apparent violation in Pennsylvania

2021Sinaiko, 664 A.2d at 1009 .

2021Sinaiko, 664 A.2d at 1009 .

2020The defendant’s argument was based upon his receipt of a letter indicating his parole status, “and the apparent presumption that [the] issuance of the letter commenced his release on parole.” Id. at 998 .

2020The defendant’s argument was based upon his receipt of a letter indicating his parole status, “and the apparent presumption that [the] issuance of the letter commenced his release on parole.” Id. at 998 .

2004Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 738 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), affirmed, 565 Pa. 493 , 776 A.2d 951 (2001); DeVore v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sun Oil Co.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth.615, 645 A.2d 917 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606 , 655 A.2d 993 (1994).

2004Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 738 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), affirmed, 565 Pa. 493 , 776 A.2d 951 (2001); DeVore v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sun Oil Co.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 615 , 645 A.2d 917 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606 , 655 A.2d 993 (1994).

2004Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 738 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), affirmed, 565 Pa. 493 , 776 A.2d 951 (2001); DeVore v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sun Oil Co.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth.615, 645 A.2d 917 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606 , 655 A.2d 993 (1994).

2004Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 738 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), affirmed, 565 Pa. 493 , 776 A.2d 951 (2001); DeVore v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sun Oil Co.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth.615, 645 A.2d 917 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606 , 655 A.2d 993 (1994).

2004Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 738 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), affirmed, 565 Pa. 493 , 776 A.2d 951 (2001); DeVore v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sun Oil Co.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth.615, 645 A.2d 917 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606 , 655 A.2d 993 (1994).

2004Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hendrie), 738 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), affirmed, 565 Pa. 493 , 776 A.2d 951 (2001); DeVore v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sun Oil Co.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 615 , 645 A.2d 917 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606 , 655 A.2d 993 (1994).

1936J. 1031; Cressler v. Brown, 79 Okla. 170 , 192 Pac. 417 ), but ‘an apparent exception to the rule of mutuality has been held to exist where the liability of defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit upon the same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff. ..’... ‘The purpose underlying res adjudicata [or estoppel by judgment] is more than to serve simply the interest of one who may see fit to invoke the rule; it is a measure of public policy, based on the principle that the general welfare requires litigation not to be interminable’”.

1936J. 1031; Cressler v. Brown, 79 Okla. 170 , 192 Pac. 417 ), but ‘an apparent exception to the rule of mutuality has been held to exist where the liability of defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit upon the same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff. ..’... ‘The purpose underlying res adjudicata [or estoppel by judgment] is more than to serve simply the interest of one who may see fit to invoke the rule; it is a measure of public policy, based on the principle that the general welfare requires litigation not to be interminable’”.

2021But I must confess, I am unfamiliar with the apparent principle that the Court’s decisions are less authoritative when they were “decided just months ago.” Id. 18 Id. (quoting Mayhugh v. Coon, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (Pa. 1975)). 19 Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (citing R.

2021But I must confess, I am unfamiliar with the apparent principle that the Court’s decisions are less authoritative when they were “decided just months ago.” Id. 18 Id. (quoting Mayhugh v. Coon, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (Pa. 1975)). 19 Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (citing R.

2017S83001/16 should the apparent waiver of issues 3-9 be excused under Martinez v. Ryan[, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012)]?

1995Plaintiff’s Argument and Support Despite this apparent rule of law, based upon the recent Supreme Court pronouncements in Clay and Lankenau, as well as other recent Superior Court decisions, plaintiff nonetheless asserts that “Pennsylvania has recently recognized a cause of action for retaliatory firing of an individual for filing a worker’s [sic] compensation claim.” (Plaintiff’s brief at 3.) Plaintiff never explains what particular mandate of public policy was violated by defendant’s action, but instead cites Machen v. Lord Corporation, 402 Pa. Super. 1 , 585 A.2d 1106 (1991), as well as fed

1995Plaintiff’s Argument and Support Despite this apparent rule of law, based upon the recent Supreme Court pronouncements in Clay and Lankenau, as well as other recent Superior Court decisions, plaintiff nonetheless asserts that “Pennsylvania has recently recognized a cause of action for retaliatory firing of an individual for filing a worker’s [sic] compensation claim.” (Plaintiff’s brief at 3.) Plaintiff never explains what particular mandate of public policy was violated by defendant’s action, but instead cites Machen v. Lord Corporation, 402 Pa. Super. 1 , 585 A.2d 1106 (1991), as well as fed

1974Co., 450 Pa. 614 (1973) that an insured had not voluntarily and intelligently relinquished his right to uninsured motorists coverage, despite an apparent waiver of such protection in the application for insurance.

1969This fact, standing alone, fails to establish that decedent did not suffer an “unusual strain.” President Judge Keller speaking for .this Court in Foster v. State College Borough, 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 492 , 189 A. 786 (1937), stated general principles which determine what is an “unusual” exertion.

1969This fact, standing alone, fails to establish that decedent did not suffer an “unusual strain.” President Judge Keller speaking for .this Court in Foster v. State College Borough, 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 492 , 189 A. 786 (1937), stated general principles which determine what is an “unusual” exertion.

1957An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been held to exist where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit, upon the same facts when sued by the same plaintiff.” The court then cited Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton’s Independence, 158 F. 63, 68 , wherein it was said: “. . . it is settled by repeated decisions that the general rule that one may not have the benefit of a judgment as an estoppel unless he would have been bound by it had it been the other way is subject to recognized exceptions, one of which is th

1951We lay aside the apparent bar of the statute of frauds (but see Burkhardt v. Schmidt, 10 Phila. 118 ; Dodds v. Dodds, 9 Pa. 315 ; Stilley v. McNeal, 219 Pa. 533 ; Zellner v. Murdoch, 298 Pa. 208 ; Axe v. Potts et al., 349 Pa. 345 ; Haskell v. Heathcote et al., 363 Pa. 184 ) for we think it clear that where, as is here the case, the power of the administrator to sell the real estate of decedent is derived exclusively from the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, sec. 541, 20 PS §320.541, jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of that power is vested exclusively in the orphans’ court.

1951We lay aside the apparent bar of the statute of frauds (but see Burkhardt v. Schmidt, 10 Phila. 118 ; Dodds v. Dodds, 9 Pa. 315 ; Stilley v. McNeal, 219 Pa. 533 ; Zellner v. Murdoch, 298 Pa. 208 ; Axe v. Potts et al., 349 Pa. 345 ; Haskell v. Heathcote et al., 363 Pa. 184 ) for we think it clear that where, as is here the case, the power of the administrator to sell the real estate of decedent is derived exclusively from the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, sec. 541, 20 PS §320.541, jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of that power is vested exclusively in the orphans’ court.

1951We lay aside the apparent bar of the statute of frauds (but see Burkhardt v. Schmidt, 10 Phila. 118 ; Dodds v. Dodds, 9 Pa. 315 ; Stilley v. McNeal, 219 Pa. 533 ; Zellner v. Murdoch, 298 Pa. 208 ; Axe v. Potts et al., 349 Pa. 345 ; Haskell v. Heathcote et al., 363 Pa. 184 ) for we think it clear that where, as is here the case, the power of the administrator to sell the real estate of decedent is derived exclusively from the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, sec. 541, 20 PS §320.541, jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of that power is vested exclusively in the orphans’ court.

1951We lay aside the apparent bar of the statute of frauds (but see Burkhardt v. Schmidt, 10 Phila. 118 ; Dodds v. Dodds, 9 Pa. 315 ; Stilley v. McNeal, 219 Pa. 533 ; Zellner v. Murdoch, 298 Pa. 208 ; Axe v. Potts et al., 349 Pa. 345 ; Haskell v. Heathcote et al., 363 Pa. 184 ) for we think it clear that where, as is here the case, the power of the administrator to sell the real estate of decedent is derived exclusively from the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, sec. 541, 20 PS §320.541, jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of that power is vested exclusively in the orphans’ court.

1951We lay aside the apparent bar of the statute of frauds (but see Burkhardt v. Schmidt, 10 Phila. 118 ; Dodds v. Dodds, 9 Pa. 315 ; Stilley v. McNeal, 219 Pa. 533 ; Zellner v. Murdoch, 298 Pa. 208 ; Axe v. Potts et al., 349 Pa. 345 ; Haskell v. Heathcote et al., 363 Pa. 184 ) for we think it clear that where, as is here the case, the power of the administrator to sell the real estate of decedent is derived exclusively from the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, sec. 541, 20 PS §320.541, jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of that power is vested exclusively in the orphans’ court.

1934This case is Donaldson v. Pettit, 31 Pa. Superior Ct. 567 .

1931It is because of the apparent exception in the Yeager and other similar cases that we have the present contention based partly on Gandy v. Weckerly, supra. In the Yeager Case a promissory note was sued on and a prospective fund was set up from which payment could be made.

1905An apparent exception to this general rule was established by the case of Scranton Poor District v. Directors, etc., of Danville and Mahoning, 106 Pa. 446 .