authorities rule in Texas

1967In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so." Miranda, 384 U.S. at p. 476 , 86 S.Ct. at p. 1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 724 .

1967In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so." Miranda, 384 U.S. at p. 476 , 86 S.Ct. at p. 1629 , 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 724 .

2015Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2015Brooks v State, 323 S.W.3d 383 (Tex.Crim App. 2010) Appellant’s whole argument is based on his interpretation of the evidence.

1969Finding no reversible error reflected by the record in this case the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. * In Simpson v. Simpson, 380 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1964, writ ref’d n. r. e.), we reviewed the authorities which apply the doctrine of judicial estop-pel in Texas but held that the doctrine was not shown to exist, as a matter of law, under the facts in that case.

1968Appellees cite only one case to counter the effect of the authorities and principle upon which appellants rely, Cox v. Queen Insurance Company of America, 370 S.W. 2d 206 , Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, writ ref. n.r.e.

1968Appellees cite only one case to counter the effect of the authorities and principle upon which appellants rely, Cox v. Queen Insurance Company of America, 370 S.W. 2d 206 , Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, writ ref. n.r.e.

1963We adhere to the “no duty” rule as announced in the Halepeska decision: if there are dangers which are not open and obvious, the occupier is under a duty to take such precautions as a reasonable prudent person would take to protect his invitees therefrom or to warn them thereof. 371 S.W.2d 368 , 378 and 380.

1960In City of El Paso v. Mendoza, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 102, 105 , the appellate court recognized the right of a city to divest itself of a duty relative to street maintenance and repair when authorized by legislative enactment; there holding in part that “deducible from the above-cited authorities is the principle that by voluntary contract or ordinance a city cannot divest itself of the duty owing with reference to the maintenance of its streets except unde9 authorization of the state. *' *.

1959Stores, 225 Mo.App. 584 , 39 S.W.2d 797 ; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515 , 44 N.E.2d 726 ; Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288 , 79 S.E.2d 785 ; 152 A.L.R. 562 ; Hartnett v. May Dept.

1959Stores, 225 Mo.App. 584 , 39 S.W.2d 797 ; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515 , 44 N.E.2d 726 ; Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288 , 79 S.E.2d 785 ; 152 A.L.R. 562 ; Hartnett v. May Dept.

1959Stores, 225 Mo.App. 584 , 39 S.W.2d 797 ; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515 , 44 N.E.2d 726 ; Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288 , 79 S.E.2d 785 ; 152 A.L.R. 562 ; Hartnett v. May Dept.

1959Stores, 225 Mo.App. 584 , 39 S.W.2d 797 ; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515 , 44 N.E.2d 726 ; Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288 , 79 S.E.2d 785 ; 152 A.L.R. 562 ; Hartnett v. May Dept.

1959Stores, 225 Mo.App. 584 , 39 S.W.2d 797 ; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515 , 44 N.E.2d 726 ; Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288 , 79 S.E.2d 785 ; 152 A.L.R. 562 ; Hartnett v. May Dept.

1959Stores, 225 Mo.App. 584 , 39 S.W.2d 797 ; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515 , 44 N.E.2d 726 ; Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288 , 79 S.E.2d 785 ; 152 A.L.R. 562 ; Hartnett v. May Dept.

1952In speaking of whether or not the day of service should be included in determining as to whether jurisdiction had been obtained, Judge Hemphill said: “We are satisfied from the authorities that no rule for the inclusion or universal exclusion of days has been laid down or is desirable; that intention " is the governing principle and must be effectuated so as to preserve rights, prevent forfeitures, and favor parties where penal consequences are sought to be enforced; and believing that the construction now given will operate to the advantage of defendants without impairing or divesting the rig

1945The opinion in the case of Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202 , loc. cit. 209, 48 S.W.2d 944 , 83 A.L.R. 278 , quotes with approval sections 284 and 285 of McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed. We here quote a portion of Section 284: “As already seen, the duty of the city to make and keep its streets reasonably safe for travel is primary, and it cannot devolve this duty upon one with whom it contracts to do the necessary work, so as to exonerate itself from liability for his negligence in performing it.” Deducible from the above-cited authorities is the principle that by voluntar

1945The opinion in the case of Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202 , loc. cit. 209, 48 S.W.2d 944 , 83 A.L.R. 278 , quotes with approval sections 284 and 285 of McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed. We here quote a portion of Section 284: “As already seen, the duty of the city to make and keep its streets reasonably safe for travel is primary, and it cannot devolve this duty upon one with whom it contracts to do the necessary work, so as to exonerate itself from liability for his negligence in performing it.” Deducible from the above-cited authorities is the principle that by voluntar

1945The opinion in the case of Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202 , loc. cit. 209, 48 S.W.2d 944 , 83 A.L.R. 278 , quotes with approval sections 284 and 285 of McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed. We here quote a portion of Section 284: “As already seen, the duty of the city to make and keep its streets reasonably safe for travel is primary, and it cannot devolve this duty upon one with whom it contracts to do the necessary work, so as to exonerate itself from liability for his negligence in performing it.” Deducible from the above-cited authorities is the principle that by voluntar

1943Vol. 22, § 68; Anderson v. Polk, 117 Tex. 73 , 297 S.W. 219 .

1943Vol. 22, § 68; Anderson v. Polk, 117 Tex. 73 , 297 S.W. 219 .

1936App.), 231 S. W., 701, 704 , Judge Powell quoted a portion of what has been quoted above from the Nebraska case and said: “The Supreme Court of Texas is in accord with the Nebraska decision just quoted as will be seen from its opinion in the case of Krause v. City of El Paso.” The opinion in Cawthorn v. City of Houston contains the following broad statement with respect to estoppel of cities: “It will be seen from the above opinion that in Texas the doctrine of estoppel not only applies generally where the city is acting in its proprietary capacity, but also by reason of the negligence or unau

1936In the Randle case, supra ( 41 Texas 292 ), we said that “gift enterprises,” “gift sales,” “American Art Union,” “prize concerts,” and “gifts for the million,” etc., were “devices and subterfuges which are used by those who seek to evade the law or entice to their own profit the credulous and unwary.” If it be granted that the plan of defendant in error’s “bank night” was not a lottery because a charge was not made for the registration entitling one to participate in the drawing (and this is the only distinction which is here or could be made), then it clearly comes within the condemnatory ter

1935If, however, an issue made by the pleadings and the evidence has not been submitted at all, a requested instruction, though defective in form, if it is so nearly correct as to be sufficient to call the court's attention to the matter, requires a proper submission of such issue by the court." The following authorities were cited: Freybe v. Tiernan, 76 Tex. 286 , 13 S.W. 370 ; Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565 , 10 S.W. 683 ; Ft.

1935If, however, an issue made by the pleadings and the evidence has not been submitted at all, a requested instruction, though defective in form, if it is so nearly correct as to be sufficient to call the court's attention to the matter, requires a proper submission of such issue by the court." The following authorities were cited: Freybe v. Tiernan, 76 Tex. 286 , 13 S.W. 370 ; Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565 , 10 S.W. 683 ; Ft.

1935If, however, an issue made by the pleadings and the evidence has not been submitted at all, a requested instruction, though defective in form, if it is so nearly correct as to be sufficient to call the court's attention to the matter, requires a proper submission of such issue by the court." The following authorities were cited: Freybe v. Tiernan, 76 Tex. 286 , 13 S.W. 370 ; Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565 , 10 S.W. 683 ; Ft.

1935If, however, an issue made by the pleadings and the evidence has not been submitted at all, a requested instruction, though defective in form, if it is so nearly correct as to be sufficient to call the court's attention to the matter, requires a proper submission of such issue by the court." The following authorities were cited: Freybe v. Tiernan, 76 Tex. 286 , 13 S.W. 370 ; Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565 , 10 S.W. 683 ; Ft.

1932Appellees’ contentions find no support from the opinion of this court in the case of Richardson v. Houston Oil Co., 176 S. W. 628, 631 , in which, after stating the general rule that a tenant is estopped from disputing the title of his landlord, it is said: “It is equally well settled by the authorities that this rule of estoppel applies with full force to one who obtains or claims possession through or under the tenant of another.

1932Flanagan v. Pearson, 61 Tex. 306 ; Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138 , 86 S. W. 746 , 87 S. W. 1148 , 122 Am.

1932Flanagan v. Pearson, 61 Tex. 306 ; Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138 , 86 S. W. 746 , 87 S. W. 1148 , 122 Am.

1931Mathis v. State, 113 Texas Crim.

1930"The Ineeda Laundry is in the middle of the block on Main Street between Liberty and Broadway, that is a fact: That would make it half a block from the laundry up to Liberty Avenue, and it would make it also half a block down to Broadway — it is practically the same distance from the intersection of Main and Liberty Street down to Willow Street as it is from the intersection of Main and Broadway — my house is on the corner of Calder and Willow." We think the following authorities in principle sustain the theory that the driver at the time of the accident was "engaged in the furtherance of his

1930App.) 288 S. W. 560 ; Pierce-Fordice Oil Co. v. Brading (Tex. Civ.

1930The following authorities in principle support this view: Goodbar v. Bank, 78 Tex. 461, 14 .

1930"The Ineeda Laundry is in the middle of the block on Main Street between Liberty and Broadway, that is a fact: That would make it half a block from the laundry up to Liberty Avenue, and it would make it also half a block down to Broadway — it is practically the same distance from the intersection of Main and Liberty Street down to Willow Street as it is from the intersection of Main and Broadway — my house is on the corner of Calder and Willow." We think the following authorities in principle sustain the theory that the driver at the time of the accident was "engaged in the furtherance of his

1925App.] 155 S.W. 1025 ." Railway v. Logan, supra: "We gather from the authorities that for the rule of discovered peril to be applicable in the instant case it must appear that appellee was in a place of danger when seen by appellant's engineer, and that the engineer realized his danger, and also that appellee could not or would not probably extricate himself from the dangerous situation.

1925App.] 155 S. W. 1025 .” Railway v. Logan, supra: “We gather from the authorities that for the rule of discovered peril to be applicable in the instant case it must appear that appellee was in a place of danger when seen, by appellant’s engineer, and that the engineer realized his danger, and also that appellee could not or would not probably extricate himself from the dangerous situation.

1925App.] 155 S.W. 1025 ." Railway v. Logan, supra: "We gather from the authorities that for the rule of discovered peril to be applicable in the instant case it must appear that appellee was in a place of danger when seen by appellant's engineer, and that the engineer realized his danger, and also that appellee could not or would not probably extricate himself from the dangerous situation.

1922Jackson v. Palmer, 52 Tex. 427 ; Vardeman v. Lawson, 17 Tex. 10 ; Dewitt v. Miller, 9 Tex. 239 ; Rutherford v. Carr, 99 Tex. 101 , 87 S. W. 816 .

1922Jackson v. Palmer, 52 Tex. 427 ; Vardeman v. Lawson, 17 Tex. 10 ; Dewitt v. Miller, 9 Tex. 239 ; Rutherford v. Carr, 99 Tex. 101 , 87 S.W. 816 .