origin rule in Pennsylvania

2021The origin of this doctrine may lie in the early case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void.” Oliver P. Field, the most noted scholar on this issue has suggested that the void ab initio theory is premised on the historical American concern over excessive authority asserted by a tyrannical executive or legislative branch in violation of the rights of individuals protected by the Constitution.

2021The origin of this doctrine may lie in the early case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void.” Oliver P. Field, the most noted scholar on this issue has suggested that the void ab initio theory is premised on the historical American concern over excessive authority asserted by a tyrannical executive or legislative branch in violation of the rights of individuals protected by the Constitution.

1942In Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. 84, 87 , the origin of the doctrine is stated to be “. . . nothing more than the application to deeds and wills of the principle of equity which treats that as done which ought to be done.” If this clear statement is kept in mind, there ought to be no difficulty in holding its application within proper limits.

1942The presumption, no matter what the form of the words, is always against conversion and even where it is required it must be kept within the limits of actual necessity.” (Italics supplied.) We said further in Hackett’s Estate (p. 596) : “In Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. 84, 87 , the origin of the doctrine is stated to be ‘. . . nothing more than the application to deeds and wills of the principle of equity which treats that as done which ought to be done.’ ” If this clear statement is kept in mind, there ought to be no difficulty in holding its application within proper limits.

2020Moreover, prior to both decisions, our Court had previously held in Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016), that, under the Teague framework, the high Court’s ruling in Alleyne – which was the focus in Barnes and DiMatteo – was not entitled to retroactive application to cases pending on collateral review, and that, as a result, the defendant’s sentence in that case was not rendered illegal by Alleyne. [J-14-2020] - 14 Marshall wrote that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void.” Oliver P. Field, the most noted scholar on this issue has suggested that the void ab initio theory

2018See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corporation , 363 U.S. 593 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company , 363 U.S. 564 , 80 S.Ct. 1363 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1432 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company , 363 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ; see also Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey , 532 U.S. 504 , 121 S.Ct. 1724 , 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001).

2018See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corporation , 363 U.S. 593 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company , 363 U.S. 564 , 80 S.Ct. 1363 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1432 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company , 363 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ; see also Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey , 532 U.S. 504 , 121 S.Ct. 1724 , 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001).

2018See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corporation , 363 U.S. 593 , 80 S.Ct. 1358 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company , 363 U.S. 564 , 80 S.Ct. 1363 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1432 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company , 363 U.S. 574 , 80 S.Ct. 1347 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ; see also Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey , 532 U.S. 504 , 121 S.Ct. 1724 , 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001).

2014We first examine Commonwealth v. Steltz, 522 Pa. 233 , 560 A.2d 1390 (1989), which was the origin of this waiver principle.

2014We first examine Commonwealth v. Steltz, 522 Pa. 233 , 560 A.2d 1390 (1989), which was the origin of this waiver principle.

2005Udylite Corp. v. Philadelphia Zoning Board, 16 D.&C.2d [346] ([Philadelphia Cty.] 1958), affirmed, 394 Pa. 645 , 148 A.2d 916 (1959).” Id. at 157, 277 A.2d at 366 . (footnote omitted) Further search for the origin of this rule led me to Udylite Corp. v. Philadelphia Board of Adjustment, an opinion written by Judge Sporkin from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.

2005Udylite Corp. v. Philadelphia Zoning Board, 16 D.&C.2d [346] ([Philadelphia Cty.] 1958), affirmed, 394 Pa. 645 , 148 A.2d 916 (1959).” Id. at 157, 277 A.2d at 366 . (footnote omitted) Further search for the origin of this rule led me to Udylite Corp. v. Philadelphia Board of Adjustment, an opinion written by Judge Sporkin from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.

2005Udylite Corp. v. Philadelphia Zoning Board, 16 D.&C.2d [346] ([Philadelphia Cty.] 1958), affirmed, 394 Pa. 645 , 148 A.2d 916 (1959).” Id. at 157, 277 A.2d at 366 . (footnote omitted) Further search for the origin of this rule led me to Udylite Corp. v. Philadelphia Board of Adjustment, an opinion written by Judge Sporkin from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.

1989Tracing the origin of that doctrine to the case of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 , 71 S.Ct. 692 , 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951), the Court noted that the doctrine is not a rule of administrative law but rather a matter of enforcing the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.

1989Tracing the origin of that doctrine to the case of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 , 71 S.Ct. 692 , 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951), the Court noted that the doctrine is not a rule of administrative law but rather a matter of enforcing the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.

1986It is equally certain, however, nor has any question ever been raised, that the privilege of parties is confined to what they do or say in the conduct of the case.” 219 Pa. at 88-90 , 67 A. at 992-93 .

1986It is equally certain, however, nor has any question ever been raised, that the privilege of parties is confined to what they do or say in the conduct of the case.” 219 Pa. at 88-90 , 67 A. at 992-93 .

1980It is our conclusion that a change in the rule would lead only to confusion and chaos and add greater difficulty in the trial of such cases.” The origin of this principle is Chesapeake & Ohio RW Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 [ 36 S.Ct. 630 , 60 L.Ed. 1117 ] (1916), in which the Supreme Court announced that awards for future damages had to be discounted to present value at some appropriate discount rate.

1980It is our conclusion that a change in the rule would lead only to confusion and chaos and add greater difficulty in the trial of such cases.” The origin of this principle is Chesapeake & Ohio RW Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 [ 36 S.Ct. 630 , 60 L.Ed. 1117 ] (1916), in which the Supreme Court announced that awards for future damages had to be discounted to present value at some appropriate discount rate.

1980Commonwealth v. New, 354 Pa. 188 , 47 A.2d 450 (1946); See I Wigmore § 26 (3d Ed. 1940). [T]he medical evidence, offered by the Commonwealth, clearly establishes repeated and severe blows to the infant as being the origin of the factors causing death.

1980Commonwealth v. New, 354 Pa. 188 , 47 A.2d 450 (1946); See I Wigmore § 26 (3d Ed. 1940). [T]he medical evidence, offered by the Commonwealth, clearly establishes repeated and severe blows to the infant as being the origin of the factors causing death.

1975Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 , 474 n. 5 (1948), which upholds the rule for use in the federal courts, but which also discusses the limitations of the rule. [3] The origin of the doctrine according to Professor Wigmore was grounded in a misreading of legal history. 7 Wigmore Evidence §§ 1981, 1982 (3d ed. 1940).

1975Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 , 474 n. 5 (1948), which upholds the rule for use in the federal courts, but which also discusses the limitations of the rule. 3 The origin of the doctrine according to Professor Wigmore was grounded in a misreading of legal history. 7 Wigmore Evidence §§1981,1982 (3d ed. 1940).

1955The certainty that a woman who has reached 50 years will not bear children is far greater than that which attends most other human affairs and to which rules of law have to be made and applied.” The most frequently quoted decision in Pennsylvania on the conclusive presumption of fertility is List v. Rodney et al., 83 Pa. 483, 492 , where the court, in speculating on the origin of the rule, stated that “. . .

1952While the origin of the doctrine of tentative trusts is generally regarded as modern and its genesis is attributed to the case of Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112 , nevertheless we find that in Pennsylvania the creation of such trusts is of much earlier origin.

1952In Smith’s Estate, 144 Pa. 428 , we find specific reference to English cases: Richards v. Delbridge, L.

1945Hand, J., in his concurring opinion in Moore v. Mitchell et al., 30 F.(2d) 600 (1929), as follows (p. 604) : “While the origin of the exception in the case of penal liabilities does not appear in the books, a sound basis for it exists, in my judgment, which includes liabilities for taxes as .well.

1936An interesting discussion of the whole question will be found in the annotation to Lynch v. Rosenberger et al., 121 Kan. 601 , 249 Pac. 682 , 60 A. L.

1936An interesting discussion of the whole question will be found in the annotation to Lynch v. Rosenberger et al., 121 Kan. 601 , 249 Pac. 682 , 60 A. L.