apparent exception in Maryland

1924Hall v. Hinks, 21 Md. 400 ; Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U. S. 631 . * * * If, however, the real owner of the goods has so acted as to clothe the seller or pledgor with apparent authority to sell or pledge, he will, even by the common law, be precluded from denying, as against those who may have acted bona fide on the faith of that apparent authority, that he had given such authority, and the result, as to them, is the same as if he had really given it; but it is, of course, otherwise in respect to those who may have acted with notice of the want or limitation of authority in point of fact.” In th

1914Hall v. Hinks, 21 Md. 406 ; Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U. S. 631 .” And in the recent case of Lemp Brewing Co. v. Mantz, 120 Md., we said on page 183, “But the defendant is not in the position of a bona fide purchaser or pledgee of the property.

2007Id.; see also, Whitehead v. State of Maryland, 116 Md.App. 497, 502 , 698 A.2d 1115 (1997); Snow v. State of Maryland, 84 Md.App. 243 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990); Ferris v. State of Maryland, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999).

2007Id.; see also, Whitehead v. State of Maryland, 116 Md.App. 497, 502 , 698 A.2d 1115 (1997); Snow v. State of Maryland, 84 Md.App. 243 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990); Ferris v. State of Maryland, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999).

2007Id.; see also, Whitehead v. State of Maryland, 116 Md.App. 497, 502 , 698 A.2d 1115 (1997); Snow v. State of Maryland, 84 Md.App. 243 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990); Ferris v. State of Maryland, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999).

2007Id.; see also, Whitehead v. State of Maryland, 116 Md.App. 497, 502 , 698 A.2d 1115 (1997); Snow v. State of Maryland, 84 Md.App. 243 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990); Ferris v. State of Maryland, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999).

1999So you may call him. *562 In Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 630 , 655 A.2d 390 (1995), the Court of Appeals opined, “When ... the trial court was notified of an apparent violation by the witness of the order of sequestration, it was then incumbent upon the trial judge to make an investigation pursuant to the discretionary power vested as to the imposition of any sanction.” In the instant case, the trial court conducted a thorough investigation by allowing witness testimony and cross-examination by opposing counsel.

1999So you may call him. *562 In Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 630 , 655 A.2d 390 (1995), the Court of Appeals opined, “When ... the trial court was notified of an apparent violation by the witness of the order of sequestration, it was then incumbent upon the trial judge to make an investigation pursuant to the discretionary power vested as to the imposition of any sanction.” In the instant case, the trial court conducted a thorough investigation by allowing witness testimony and cross-examination by opposing counsel.

1995The inquiry then conducted by the trial court involved a question of law as to whether or not the testimony of [the offending witness] would remain admissible or be excluded.” 272 Md. at 478 , 325 A.2d at 572 .

1995The inquiry then conducted by the trial court involved a question of law as to whether or not the testimony of [the offending witness] would remain admissible or be excluded.” 272 Md. at 478 , 325 A.2d at 572 .

1991A thorough analysis of this exception is set forth in Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284 , 563 A.2d 392 (1989).

1991A thorough analysis of this exception is set forth in Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284 , 563 A.2d 392 (1989).

1984We have so held with respect to inconsistency between verdicts on separate charges against one defendant, Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 , 80 ALR 161 (1932), and also with respect to verdicts that treat codefendants in a joint trial incon *357 sistently, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 , 64 S.Ct. 134 , 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943).” In Harris v. Rivera, supra, the beneficiary of the apparent error did not receive merely a lighter verdict but an actual acquittal.

1984We have so held with respect to inconsistency between verdicts on separate charges against one defendant, Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 , 80 ALR 161 (1932), and also with respect to verdicts that treat codefendants in a joint trial incon *357 sistently, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 , 64 S.Ct. 134 , 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943).” In Harris v. Rivera, supra, the beneficiary of the apparent error did not receive merely a lighter verdict but an actual acquittal.

1984We have so held with respect to inconsistency between verdicts on separate charges against one defendant, Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 , 80 ALR 161 (1932), and also with respect to verdicts that treat codefendants in a joint trial incon *357 sistently, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 , 64 S.Ct. 134 , 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943).” In Harris v. Rivera, supra, the beneficiary of the apparent error did not receive merely a lighter verdict but an actual acquittal.

1984We have so held with respect to inconsistency between verdicts on separate charges against one defendant, Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 , 80 ALR 161 (1932), and also with respect to verdicts that treat codefendants in a joint trial incon *357 sistently, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 , 64 S.Ct. 134 , 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943).” In Harris v. Rivera, supra, the beneficiary of the apparent error did not receive merely a lighter verdict but an actual acquittal.

1984In holding that a bizarre and eccentric result acquitting one defendant will not erode the validity of the otherwise proper convictions of other defendants, the Supreme Court held, at 454 U.S. 344 , 102 S.Ct. at 463 : “[E]ven if the acquittal rests on an improper ground, that error would not create a constitutional defect in a guilty verdict that is supported by sufficient evidence and is the product of a fair trial.” The appellant Ball got an unintended and undeserved “lucky break.” The aggrieved party in that respect is the State; the State, however, may not appeal.

1974As was pointed out in the concurring opinion of-Orth, J. in Massey v. State, 7 Md.

1972See Clark v. McClurg, 4 P. 2d 149 (Cal. 1931), aff’d on reh. 215 Cal. 279 , 9 P. 2d 505 (1932); Fitchette v. Sumter Hardwood Co., 145 S. C. 53, 142 S. E. 828 (1928); Hesse v. Clark, 6 N. J.

1968“It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether to admit the testimony of the witness where there has been a violation of the ex- *638 elusion order.” Cunningham v. State, 247 Md. 404, 417 , 231 A. 2d 501 (1967); Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283 290 , 208 A. 2d 599 (1965).

1968“It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether to admit the testimony of the witness where there has been a violation of the ex- *638 elusion order.” Cunningham v. State, 247 Md. 404, 417 , 231 A. 2d 501 (1967); Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283 290 , 208 A. 2d 599 (1965).

1968“It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether to admit the testimony of the witness where there has been a violation of the ex- *638 elusion order.” Cunningham v. State, 247 Md. 404, 417 , 231 A. 2d 501 (1967); Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283 290 , 208 A. 2d 599 (1965).

1968“It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether to admit the testimony of the witness where there has been a violation of the ex- *638 elusion order.” Cunningham v. State, 247 Md. 404, 417 , 231 A. 2d 501 (1967); Mayson v. State, 238 Md. 283 290 , 208 A. 2d 599 (1965).

1966However, since the petitioner was adjudicated a defective delinquent less than eleven months after his conviction, and in light of Hunter v. Warden, 198 Md. 655 , 80 A. 2d 611 (1951), which holds that a sentence is invalid only to the extent of its excess over the maximum, this apparent error has no significance in the matter before us. 3 .

1966However, since the petitioner was adjudicated a defective delinquent less than eleven months after his conviction, and in light of Hunter v. Warden, 198 Md. 655 , 80 A. 2d 611 (1951), which holds that a sentence is invalid only to the extent of its excess over the maximum, this apparent error has no significance in the matter before us. 3 .

1948Hickey v. Peck, 180 Md. 289, 298-300 , 23 A. 2d 711 , Reports and ratification of tax sales were not before 1867, and are not since 1943 or (in Baltimore) 1941, required or provided for.

1948Hickey v. Peck, 180 Md. 289, 298-300 , 23 A. 2d 711 , Reports and ratification of tax sales were not before 1867, and are not since 1943 or (in Baltimore) 1941, required or provided for.

1924Price v. Read, 2 H. & G. 291 ; Adams v. Anderson, 4 H. & J. 458 .

1914Hall v. Hinks, 21 Md. 406 ; Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U. S. 631 .” And in the recent case of Lemp Brewing Co. v. Mantz, 120 Md., we said on page 183, “But the defendant is not in the position of a bona fide purchaser or pledgee of the property.