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16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1888–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2024Instead, we acknowledged that “title acquired through boundary by acquiescence may be transferred to a successor through means apart from a deed,” “including by grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Q-2 LLC v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8, ¶ 18 , 368 P.3d 86 (“Because title is vested as soon as the elements are satisfied just as if title had been transferred by deed, title remains vested until it passes by grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.” (cleaned up)). 20220523-CA 16 2024 UT App 37 B.G.T.S. v. Balls Brothers Fa 2024Instead, we acknowledged that “title acquired through boundary by acquiescence may be transferred to a successor through means apart from a deed,” “including by grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Q-2 LLC v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8, ¶ 18 , 368 P.3d 86 (“Because title is vested as soon as the elements are satisfied just as if title had been transferred by deed, title remains vested until it passes by grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.” (cleaned up)). 20220523-CA 16 2024 UT App 37 B.G.T.S. v. Balls Brothers Fa | 2 | 2 |
B.G.T.S. v. Balls Brothers Farmgreen1 sentence2024Instead, we acknowledged that “title acquired through boundary by acquiescence may be transferred to a successor through means apart from a deed,” “including by grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Q-2 LLC v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8, ¶ 18 , 368 P.3d 86 (“Because title is vested as soon as the elements are satisfied just as if title had been transferred by deed, title remains vested until it passes by grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.” (cleaned up)). 20220523-CA 16 2024 UT App 37 B.G.T.S. v. Balls Brothers Fa | 1 | 1 |
Eaton v. City of Tulsagreen2 sentences2006See Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (1) (defining contempt as, inter alia, "[dlisorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding"); see also Haton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 , 94 S.Ct. 1228 , 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) ("[A] single isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt." {emphasis added)). 2006See Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (1) (defining contempt as, inter alia, "[dlisorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding"); see also Haton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 , 94 S.Ct. 1228 , 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) ("[A] single isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt." {emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larsengreen2 sentences1998See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("[A] criminal defendant `is not automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction' merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. [Rather], the `appropriate remedy lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar.'") (citations omitted), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 1998See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (“[A] criminal defendant 'is not automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction’ merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. [Rather], the ‘appropriate remedy lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar.’”) (citations omitted), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larsengreen2 sentences1998See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("[A] criminal defendant `is not automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction' merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. [Rather], the `appropriate remedy lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar.'") (citations omitted), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 1998See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (“[A] criminal defendant 'is not automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction’ merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. [Rather], the ‘appropriate remedy lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar.’”) (citations omitted), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co.green2 sentences1968Johnson v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 250 , 272 P.2d 171, 173 (1954). 1968Johnson v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 250 , 272 P.2d 171, 173 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
Marrujo v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1968See footnote 2, supra. 6 . 83 C.J.S., Stipulations § 35(b) (2), p. 91; also see Marrajo v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 595 , 426 P.2d 199, 202 (1967), where the court observed that if they examined the factors relative to the execution of the stipulation and assumed there was a mistake of fact, there were ample facts to alert a person of reasonable prudence to the apparent error. 7 . 17 Utah 2d 96 , 404 P.2d 964 (1965). 8 . 1968See footnote 2, supra. 6 . 83 C.J.S., Stipulations § 35(b) (2), p. 91; also see Marrajo v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 595 , 426 P.2d 199, 202 (1967), where the court observed that if they examined the factors relative to the execution of the stipulation and assumed there was a mistake of fact, there were ample facts to alert a person of reasonable prudence to the apparent error. 7 . 17 Utah 2d 96 , 404 P.2d 964 (1965). 8 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. United States
green
1 sentence2026In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the United States Supreme Court approved the use of supplemental jury instructions to help a deadlocked jury reach a unanimous verdict. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Cissel
green
1 sentence2024This apparent error had no bearing on Cissel’s conviction since his BAC exceeded both concentrations. 20220963-CA 5 2024 UT App 139 State v. Cissel wanted “to really focus on the first one,” which was whether Cissel had “sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test showed that [he] had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test.” The prosecutor then said, “In my hand I have the results of the test. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Miller v. Dasilva
neutral
1 sentence2022Any errors in the commissioner’s analysis must be raised at the hearing on Miller’s objection. 20200719-CA 2 2022 UT App 15 Miller v. Dasilva A minute entry reflected that the “Commissioner recommends” that the petition “be DENIED and this case be dismissed” because “[t]he evidence does not support the entry of a protective order.” ¶3 That same day, at the direction of a district court judge, the court clerk entered a final order that stated: “This case is dismissed. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Johansen v. Johansen
green
1 sentence2021“On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard and only present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Linebaugh v. Gibson, 2020 UT App 108, n.5 , 471 P.3d 835 (quotation simplified). 20200234-CA 2 2021 UT App 130 Johansen v. Johansen found that the apparent violation of the rule was harmless. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Linebaugh v. Gibson
green
2 sentences2021“On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard and only present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Linebaugh v. Gibson, 2020 UT App 108, n.5 , 471 P.3d 835 (quotation simplified). 20200234-CA 2 2021 UT App 130 Johansen v. Johansen found that the apparent violation of the rule was harmless. 2021“On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard and only present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Linebaugh v. Gibson, 2020 UT App 108, n.5 , 471 P.3d 835 (quotation simplified). 20200234-CA 2 2021 UT App 130 Johansen v. Johansen found that the apparent violation of the rule was harmless. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Goldman v. Quadrato
green
1 sentence2019Our supreme court’s recent decision in Q–2 clearly states that title vested through boundary by acquiescence may be transferred to a successor-in-interest in a variety of ways, including by “‘grant, descent, adverse possession, or some other operation of law.’” 2016 UT 8, ¶ 18 (quoting Goldman, 114 A.2d at 690 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Howard I. Green Mary Green Roylan Finance Ernestine Woodmansee Howard I. Green Mary Green
green
1 sentence2006I do not see how this apparent error affects either my analysis or the majority's, and I mention it solely in the interest of accuracy. [2] Although perhaps irrelevant to the point at hand, it seems worth noting that the Fenleys are not privies to Father or his estate, were not parties to Tolle's Florida suit, and had no opportunity to litigate a statute of imitations defense in a Florida court. [3] The majority opinion also cites to United States v. Green, 201 F.3d 251 (3d Cir.2000) ( cited in 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 3 (2001)), as support for its decision that mere | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Manning v. State
red
1 sentence2005The Manning remedy provides that the time for filing an appeal may be reinstated to a defendant who carries the burden of proving “that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal.” Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 31 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2005There, we took up the question of how a defendant who had entered an unconditional guilty plea and in so doing surrendered his right to appeal could go about pursuing his claim that the apparent waiver of his right to appeal was not knowing or voluntary, thereby violating article I, section 12. ¶ 24 Our opinion traversed terrain stretching from the common law writ of coram nobis, through State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), where we created the procedural sleight of hand known as nunc pro tunc resentencing, across multiple amendments to rule 65B, on into the realm of the Post Conviction | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Ford
green
2 sentences1992Id. at 400 . 1992In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App.1990), this court said that a criminal defendant “is not automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction” merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Denver Policemen's Protective Association v. Alvin Lichtenstein
green
1 sentence1987In Denver Policeman’s Protective Association v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.1981), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit articulated some of the policy considerations involved in determining whether to disclose a police department’s investigatory files. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Redmond v. City Court of Salt Lake City
neutral
1 sentence1968See footnote 2, supra. 6 . 83 C.J.S., Stipulations § 35(b) (2), p. 91; also see Marrajo v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 595 , 426 P.2d 199, 202 (1967), where the court observed that if they examined the factors relative to the execution of the stipulation and assumed there was a mistake of fact, there were ample facts to alert a person of reasonable prudence to the apparent error. 7 . 17 Utah 2d 96 , 404 P.2d 964 (1965). 8 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Stank v. Jones
green
1 sentence1968See footnote 2, supra. 6 . 83 C.J.S., Stipulations § 35(b) (2), p. 91; also see Marrajo v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 595 , 426 P.2d 199, 202 (1967), where the court observed that if they examined the factors relative to the execution of the stipulation and assumed there was a mistake of fact, there were ample facts to alert a person of reasonable prudence to the apparent error. 7 . 17 Utah 2d 96 , 404 P.2d 964 (1965). 8 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Hertweck v. Fearon
green
1 sentence1939A., N. S., page 51, et seq.: “The broad rule is laid down by a large number of the cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of real estate under an apparent claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature.” Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392 , 24 *179 P. 190; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249 , 26 P. 300 ; Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334 , 37 P. 573 ; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon
green
2 sentences1939A., N. S., page 51, et seq.: “The broad rule is laid down by a large number of the cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of real estate under an apparent claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature.” Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392 , 24 *179 P. 190; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249 , 26 P. 300 ; Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334 , 37 P. 573 ; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 . 1939A., N. S., page 51, et seq.: “The broad rule is laid down by a large number of the cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of real estate under an apparent claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature.” Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392 , 24 *179 P. 190; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249 , 26 P. 300 ; Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334 , 37 P. 573 ; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Stahn v. Hall
neutral
2 sentences1939P. 983; Stahn v. Hall et al., 10 Utah 400 , 37 P. 585 ; Dennis v. Northern Pac. 1939P. 983; Stahn v. Hall et al., 10 Utah 400 , 37 P. 585 ; Dennis v. Northern Pac. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Lynch v. Coviglio
neutral
1 sentence1939A., N. S., page 51, et seq.: “The broad rule is laid down by a large number of the cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of real estate under an apparent claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature.” Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392 , 24 *179 P. 190; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249 , 26 P. 300 ; Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334 , 37 P. 573 ; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Toland v. Corey
green
1 sentence1939A., N. S., page 51, et seq.: “The broad rule is laid down by a large number of the cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of real estate under an apparent claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature.” Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392 , 24 *179 P. 190; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249 , 26 P. 300 ; Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334 , 37 P. 573 ; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Ayres v. Jack
neutral
1 sentence1939A., N. S., page 51, et seq.: “The broad rule is laid down by a large number of the cases, that open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of real estate under an apparent claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, whether such claim is legal or equitable in its nature.” Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392 , 24 *179 P. 190; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah 249 , 26 P. 300 ; Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334 , 37 P. 573 ; Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1938An apparent exception to the general or plant rule where an employee was injured before he arrived at the locus of his work and attached himself to it is found in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161 , 207 P. 148 , 28 A. L. 1938An apparent exception to the general or plant rule where an employee was injured before he arrived at the locus of his work and attached himself to it is found in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161 , 207 P. 148 , 28 A. L. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Stewart v. Sonneborn
green
1 sentence1888This is mentioned in Stewart v. Sonneborn, supra, as an apparent exception to the general rule that what facts will coiistitute probable cause is a question of law for the court; but this does not apply to a case where all the undisputed facts known to the defendant, taken together, would, justify in a reasonable person the honest belief that the fact charged was probably true. | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.