apparent presumption in Kentucky

2016Cf. Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.130-3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused."). 4 Under these rules, the opening statement by either side is limited to outlining what counsel in good faith expects to prove or support by

2016Cf. Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.130-3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused."). 4 Under these rules, the opening statement by either side is limited to outlining what counsel in good faith expects to prove or support by

2016Cf. Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.130-3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused."). 4 Under these rules, the opening statement by either side is limited to outlining what counsel in good faith expects to prove or support by

2015Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 14 , 104 S.Ct. 852 (discussing Congress’s intent to counteract “common law hostility toward arbitration”).

2015Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 14 , 104 S.Ct. 852 (discussing Congress’s intent to counteract “common law hostility toward arbitration”).

2014Overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 618 (Ky.1999).

1982Before the enactment of KRS 342.690, however, case law had placed some limitation upon the immunity which was established for fellow employees by Miller v. Scott, supra. The immunity would not exist in case of “deliberate” intent to injure.

1969As lately as February 14, 1969, in Breathitt Funeral Home et al. v. Neace, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 490 , we pointed out that when a deficiency or irregularity in a verdict is at once discernible upon the return of the verdict, any party adversely affected and desiring to invoke judicial relief must call the matter to the court’s attention then and there and afford the trial judge the opportunity to have the jury reconsider its verdict and correct its findings.

1969As lately as February 14, 1969, in Breathitt Funeral Home et al. v. Neace, Ky., 437 S. W.2d 490 , we pointed out that when a deficiency or irregularity in a verdict is at once discernible upon the return of the verdict, any party adversely affected and desiring to invoke judicial relief must call the matter to the court's attention then and there and afford the trial judge the opportunity to have the jury reconsider its verdict and correct its findings.

1937And though it involves an apparent violation of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, the rule is general and well settled that where the liability, if any, of a principal or master to a third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely on the principle of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the agent or servant, or even a judgment against him, insofar as it fixes the maximum limit of liability, is res judicata in favor of the principal or master though he was not a party to the action.” See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., 225 U. S. 111 , 32 S. Ct. 641

1937And though it involves an apparent violation of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, the rule is general and well settled that where the liability, if any, of a principal or master to a third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely on the principle of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the agent or servant, or even a judgment against him, insofar as it fixes the maximum limit of liability, is res judicata in favor of the principal or master though he was not a party to the action.” See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., 225 U. S. 111 , 32 S. Ct. 641

1928In North American Accident Insurance Co. v. Hill’s Adm’x, 182 Ky. 125 , 206 S. W. 170 , the insured carried an accident policy which insured him against injuries received “while actually riding as a passenger in a place regularly provided for the transportation of passengers *602 only, within a railroad car, elevated, subway, or interurban railroad car, street car or steamboat, provided by a common carrier for passenger Service.” The decedent’s physician testified that the decedent, in giving a history of his case, said: “That while he was boarding a train the train started off suddenly, throw

1928In North American Accident Insurance Co. v. Hill’s Adm’x, 182 Ky. 125 , 206 S. W. 170 , the insured carried an accident policy which insured him against injuries received “while actually riding as a passenger in a place regularly provided for the transportation of passengers *602 only, within a railroad car, elevated, subway, or interurban railroad car, street car or steamboat, provided by a common carrier for passenger Service.” The decedent’s physician testified that the decedent, in giving a history of his case, said: “That while he was boarding a train the train started off suddenly, throw