nexus requirement in Texas

2008Nopak further contends that Sebbas’s activities in Texas were, at best, de minimis activities that should be ignored for taxing purposes.  The substantial nexus requirement requires more than de minimis contact with the state before taxes may be assessed against a foreign company doing business through interstate commerce.  See Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co. , 505 U.S. 214, 231 , 112 S.Ct . 2447, 120 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992).  Texas has defined de minimis activities to include “those [activities] that, when taken together, establish only a trivial additional connection with

2008Nopak further contends that Sebbas’s activities in Texas were, at best, de minimis activities that should be ignored for taxing purposes.  The substantial nexus requirement requires more than de minimis contact with the state before taxes may be assessed against a foreign company doing business through interstate commerce.  See Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co. , 505 U.S. 214, 231 , 112 S.Ct . 2447, 120 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992).  Texas has defined de minimis activities to include “those [activities] that, when taken together, establish only a trivial additional connection with

2011The nexus requirement limits an employer’s liability to prevent an employer from becoming “an insurer of the safety of every person who happens to come into contact with his employee simply because of his status as an employee.” Houser, 968 S.W.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted); see LaBella, 942 S.W.2d at 137 .

2011The nexus requirement limits an employer's liability to prevent an employer from becoming "an insurer of the safety of every person who happens to come into contact with his employee simply because of his status as an employee." Houser , 968 S.W.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted); see LaBella , 942 S.W.2d at 137 .

2011The nexus requirement limits an employer’s liability to prevent an employer from becoming “an insurer of the safety of every person who happens to come into contact with his employee simply because of his status as an employee.” Houser, 968 S.W.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted); see LaBella, 942 S.W.2d at 137 .

2011The nexus requirement limits an employer's liability to prevent an employer from becoming "an insurer of the safety of every person who happens to come into contact with his employee simply because of his status as an employee." Houser , 968 S.W.2d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted); see LaBella , 942 S.W.2d at 137 .

2009Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992).

2009Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 , 112 S.Ct. 1904 , 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992).

2015By way of the majority's discussion in this regard we essentially revisit the nexus requirement, Lackey v. State, [**45] Moreover, other portions of the Penry 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991) (On appellant's opinion support my long-held belief -- based on my motion for rehearing), in a new setting.

1997He asserts that the nexus requirement set out by this Court in cases like Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 , 135 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), [4] Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim.App.1993), and Willingham v. State, supra , is no longer valid in light of the post- Penry sentencing scheme. [5] He conclusorily states that, while a nexus was required under these post- Penry , pre-statute cases, this should no longer be the law in light of the enactment of Article 37.071, Section 2(e). [6] We have held that, to constitute proper jury ar

1997He asserts that the nexus requirement set out by this Court in cases like Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 , 135 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), [4] Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim.App.1993), and Willingham v. State, supra , is no longer valid in light of the post- Penry sentencing scheme. [5] He conclusorily states that, while a nexus was required under these post- Penry , pre-statute cases, this should no longer be the law in light of the enactment of Article 37.071, Section 2(e). [6] We have held that, to constitute proper jury ar

1997He asserts that the nexus requirement set out by this Court in cases like Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 , 135 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), 4 Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), and Willingham v. State, supra, is no longer valid in light of the post- Penry sentencing scheme. 5 He conelusorily states that, while a nexus was required under these post-Penry, pre-statute cases, this should no longer be the law in light of the enactment of Article 37.071, Section 2(e). 6 We have held that, to constitute proper jury argument, th

1993And I continue to believe the nexus requirement restricts the Eighth Amendment and violates the explicit holding of Penry that a jury must be able to “consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background, character, or the circumstances of the crime.” Mines, 852 S.W.2d at 960 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 328 , 109 S.Ct. at 2951 [emphasis in original]). 3 Nevertheless, the nexus requirement has been adopted by a majority of this Court and has become settled law.

1993And I continue to believe the nexus requirement restricts the Eighth Amendment and violates the explicit holding of Penry that a jury must be able to “consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background, character, or the circumstances of the crime.” Mines, 852 S.W.2d at 960 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 328 , 109 S.Ct. at 2951 [emphasis in original]). 3 Nevertheless, the nexus requirement has been adopted by a majority of this Court and has become settled law.

2023Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 559 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011), judgm’t withdrawn, appeal dism’d, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12063 , [] (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Mellon Mortg.

2021Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 559 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011), judgm’t withdrawn, appeal dism’d, No. 03-09-00566-CV, 2014 WL 5801862 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Mellon Mortg.

2013Id.; see also State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260 , 8 P.3d 1174, 1178-80 (Ariz.Ct.App.2000) (interpreting the statutory phrase "knowingly ... [u]sing or possessing a deadly weapon during the commission of any felony offense” as requiring a nexus between the felony and the weapon; "We find it persuasive that other courts facing similar language have required a nexus between the gun and the crime to avoid absurd results or overbreadth.’'). 45 .

2013Id.; see also State v. Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260 , 8 P.3d 1174, 1178-80 (Ariz.Ct.App.2000) (interpreting the statutory phrase "knowingly ... [u]sing or possessing a deadly weapon during the commission of any felony offense” as requiring a nexus between the felony and the weapon; "We find it persuasive that other courts facing similar language have required a nexus between the gun and the crime to avoid absurd results or overbreadth.’'). 45 .

1992Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 , 98 S.Ct. at 2965 ; see Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 , 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987).

1992Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 , 98 S.Ct. at 2965 ; see Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 , 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987).

2026Therefore, “[t]he requested examination . . . directly relates to the condition in controversy and satisfies the nexus requirement.” Id.

2018The requested examination thus directly relates to the condition in controversy and satisfies the nexus requirement. 492 S.W.3d at 303 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted); see In re AutoZone, 2017 WL 4974559 , at *2; In re Reliable Commercial Roofing Servs., Inc., No. 01- 20 15-00450-CV, 2016 WL 3345483 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 24, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). (ii) Inability to obtain the evidence through less intrusive means The only remaining question is whether Relators established the third element of Rule 204.1’s “good cause” prong, that is, their inabili

2013See LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51; Elgin Indep.

2013LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51 .

1997He asserts that the nexus requirement set out by this Court in cases like Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 , 135 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), [4] Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim.App.1993), and Willingham v. State, supra , is no longer valid in light of the post- Penry sentencing scheme. [5] He conclusorily states that, while a nexus was required under these post- Penry , pre-statute cases, this should no longer be the law in light of the enactment of Article 37.071, Section 2(e). [6] We have held that, to constitute proper jury ar

1997He asserts that the nexus requirement set out by this Court in cases like Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 , 135 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), 4 Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), and Willingham v. State, supra, is no longer valid in light of the post- Penry sentencing scheme. 5 He conelusorily states that, while a nexus was required under these post-Penry, pre-statute cases, this should no longer be the law in light of the enactment of Article 37.071, Section 2(e). 6 We have held that, to constitute proper jury argument, th

2025Exclusion of Alternative-Perpetrator Evidence In his second issue, Appellant argues that if this court holds that his constitutional arguments in his first issue were not sufficiently preserved, then the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was nonetheless erroneous.10 Specifically, Appellant 10 Within his first and second issues complaining about his inability to present a complete defense, Appellant contends that “[w]hether the nexus requirement [from Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Tex. Crim.

2008Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d at 406 .

1997A majority of this Court then adopted the nexus requirement in Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).

1994See e.g., Richardson, 879 S.W.2d at 884 ; Earhart, 877 S.W.2d at 765-767 ; Gunter v. State, 858 S.W.2d 430, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Satterwhite v. State, 858 S.W.2d 412, 428 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 256 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); and, Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 134 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).

1986However, the court in C & H Transportation Co., 719 F.2d at 1269 n. 8, did note that the second prong, the nexus requirement, might be constitutionally required in light of language in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 408 , 104 U.S. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that the second prong is a necessary requirement when the nonresident defendant has only maintained single or few contacts with the forum.

1985Yet, in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 , the Court held that, although the second prong of the test was useful in any situation involving a jurisdictional question, it is unnecessary when the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum are of such a nature as to satisfy "the demands of the ultimate test of due process."

2025“But the existence of a logically defined single episode within a small spatial area, where the challenged governmental actions were undertaken both soon after and because of the downpour, makes it more likely (but certainly not guaranteed) that both the temporal and geographic showings can be made.” Id.; see also City of Dallas v. Hillis, 308 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (“When an alleged cause is geographically, temporally, or causally attenuated from the alleged effect, that attenuation will tend to show that the alleged cause did no more than furnish the condition t