nexus requirement in Michigan

2003In Magnetek, supra at 408 , this Court noted that, under Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 US 298, 315 ; 112 S Ct *527 1904; 119 L Ed 2d 91 (1992), the substantial nexus requirement would be satisfied by “the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office.” Alternatively, under In re Orvis Co, Inc v Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 86 NY2d 165 ; 654 NE2d 954 (1995), the conduct of economic activities in the taxing state performed by either the taxpayer’s personnel or others on its behalf, can satisfy the test for a substantial nexus.

2003In Magnetek, supra at 408 , this Court noted that, under Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 US 298, 315 ; 112 S Ct *527 1904; 119 L Ed 2d 91 (1992), the substantial nexus requirement would be satisfied by “the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office.” Alternatively, under In re Orvis Co, Inc v Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, 86 NY2d 165 ; 654 NE2d 954 (1995), the conduct of economic activities in the taxing state performed by either the taxpayer’s personnel or others on its behalf, can satisfy the test for a substantial nexus.

2005In Magnetek, supra at 408 , this Court noted that, under Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 U S 298, 315; 112 S Ct 1904 ; 119 L Ed 2d 91 (1992), the substantial nexus requirement would be satisfied by “the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office[.]’ ” Alternatively, the conduct of economic activities in the taxing state, performed by either the taxpayer’s personnel or others on its behalf, can satisfy the test for a substantial nexus.

2005In Magnetek, supra at 408 , this Court noted that, under Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 U S 298, 315; 112 S Ct 1904 ; 119 L Ed 2d 91 (1992), the substantial nexus requirement would be satisfied by “the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office[.]’ ” Alternatively, the conduct of economic activities in the taxing state, performed by either the taxpayer’s personnel or others on its behalf, can satisfy the test for a substantial nexus.

2005In Magnetek, supra at 408 , 562 N.W.2d 219 , this Court noted that, under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), the substantial nexus requirement would be satisfied by "the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office[.]" Alternatively, the conduct of economic activities in the taxing state, performed by either the taxpayer's personnel or others on its behalf, can satisfy the test for a substantial nexus.

2005In Magnetek, supra at 408 , this Court noted that, under Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 U S 298, 315; 112 S Ct 1904 ; 119 L Ed 2d 91 (1992), the substantial nexus requirement would be satisfied by “the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office[.]’ ” Alternatively, the conduct of economic activities in the taxing state, performed by either the taxpayer’s personnel or others on its behalf, can satisfy the test for a substantial nexus.

1980Justice Talbot Smith elaborated the nexus principle in his influential dissent in Salmon v Bagley Laundry Co, 344 Mich 471, 490 ; 74 NW2d 1 (1955), again without reference to or reliance on the concept embodied in the on-premises amendment. 26 Although Dyer, the case in which Haller was reinstated, 27 and Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 28 the only post-Dyer lunchtime injury case decided by this Court, were based on the "on-premises” presumption, the Court did not thereby reject the independently developing principle enunciated in Haller.

1980Justice Talbot Smith elaborated the nexus principle in his influential dissent in Salmon v Bagley Laundry Co, 344 Mich 471, 490 ; 74 NW2d 1 (1955), again without reference to or reliance on the concept embodied in the on-premises amendment. 26 Although Dyer, the case in which Haller was reinstated, 27 and Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 28 the only post-Dyer lunchtime injury case decided by this Court, were based on the "on-premises” presumption, the Court did not thereby reject the independently developing principle enunciated in Haller.

2025However, federal caselaw is not binding on us, see People v Gillam, 479 Mich 253, 261 ; 734 NW2d 585 (2007), and we have not explicitly adopted the nexus framework employed by the federal appellate courts. -3- “consistently” seen at each other’s residences and they were seen in each other’s vehicles; text messages existed between one of the brothers and defendant that discussed “drug amounts, meeting locations and ‘catching plays,’ which [was] a common street term for making drug transactions,” according to Officer Evans; and defendant was investigated for his involvement in drug trafficking i

2025However, federal caselaw is not binding on us, see People v Gillam, 479 Mich 253, 261 ; 734 NW2d 585 (2007), and we have not explicitly adopted the nexus framework employed by the federal appellate courts. -3- “consistently” seen at each other’s residences and they were seen in each other’s vehicles; text messages existed between one of the brothers and defendant that discussed “drug amounts, meeting locations and ‘catching plays,’ which [was] a common street term for making drug transactions,” according to Officer Evans; and defendant was investigated for his involvement in drug trafficking i

2005Defendant also directed that this nexus standard should apply retroactively to 1989 on the basis of this Court’s decision in Syntex Laboratories v Dep’t of Treasury, 233 Mich App 286 ; 590 NW2d 612 (1998).

2005Defendant also directed that this nexus standard should apply retroactively to 1989 on the basis of this Court’s decision in Syntex Laboratories v Dep’t of Treasury, 233 Mich App 286 ; 590 NW2d 612 (1998).