P.3d at 246 (explaining that an injury that is “overly indirect and incidental” to the challenged government action will not convey taxpayer standing (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶13     We most explicitly articulated this nexus requirement in Brotman.

2012"Thus, [the Colorado Supreme Court has] interpreted Wimberly to confer standing when a plaintiff argues that a governmental action that harms him is unconstitutional." Barber, 196 P.3d at 246 (quoting Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; even where economic harm is not directly implicated, citizens have standing to ensure that government's action conforms to Colorado's Constitution). ¶ 49 A division of this court recently held that, although the Colorado standing case law has never referred to it as such, there is also a nexus requirement for taxpayer standing.

2012"Thus, [the Colorado Supreme Court has] interpreted Wimberly to confer standing when a plaintiff argues that a governmental action that harms him is unconstitutional." Barber, 196 P.3d at 246 (quoting Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; even where economic harm is not directly implicated, citizens have standing to ensure that government's action conforms to Colorado's Constitution). ¶ 49 A division of this court recently held that, although the Colorado standing case law has never referred to it as such, there is also a nexus requirement for taxpayer standing.

2011See id. at 246 (noting the requirement of an injury that is not overly indirect or incidental); Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (same). 4 Our understanding of Colorado taxpayer standing jurisprudence, and in particular this nexus requirement, is reinforced by Brotman v. East Lake Creek Ranch, L.L.P., 31 P.3d 886 (Colo.2001).

2024Cir. 2020) (“We see no need to articulate a precise test for evaluating section 1915(g)’s nexus requirement because, whatever the standard, Gorbey’s claims bear no relationship at all to the dangers alleged.”); McFadden v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 270 F. Supp. 3d 82, 89 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[T]he language of the exception itself is, at most, incomplete; it neither imposes a nexus requirement nor forecloses the imposition of such a requirement.

2024But see Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e decline to reach whether § 1915(g) incorporates a nexus requirement, as [defendant] would not prevail even if we were to adopt the Second Circuit standard.”); Barber v. Krepp, 680 F. App’x 819, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (declining to decide whether “§ 1915(g)’s ‘imminent danger’ exception requires proof of . . . a nexus” because, even if it did, the plaintiff had alleged such “a 17 nexus between the harm he has suffered and the defendant’s inaction”). ¶ 31 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals articu

2024But see Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e decline to reach whether § 1915(g) incorporates a nexus requirement, as [defendant] would not prevail even if we were to adopt the Second Circuit standard.”); Barber v. Krepp, 680 F. App’x 819, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (declining to decide whether “§ 1915(g)’s ‘imminent danger’ exception requires proof of . . . a nexus” because, even if it did, the plaintiff had alleged such “a 17 nexus between the harm he has suffered and the defendant’s inaction”). ¶ 31 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals articu

2020No. 1, 2019 CO 40, ¶ 28 . “[T]he interest of the taxpayer who challenges the constitutionality of government action is her ‘economic interest in having h[er] tax dollars spent in a constitutional manner.’” Id. at ¶ 23 (second alteration in original) 7 (emphasis in original) (quoting Conrad v. City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982)). ¶ 16 The district court found that the member plaintiffs have taxpayer standing “based upon their challenge to the constitutionality of the subject provisions under TABOR, pursuant to the test articulated in Barber and Dodge.”4 The court further foun

2014Even if defendant kept | or used his gun to protect his family, he was subject to enhanced punishment because it was also connected to his possession with mtent to distribute marijuana. 153 Relying on People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728, 733 (Colo.App.2011), defendant urges that, under the Colorado Constitution, he is entitled to assert the right to bear arms in self-defense as an affirmative defense.

2014People v. Martinez, 165 P.3d 907, 912 (Colo.App.2007).

2001See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 , 80 S.Ct. 168 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).

2001See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 , 80 S.Ct. 168 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).