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59 New York opinions name it 12 courts 1890–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Brockgreen2 sentences2022Thus, automobile stops are lawful when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation ( People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]). [2] Contrary to defendant's contention, the credible evidence at the Mapp / Dunaway hearing, where the detective testified{**78 Misc 3d at 6} that he stopped defendant's vehicle for having "excessively tinted windows," was sufficient to establish that the detective had probable cause to lawfully stop the "vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2)" ( People v Rowe , 189 AD3d 894 , 895 [2d Dep 2020The credible evidence at the hearing established [*2]that the police officers lawfully stopped the defendant's vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b)(2) ( see People v Vanderpool , 157 AD3d 831 ; People v Bacquie , 154 AD3d 648, 649 ; People v Brock , 107 AD3d 1025, 1026-1027 ; People v Collins , 105 AD3d 1378, 1379 ). | 1 | 3 |
Pratt v. Habergreen1 sentence2026The doctrine of apparent/ostensible agency requires proof of "words or conduct by the hospital" giving rise to a reasonable belief that the physician possessed authority to act on behalf of the hospital, and reasonable reliance by the patient on that perceived relationship (Pratt v Haber, 105 AD3d 429, 429 [1st Dept 2013]; Welch, 21 AD3d at 807 ). | 1 | 1 |
Nix v. Whitesidegreen2 sentences2026The discovery statute's interlocking provisions place clear duties upon both parties to approach discovery disputes with mutual good-faith, accommodation, reasonableness and 'due diligence,' which is 'a familiar and flexible standard that requires the [parties] to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives' " ( McCray , 2024 NY Slip Op 50760[U], *8 , quoting Bay , 41 NY3d at 211; see People v DePallo , 96 NY2d 437, 441 [2001] ["an attorney's duty to zealously represent a client is circumscribed by an 'equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional con 2026The discovery statute's interlocking provisions place clear duties upon both parties to approach discovery disputes with mutual good-faith, accommodation, reasonableness and 'due diligence,' which is 'a familiar and flexible standard that requires the [parties] to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives' " ( McCray , 2024 NY Slip Op 50760[U], *8, quoting Bay , 41 NY3d at 211; see People v DePallo , 96 NY2d 437, 441 [2001] ["an attorney's duty to zealously represent a client is circumscribed by an 'equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional cond | 1 | 1 |
People v. DePallogreen2 sentences2026The discovery statute's interlocking provisions place clear duties upon both parties to approach discovery disputes with mutual good-faith, accommodation, reasonableness and 'due diligence,' which is 'a familiar and flexible standard that requires the [parties] to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives' " ( McCray , 2024 NY Slip Op 50760[U], *8 , quoting Bay , 41 NY3d at 211; see People v DePallo , 96 NY2d 437, 441 [2001] ["an attorney's duty to zealously represent a client is circumscribed by an 'equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional con 2026The discovery statute's interlocking provisions place clear duties upon both parties to approach discovery disputes with mutual good-faith, accommodation, reasonableness and 'due diligence,' which is 'a familiar and flexible standard that requires the [parties] to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives' " ( McCray , 2024 NY Slip Op 50760[U], *8, quoting Bay , 41 NY3d at 211; see People v DePallo , 96 NY2d 437, 441 [2001] ["an attorney's duty to zealously represent a client is circumscribed by an 'equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional cond | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2025Here, the police conduct was justified in light of the defendant's apparent violation of Code of the Village of Hempstead § 95-14, i.e., the Village of Hempstead's open-container law, and the defendant's conduct while interacting with the police ( see People v Mack , 49 AD3d 1291, 1291-1292 ; People v Bothwell , 261 AD2d 232, 234-235 ; see also People v Mitchell , 148 AD3d 730, 731 ; People v Pace , 143 AD3d 1286, 1287 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maninigreen1 sentence2022Moreover, the detective's testimony at the hearing that he noticed, in plain view, a mason jar filled with marihuana in the cup holder of the front center console of the vehicle was sufficient to establish that the arrest was lawful, since the officer had probable cause to believe that the marihuana was, contrary to defendant's contention, readily accessible and available to defendant who was in close proximity to the marihuana, such that the factual circumstances support an inference of defendant's dominion and control over the marihuana ( see People v Manini , 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992]; People | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cartergreen1 sentence2022Moreover, the detective's testimony at the hearing that he noticed, in plain view, a mason jar filled with marihuana in the cup holder of the front center console of the vehicle was sufficient to establish that the arrest was lawful, since the officer had probable cause to believe that the marihuana was, contrary to defendant's contention, readily accessible and available to defendant who was in close proximity to the marihuana, such that the factual circumstances support an inference of defendant's dominion and control over the marihuana ( see People v Manini , 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992]; People | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2022Thus, automobile stops are lawful when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation ( People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]). [2] Contrary to defendant's contention, the credible evidence at the Mapp / Dunaway hearing, where the detective testified{**78 Misc 3d at 6} that he stopped defendant's vehicle for having "excessively tinted windows," was sufficient to establish that the detective had probable cause to lawfully stop the "vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2)" ( People v Rowe , 189 AD3d 894 , 895 [2d Dep | 1 | 1 |
In re Spectacular Limo Link, Inc.green1 sentence2020The dispatch system would match the driver with work once the driver decided when and where to work ( compare Matter of Spectacular Limo Link, Inc. [Commissioner of Labor] , 21 AD3d 1172, 1173 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Omowalegreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2019The police had, at least, an objective credible reason to approach defendant's stationary vehicle and ask for basic identification information, since the vehicle was double-parked, which constituted a traffic infraction ( see People v Omowale , 83 AD3d 614, 618 [2011], affd 18 NY3d 825 [2011]; People v Citron , 255 AD2d 452 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1030 [1998]) and had a piece of cardboard with handwritten numbers and letters instead of a rear license plate, an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402(1)(a) ( see People v Ocasio , 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995] ; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ocasiogreen1 sentence2019The police had, at least, an objective credible reason to approach defendant's stationary vehicle and ask for basic identification information, since the vehicle was double-parked, which constituted a traffic infraction ( see People v Omowale , 83 AD3d 614, 618 [2011], affd 18 NY3d 825 [2011]; People v Citron , 255 AD2d 452 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1030 [1998]) and had a piece of cardboard with handwritten numbers and letters instead of a rear license plate, an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402(1)(a) ( see People v Ocasio , 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995] ; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d | 1 | 1 |
| Leibowits v. Leibowitsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Alexandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Longo v. Tafarogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brill v. Winggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ranalli v. Burnsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gardner v. Broderickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Collins
green
2 sentences2020The credible evidence at the hearing established [*2]that the police officers lawfully stopped the defendant's vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b)(2) ( see People v Vanderpool , 157 AD3d 831 ; People v Bacquie , 154 AD3d 648, 649 ; People v Brock , 107 AD3d 1025, 1026-1027 ; People v Collins , 105 AD3d 1378, 1379 ). 2017Thus, contrary to the defendant’s contention, and to our dissenting colleague’s conclusion, the police lawfully stopped the defendant’s car due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (see People v Brock, 107 AD3d at 1026-1027 ; People v Collins, 105 AD3d at 1379 ; People v Hawkins, 45 AD3d at 991 ; People v McKane, 267 AD2d at 253 ). | 2 | 2017–2020 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2018The credible evidence at the hearing established that police officers properly stopped the vehicle in which the defendant was riding based on an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b) ( see People v Estrella, 10 NY3d 945, 946 ; People v McKane, 267 AD2d 253 ; People v Edwards, 222 AD2d 603, 604 ). 1999Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police properly stopped his car due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2) (see, People v Henry, 258 AD2d 473 ; People v Alcide, 252 AD2d 591 ; People v Dougherty, 251 AD2d 344, 345 ; People v Edwards, 222 AD2d 603 ; People v McGriff, 219 AD2d 829 ). | 2 | 1999–2018 |
People v. McKane
neutral
2 sentences2018The credible evidence at the hearing established that police officers properly stopped the vehicle in which the defendant was riding based on an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b) ( see People v Estrella, 10 NY3d 945, 946 ; People v McKane, 267 AD2d 253 ; People v Edwards, 222 AD2d 603, 604 ). 2017Thus, contrary to the defendant’s contention, and to our dissenting colleague’s conclusion, the police lawfully stopped the defendant’s car due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (see People v Brock, 107 AD3d at 1026-1027 ; People v Collins, 105 AD3d at 1379 ; People v Hawkins, 45 AD3d at 991 ; People v McKane, 267 AD2d at 253 ). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Fred Smith Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Christensen
green
2 sentences2013To the extent that the breach of contract defense may amount to a viable claim, it may be asserted in a separate action (see SCP [Bermuda], 242 AD2d at 430 ; Malsin v Stockman, 265 AD2d 533 [2d Dept 1999]). 2013To the extent that the breach of contract defense may amount to a viable claim, it may be asserted in a separate action (see SCP [Bermuda], 242 AD2d at 430 ; Malsin v Stockman, 265 AD2d 533 [2d Dept 1999]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Malsin v. Stockman
green
2 sentences2013To the extent that the breach of contract defense may amount to a viable claim, it may be asserted in a separate action (see SCP [Bermuda], 242 AD2d at 430 ; Malsin v Stockman, 265 AD2d 533 [2d Dept 1999]). 2013To the extent that the breach of contract defense may amount to a viable claim, it may be asserted in a separate action (see SCP [Bermuda], 242 AD2d at 430 ; Malsin v Stockman, 265 AD2d 533 [2d Dept 1999]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Welch v. Scheinfeld
green
1 sentence2026The doctrine of apparent/ostensible agency requires proof of "words or conduct by the hospital" giving rise to a reasonable belief that the physician possessed authority to act on behalf of the hospital, and reasonable reliance by the patient on that perceived relationship (Pratt v Haber, 105 AD3d 429, 429 [1st Dept 2013]; Welch, 21 AD3d at 807 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hill v. St. Clare's Hospital
green
1 sentence2026While ostensible agency may be viable where a patient seeks care from a facility rather than from a particular physician (Hill, 67 NY2d at 80 -81 ), the relevant inquiry is fact-specific and depends on the "attendant circumstances." Here, NYPH proffers deposition testimony and documentary evidence demonstrating that plaintiff understood the relevant distinction: plaintiff presented to the NYPH emergency department, but awaited a specialist identified as Dr. Lorich; plaintiff opted to wait for Dr. Lori ch because of the surgeon's reputation; and, critically, following discharge plaintiff contin | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2025Once the defendant admitted to having both a gun and drugs on his person, the police recovery of these items from the defendant's person was justified as a search incident to lawful arrest ( see People v Davis , 32 AD3d 445 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Mack
green
1 sentence2025Here, the police conduct was justified in light of the defendant's apparent violation of Code of the Village of Hempstead § 95-14, i.e., the Village of Hempstead's open-container law, and the defendant's conduct while interacting with the police ( see People v Mack , 49 AD3d 1291, 1291-1292 ; People v Bothwell , 261 AD2d 232, 234-235 ; see also People v Mitchell , 148 AD3d 730, 731 ; People v Pace , 143 AD3d 1286, 1287 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Bothwell
green
1 sentence2025Here, the police conduct was justified in light of the defendant's apparent violation of Code of the Village of Hempstead § 95-14, i.e., the Village of Hempstead's open-container law, and the defendant's conduct while interacting with the police ( see People v Mack , 49 AD3d 1291, 1291-1292 ; People v Bothwell , 261 AD2d 232, 234-235 ; see also People v Mitchell , 148 AD3d 730, 731 ; People v Pace , 143 AD3d 1286, 1287 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Newton
green
1 sentence2025Here, the police conduct was justified in light of the defendant's apparent violation of Code of the Village of Hempstead § 95-14, i.e., the Village of Hempstead's open-container law, and the defendant's conduct while interacting with the police ( see People v Mack , 49 AD3d 1291, 1291-1292 ; People v Bothwell , 261 AD2d 232, 234-235 ; see also People v Mitchell , 148 AD3d 730, 731 ; People v Pace , 143 AD3d 1286, 1287 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Fagan
green
1 sentence2022Thus, automobile stops are lawful when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation ( People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]). [2] Contrary to defendant's contention, the credible evidence at the Mapp / Dunaway hearing, where the detective testified{**78 Misc 3d at 6} that he stopped defendant's vehicle for having "excessively tinted windows," was sufficient to establish that the detective had probable cause to lawfully stop the "vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2)" ( People v Rowe , 189 AD3d 894 , 895 [2d Dep | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Rowe
green
1 sentence2022Thus, automobile stops are lawful when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation ( People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]). [2] Contrary to defendant's contention, the credible evidence at the Mapp / Dunaway hearing, where the detective testified{**78 Misc 3d at 6} that he stopped defendant's vehicle for having "excessively tinted windows," was sufficient to establish that the detective had probable cause to lawfully stop the "vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2)" ( People v Rowe , 189 AD3d 894 , 895 [2d Dep | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Nektalov (Samual)
yellow
1 sentence2022Thus, automobile stops are lawful when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation ( People v Robinson , 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]). [2] Contrary to defendant's contention, the credible evidence at the Mapp / Dunaway hearing, where the detective testified{**78 Misc 3d at 6} that he stopped defendant's vehicle for having "excessively tinted windows," was sufficient to establish that the detective had probable cause to lawfully stop the "vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2)" ( People v Rowe , 189 AD3d 894 , 895 [2d Dep | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Foster
green
1 sentence2020The officers had the right to request that the defendant produce his license and registration ( see People v Foster , 153 AD3d 853, 854 ; People v Graham , 54 AD3d 1056, 1058 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Gaskin
green
1 sentence2020The officers had the right to request that the defendant produce his license and registration ( see People v Foster , 153 AD3d 853, 854 ; People v Graham , 54 AD3d 1056, 1058 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Bacquie
green
1 sentence2020The credible evidence at the hearing established [*2]that the police officers lawfully stopped the defendant's vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b)(2) ( see People v Vanderpool , 157 AD3d 831 ; People v Bacquie , 154 AD3d 648, 649 ; People v Brock , 107 AD3d 1025, 1026-1027 ; People v Collins , 105 AD3d 1378, 1379 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Omowale
green
1 sentence2019The police had, at least, an objective credible reason to approach defendant's stationary vehicle and ask for basic identification information, since the vehicle was double-parked, which constituted a traffic infraction ( see People v Omowale , 83 AD3d 614, 618 [2011], affd 18 NY3d 825 [2011]; People v Citron , 255 AD2d 452 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1030 [1998]) and had a piece of cardboard with handwritten numbers and letters instead of a rear license plate, an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402(1)(a) ( see People v Ocasio , 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995] ; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Stubblefield green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Citron
neutral
1 sentence2019The police had, at least, an objective credible reason to approach defendant's stationary vehicle and ask for basic identification information, since the vehicle was double-parked, which constituted a traffic infraction ( see People v Omowale , 83 AD3d 614, 618 [2011], affd 18 NY3d 825 [2011]; People v Citron , 255 AD2d 452 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1030 [1998]) and had a piece of cardboard with handwritten numbers and letters instead of a rear license plate, an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402(1)(a) ( see People v Ocasio , 85 NY2d 982, 984 [1995] ; People v Thomas , 19 AD3d | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Estrella green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Hawkins green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Jennings v. Lippman neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Mulcahy v. Mulcahy green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re John G. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| O'Connor v. Alfano green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mahoney v. Jackson's Marina, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Tutt green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. McGriff green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Jackson green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Dougherty green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Alcide neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Sira neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| MATTER OF TROPEA v. Tropea green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Chang v. Chang green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Miller v. Lines green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Veloz neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Diaz green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Pennsylvania v. Mimms green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.