nexus requirement in Louisiana

2026State v. Jordan, 06-187 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/26/06), 938 So.2d 805.

2015In State v. Jordan, 06-187 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/26/06) , 938 So.2d 805, 808 , rehearing denied, 06-187 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/16/2006) , this Court noted, “As evidenced by Blanchard , the nexus requirement of LSA-R.S. 14:95(E) is fact sensitive.” Although defendant, in his assignment of error contends that he only had “constructive possession of the guns,” the record shows, in fact, that he never denied that the guns seized pursuant to the search warrant were his.

2026State v. Reed, 14-1980, (La. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 291, 315, reh’g granted in part on other grounds, 14-1980 (La. 10/19/16), 213 So.3d 384, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1166, 137 S.Ct. 787 (2017); State v. Rickmon, 23-766, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/25), 409 So.3d 284, 292–93.

2026State v. Reed, 14-1980, (La. 9/7/16), 200 So.3d 291, 315, reh’g granted in part on other grounds, 14-1980 (La. 10/19/16), 213 So.3d 384, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1166, 137 S.Ct. 787 (2017); State v. Rickmon, 23-766, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/25), 409 So.3d 284, 292–93.

2024The Blanchard court further held, however, that “[p]roof of a nexus requirement is not required where the defendant uses or has actual possession of the firearm, or has the firearm within his immediate control.” Id. [Emphasis supplied.] A person is in “constructive possession” of a firearm when the firearm is subject to defendant’s dominion and control.

2024State v. Johnson, 03-1228 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 998 .

2008Bridges , 04-0814 at pp. 6 and 31, 900 So.2d at 789 and 805. [11] On appeal, Geoffrey does not address the remaining prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test, but rather, limits its argument to the substantial nexus requirement.

2004In determining what constitutes a substantial nexus, the Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), found that if a vendor maintains a "physical presence" in the taxing state, the substantial nexus requirement is fulfilled.

2004In determining what constitutes a substantial nexus, the Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), found that if a vendor maintains a "physical presence" in the taxing state, the substantial nexus requirement is fulfilled.

2004However, the crucial factor governing nexus, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232, 251 , 107 S.Ct. 2810, 2821 , 97 L.Ed.2d 199 (1987), is whether the activities performed in the taxing state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in the taxing state.

2004However, the crucial factor governing nexus, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232, 251 , 107 S.Ct. 2810, 2821 , 97 L.Ed.2d 199 (1987), is whether the activities performed in the taxing state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in the taxing state.

2001The Supreme Court elaborated on both requirements of admiralty jurisdiction in the most recent of the trilogy, Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 , 110 S.Ct. 2892 , 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), a case involving a fire aboard a pleasure boat which spread to other boats and the nearby marina.

2001The Supreme Court elaborated on both requirements of admiralty jurisdiction in the most recent of the trilogy, Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 , 110 S.Ct. 2892 , 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), a case involving a fire aboard a pleasure boat which spread to other boats and the nearby marina.

1990In that judgment, the court found that it did not have admiralty jurisdiction because the alleged tort did not satisfy the nexus requirement stated in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 , 93 S.Ct. 493 , 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972)—that is, the wrong did not bear a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.

1990In that judgment, the court found that it did not have admiralty jurisdiction because the alleged tort did not satisfy the nexus requirement stated in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 , 93 S.Ct. 493 , 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972)—that is, the wrong did not bear a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.

1989Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d at 525 .