qualitative standard in California

2019Consequently, Frandsen correctly construes the California cases that have held Johnson inapplicable where a crime requires the court to apply a statutory standard to "real-world facts" underlying the defendant's conviction. ( Frandsen , supra , at pp. 1142-44, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 , 2019 WL 1486863 , at *10-11 [discussing *976 People v. Ledesma (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 830 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 and People v. White (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 433 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].) A statute that applies a qualitative standard to a defendant's actual conduct-such as a prohibition on "reckless" driving-is not unconsti

2019Consequently, Frandsen correctly construes the California cases that have held Johnson inapplicable where a crime requires the court to apply a statutory standard to "real-world facts" underlying the defendant's conviction. ( Frandsen , supra , at pp. 1142-44, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 , 2019 WL 1486863 , at *10-11 [discussing *976 People v. Ledesma (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 830 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 and People v. White (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 433 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].) A statute that applies a qualitative standard to a defendant's actual conduct-such as a prohibition on "reckless" driving-is not unconsti

2026(People v. Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 708-709.) In Chavez Zepeda, a case defendant relies on, the court found that aggravating circumstances are not unconstitutionally vague even when the factor uses undefined qualitative terms, such as “great violence,” “high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness,” “particularly vulnerable,” and “serious danger.” (Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71, 86-88, 91-92; see rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (9), (b)(1).) Although the court did not expressly address the term “great monetary value” in its analysis, nothing 47. suggests that factor is un

2024(Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 86, 91.) This discretion is a meaningful protection against the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s liberty interest.

2018The nature of the proceeding; the character of the witness and [his or her] connection with the events; the extent and subject of his direct testimony; the time and preparatory opportunities available to the accused and his attorney—these are some of the influential factors.’ ” (Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 929 .) Insufficient opportunity based upon the ineffectiveness of counsel, however, need not render former testimony inadmissible unless the ineffective assistance affected the cross-examination.

2018The nature of the proceeding; the character of the witness and [his or her] connection with the events; the extent and subject of his direct testimony; the time and preparatory opportunities available to the accused and his attorney—these are some of the influential factors.’ ” (Stevenson v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 929 .) Insufficient opportunity based upon the ineffectiveness of counsel, however, need not render former testimony inadmissible unless the ineffective assistance affected the cross-examination.

1985The nature of the proceeding; the character of the witness and his connection with the events; the extent and subject of his direct testimony; the time and preparatory opportunities available to the accused and his attorney—these are some of the influential factors.” (Id., at p. 743.) In People v. Johnson (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 701 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 372 ], defendant’s conviction was based almost exclusively on the preliminary hearing testimony of a Spanish-speaking witness which was admitted at trial after the witness was shown to be unavailable.

1985The nature of the proceeding; the character of the witness and his connection with the events; the extent and subject of his direct testimony; the time and preparatory opportunities available to the accused and his attorney—these are some of the influential factors.” (Id., at p. 743.) In People v. Johnson (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 701 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 372 ], defendant’s conviction was based almost exclusively on the preliminary hearing testimony of a Spanish-speaking witness which was admitted at trial after the witness was shown to be unavailable.

2026(People v. Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 708-709.) In Chavez Zepeda, a case defendant relies on, the court found that aggravating circumstances are not unconstitutionally vague even when the factor uses undefined qualitative terms, such as “great violence,” “high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness,” “particularly vulnerable,” and “serious danger.” (Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71, 86-88, 91-92; see rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (9), (b)(1).) Although the court did not expressly address the term “great monetary value” in its analysis, nothing 47. suggests that factor is un

2024As we summarized in Strauss, “the numerous past decisions of this court that have addressed this issue all have indicated that the type of measure that may constitute a revision of the California Constitution is one that makes ‘far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan’ (Amador [Valley], supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , 223, italics added), or, stated in slightly different terms, that ‘substantially alter[s] the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.’ (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 510 , italics added.)” (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441 .) For

2024As we summarized in Strauss, “the numerous past decisions of this court that have addressed this issue all have indicated that the type of measure that may constitute a revision of the California Constitution is one that makes ‘far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan’ (Amador [Valley], supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , 223, italics added), or, stated in slightly different terms, that ‘substantially alter[s] the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.’ (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 510 , italics added.)” (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441 .) For

2024As we summarized in Strauss, “the numerous past decisions of this court that have addressed this issue all have indicated that the type of measure that may constitute a revision of the California Constitution is one that makes ‘far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan’ (Amador [Valley], supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , 223, italics added), or, stated in slightly different terms, that ‘substantially alter[s] the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.’ (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 510 , italics added.)” (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441 .) For

2024As we summarized in Strauss, “the numerous past decisions of this court that have addressed this issue all have indicated that the type of measure that may constitute a revision of the California Constitution is one that makes ‘far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan’ (Amador [Valley], supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , 223, italics added), or, stated in slightly different terms, that ‘substantially alter[s] the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.’ (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 510 , italics added.)” (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441 .) For

2024As we summarized in Strauss, “the numerous past decisions of this court that have addressed this issue all have indicated that the type of measure that may constitute a revision of the California Constitution is one that makes ‘far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan’ (Amador [Valley], supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , 223, italics added), or, stated in slightly different terms, that ‘substantially alter[s] the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution.’ (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 510 , italics added.)” (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 441 .) For

2023Code “[§] 300 provides guidelines sufficiently specific to delineate the circumstances under which a child will qualify for dependent status and thus to define the parental duty of care and protection that would prevent the occurrence of those circumstances”]; In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428 , 435-438 [rejecting the argument that the phrase “ ‘serious physical harm,’ ” as it appears in § 300, subd. (a), is unconstitutionally vague]; accord, Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. 591 , 603-604 [“As a general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the ap

2020On the other hand, a tax consultant employed either by an individual company or by a firm of consultants is ordinarily doing work of substantial importance to the management or operation of a business.” ( 29 C.F.R. § 541.205 (a)-(c).) The qualitative requirement articulated in Harris stems from former parts 541.205(a) and 541.205(b). ( Harris, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 180-182.) Former part 541.205(a) articulates that work “‘directly related to the management policies or general business operations’” describes activities “relating to the administrative operations of a business”; and part (b) pr

2020On the other hand, a tax consultant employed either by an individual company or by a firm of consultants is ordinarily doing work of substantial importance to the management or operation of a business.” ( 29 C.F.R. § 541.205 (a)-(c).) The qualitative requirement articulated in Harris stems from former parts 541.205(a) and 541.205(b). ( Harris, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 180-182.) Former part 541.205(a) articulates that work “‘directly related to the management policies or general business operations’” describes activities “relating to the administrative operations of a business”; and part (b) pr

2012(Limited, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1499 .) The Limited Stores, Inc., had argued that its treasury department was integral to its retail operations because the company needed to manage a cash reserve to meet consistent cyclical needs to purchase seasonal inventory.

2009This is because the Abelleira court “did not hold that the exhaustion doctrine implicated a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 .) Rather, the doctrine is “ ‘a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts of last resort, followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.’ ” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 , quoting Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 293 .) The Mokler court further noted that there are strong jurisprudential reasons for requiring a litigant who wishes to assert the exhaustion doctrine to ra

2009This is because the Abelleira court “did not hold that the exhaustion doctrine implicated a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 .) Rather, the doctrine is “ ‘a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts of last resort, followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.’ ” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 , quoting Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 293 .) The Mokler court further noted that there are strong jurisprudential reasons for requiring a litigant who wishes to assert the exhaustion doctrine to ra

2009This is because the Abelleira court “did not hold that the exhaustion doctrine implicated a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 .) Rather, the doctrine is “ ‘a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts of last resort, followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.’ ” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 , quoting Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 293 .) The Mokler court further noted that there are strong jurisprudential reasons for requiring a litigant who wishes to assert the exhaustion doctrine to ra

2009This is because the Abelleira court “did not hold that the exhaustion doctrine implicated a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 .) Rather, the doctrine is “ ‘a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts of last resort, followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts.’ ” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 134 , quoting Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 293 .) The Mokler court further noted that there are strong jurisprudential reasons for requiring a litigant who wishes to assert the exhaustion doctrine to ra

2007(Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) 11 The Harris court further held that, in evaluating the viability of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim based upon a category not enumerated in the statute or identified in a prior appellate decision, one of the questions in the three-part test is whether the new claim “is based on a classification that involves personal.characteristics.” ( Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) Since Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 , held that the Act prohibited arbitrary discrimination on the basis of one’s occupation, we need not engage in the three-part Harris test tha

2007(Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) 11 The Harris court further held that, in evaluating the viability of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim based upon a category not enumerated in the statute or identified in a prior appellate decision, one of the questions in the three-part test is whether the new claim “is based on a classification that involves personal.characteristics.” ( Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) Since Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 , held that the Act prohibited arbitrary discrimination on the basis of one’s occupation, we need not engage in the three-part Harris test tha