origin doctrine in West Virginia

7 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Boydgreen wva · 1977 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007In order to protect the right against self-incrimination, the West Virginia Legislature adopted W.Va.Code, 57-3-6 (1923), which provides that the failure of the defendant to testify cannot be the subject of comment before the court or jury by anyone. [5] In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228, 235 , 50 S.E. 247, 249 (1905) this Court explained the origin of the rule against self-incrimination by stating that ". . . the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him." Later, this Court in State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 2007In order to protect the right against self-incrimination, the West Virginia Legislature adopted W.Va.Code, 57-3-6 (1923), which provides that the failure of the defendant to testify cannot be the subject of comment before the court or jury by anyone. [5] In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228, 235 , 50 S.E. 247, 249 (1905) this Court explained the origin of the rule against self-incrimination by stating that ". . . the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him." Later, this Court in State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va.	1	1
State v. Taylorgreen wva · 1905 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007In order to protect the right against self-incrimination, the West Virginia Legislature adopted W.Va.Code, 57-3-6 (1923), which provides that the failure of the defendant to testify cannot be the subject of comment before the court or jury by anyone. [5] In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228, 235 , 50 S.E. 247, 249 (1905) this Court explained the origin of the rule against self-incrimination by stating that ". . . the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him." Later, this Court in State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 2007In order to protect the right against self-incrimination, the West Virginia Legislature adopted W.Va.Code, 57-3-6 (1923), which provides that the failure of the defendant to testify cannot be the subject of comment before the court or jury by anyone. [5] In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228, 235 , 50 S.E. 247, 249 (1905) this Court explained the origin of the rule against self-incrimination by stating that ". . . the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him." Later, this Court in State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
Davis v. Robertson green wva · 1985 2 sentences 1994As we discussed in Davis v. Robertson, 175 W.Va. 364 , 332 S.E.2d 819 (1985), an insurer cannot be joined as a party to a negligence action "because there was no cause of action against the insurer until the liability of the insured had been established." Id. at 366 , 332 S.E.2d at 821 . 1994As we discussed in Davis v. Robertson, 175 W.Va. 364 , 332 S.E.2d 819 (1985), an insurer cannot be joined as a party to a negligence action "because there was no cause of action against the insurer until the liability of the insured had been established." Id. at 366 , 332 S.E.2d at 821 .	2	1994–1994
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. green wva · 1992 2 sentences 2000Indeed, as the majority cites, syllabus point fifteen of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), provides the proper origin for our inquiry, as follows: The outer limit of the ratio of punitives to compensatory damages in cases in which the defendant has acted with extreme negligence or wanton disregard but with no actual intention to cause harm and in which compensatory damages are neither negligible nor very large is roughly 5 to 1. 2000Indeed, as the majority cites, syllabus point fifteen of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W.Va. 457 , 419 S.E.2d 870 (1992), provides the proper origin for our inquiry, as follows: The outer limit of the ratio of punitives to compensatory damages in cases in which the defendant has acted with extreme negligence or wanton disregard but with no actual intention to cause harm and in which compensatory damages are neither negligible nor very large is roughly 5 to 1.	1	2000–2000
Axtell Ex Rel. Axtell v. LaPenna green pawd · 1971 2 sentences 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S. 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S.	1	1982–1982
Suits v. Glover green ala · 1954 2 sentences 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S. 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S.	1	1982–1982
Laucher v. Simpson green ohioctapp · 1971 2 sentences 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S. 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S.	1	1982–1982
Whitfield v. Simpson green illinoised · 1970 2 sentences 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S. 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S.	1	1982–1982
Brooks v. Jacobs green me · 1943 2 sentences 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S. 1982E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449 , 71 So.2d 49 , 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954); Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371 , 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Laucher v. Simpson, 28 Ohio App.2d 195 , 57 Ohio Op.2d 303 , 276 N.E.2d 261 (1971); 79 C.J.S.	1	1982–1982
Washington v. Texas green scotus · 1967 2 sentences 1980The origin of this rule may be traced to Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 18 L. 1980The origin of this rule may be traced to Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , 18 L.	1	1980–1980
Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co. green · 1911 2 sentences 1978The first New York act providing compulsory coverage and direct employer liability for certain ‘hazardous employments’ was held unconstitutional in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271 , 94 N.E. 431 (1911), primarily on the ground that the provisions requiring payment to an employee for injuries sustained in the course and as a result of employment without regard to the employer’s negligence or fault deprived employers of substantive due process. 1978The first New York act providing compulsory coverage and direct employer liability for certain ‘hazardous employments’ was held unconstitutional in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271 , 94 N.E. 431 (1911), primarily on the ground that the provisions requiring payment to an employee for injuries sustained in the course and as a result of employment without regard to the employer’s negligence or fault deprived employers of substantive due process.	1	1978–1978

Where else courts name it

PA 31 (1908–2024) IL 17 (1874–2017) CA 15 (1898–2026) GA 15 (1917–2024) NY 13 (1835–2018) TX 12 (1928–2005) ID 10 (1912–2025) MD 9 (1895–2025) MO 9 (1882–2025) WA 8 (1906–2003) IN 7 (1834–2000) LA 7 (1964–2002) TN 7 (1940–2019) WV 7 (1978–2007) OH 6 (1948–2021) WI 6 (1978–2020) SD 6 (1969–1978) NC 6 (1926–2019) IA 5 (1909–2001) VT 5 (1971–2014) VA 5 (1836–2020) OR 5 (1989–2020) FL 5 (1958–2022) MA 4 (1932–2011) KY 4 (1820–1964) MN 4 (1961–1996) NJ 3 (1967–2014) NE 3 (1984–1995) AZ 3 (1952–1984) AR 3 (1984–2010) AL 3 (1969–1994) WY 2 (1978–2020) NH 2 (1954–1965) AK 2 (1971–2016) MT 2 (1925–2006) KS 2 (1903–1966) DC 2 (1976–1978) HI 2 (2007–2015) MI 2 (1943–1976) CT 2 (1991–1992) CO 2 (1938–2025) NM 2 (1935–1974) RI 2 (1874–1946)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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