origin doctrine in North Carolina

6 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
Anderson v. Assimosgreen nc · 2002 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019The independent origin inquiry, on which both our and the partial concurrence’s conclusions are based, is merely the second part of the due process inquiry.2 2 The partial concurrence is, of course, correct that we generally “avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on other grounds.” Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415 , 416 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002). 2019The independent origin inquiry, on which both our and the partial concurrence’s conclusions are based, is merely the second part of the due process inquiry.2 2 The partial concurrence is, of course, correct that we generally “avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on other grounds.” Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415 , 416 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Smathers green ncctapp · 2014 2 sentences 2017The origin of the doctrine "is the desire to give police officers the flexibility to help citizens in need or protect the public even if the prerequisite suspicion of criminal activity which would otherwise be necessary for a constitutional intrusion is nonexistent." Smathers , at 125 , 753 S.E.2d at 384 . 2017The origin of the doctrine “is the desire to give police officers the flexibility to help citizens in need or protect the public even if the prerequisite suspicion of criminal activity which would otherwise be necessary for a constitutional intrusion is nonexistent.” Smathers, at 125, 753 S.E.2d at 384 .	1	2017–2017
Moffitt v. . Asheville green nc · 1889 2 sentences 1976Likewise, it was not sovereign immunity but municipal immunity which was first rejected by this Court in Meares v. Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73 (1848), and in Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156 (1885), and then accepted in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237 , 9 S.E. 695 (1889). 1976Likewise, it was not sovereign immunity but municipal immunity which was first rejected by this Court in Meares v. Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73 (1848), and in Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156 (1885), and then accepted in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237 , 9 S.E. 695 (1889).	1	1976–1976
Wright v. . the City of Wilmington neutral · 1885 1 sentence 1976Likewise, it was not sovereign immunity but municipal immunity which was first rejected by this Court in Meares v. Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73 (1848), and in Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156 (1885), and then accepted in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237 , 9 S.E. 695 (1889).	1	1976–1976
Meares v. Commissioners of the Town of Wilmington green nc · 1848 1 sentence 1976Likewise, it was not sovereign immunity but municipal immunity which was first rejected by this Court in Meares v. Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73 (1848), and in Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156 (1885), and then accepted in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237 , 9 S.E. 695 (1889).	1	1976–1976
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n green wash · 1953 2 sentences 1967Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., supra. With reference to the origin of the doctrine of immunity, the Washington court said, in abandoning it: "Ordinarily, when a court decides to modify or abandon a court-made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying that `the reason for the rule no longer exists.' In this case, it is correct to say that the `reason' originally given for the rule of immunity never did exist." Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp., supra 43 Wash.2d at 167 , 260 P.2d at 768 . 1967Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., supra. With reference to the origin of the doctrine of immunity, the Washington court said, in abandoning it: "Ordinarily, when a court decides to modify or abandon a court-made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying that `the reason for the rule no longer exists.' In this case, it is correct to say that the `reason' originally given for the rule of immunity never did exist." Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp., supra 43 Wash.2d at 167 , 260 P.2d at 768 .	1	1967–1967
Parker v. . Harden neutral nc · 1897 1 sentence 1954Though found among the remains of feudality, it is neither a relic of barbarism nor a part of the rubbish of the dark ages, but rather a Gothic column, as it were, which has been preserved to aid in sustaining the fabric of our modern social system.” Douglas, J., in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N.C. 251 , 28 S.E. 20 , calls Shelley’s case “the Don Quixote of the law, which, like the last knight-errant of chivalry, has long survived every cause that gave it birth and now wanders aimlessly through the reports, still vigorous, but equally useless and dangerous.” The judgment of the lower court is Afli	1	1954–1954
Welch v. . Gibson neutral nc · 1927 1 sentence 1954J., in Welch v. Gibson, supra, says: “The origin of the rule (in Shelley’s case) as well as the wisdom of its adoption, has been the subject of much curious and learned speculation.	1	1954–1954
Stamper v. . Stamper neutral nc · 1897 1 sentence 1954Though found among the remains of feudality, it is neither a relic of barbarism nor a part of the rubbish of the dark ages, but rather a Gothic column, as it were, which has been preserved to aid in sustaining the fabric of our modern social system.” Douglas, J., in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N.C. 251 , 28 S.E. 20 , calls Shelley’s case “the Don Quixote of the law, which, like the last knight-errant of chivalry, has long survived every cause that gave it birth and now wanders aimlessly through the reports, still vigorous, but equally useless and dangerous.” The judgment of the lower court is Afli	1	1954–1954
Fillyaw v. . Van Lear neutral nc · 1924 1 sentence 1926Hartman v. Flynn, 189 N. C., 452 ; Fillyaw v. Van Lear, *633 188 N. C., 772 ; Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 .	1	1926–1926
Wallace v. . Wallace neutral nc · 1921 1 sentence 1926Hartman v. Flynn, 189 N. C., 452 ; Fillyaw v. Van Lear, *633 188 N. C., 772 ; Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 .	1	1926–1926
Hartman v. . Flynn neutral nc · 1925 1 sentence 1926Hartman v. Flynn, 189 N. C., 452 ; Fillyaw v. Van Lear, *633 188 N. C., 772 ; Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 .	1	1926–1926
Merchants National Bank v. Dortch neutral nc · 1923 1 sentence 1926Hartman v. Flynn, 189 N. C., 452 ; Fillyaw v. Van Lear, *633 188 N. C., 772 ; Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510 ; Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158 .	1	1926–1926

Where else courts name it

PA 31 (1908–2024) IL 17 (1874–2017) CA 15 (1898–2026) GA 15 (1917–2024) NY 13 (1835–2018) TX 12 (1928–2005) ID 10 (1912–2025) MD 9 (1895–2025) MO 9 (1882–2025) WA 8 (1906–2003) IN 7 (1834–2000) LA 7 (1964–2002) TN 7 (1940–2019) WV 7 (1978–2007) OH 6 (1948–2021) WI 6 (1978–2020) SD 6 (1969–1978) NC 6 (1926–2019) IA 5 (1909–2001) VT 5 (1971–2014) VA 5 (1836–2020) OR 5 (1989–2020) FL 5 (1958–2022) MA 4 (1932–2011) KY 4 (1820–1964) MN 4 (1961–1996) NJ 3 (1967–2014) NE 3 (1984–1995) AZ 3 (1952–1984) AR 3 (1984–2010) AL 3 (1969–1994) WY 2 (1978–2020) NH 2 (1954–1965) AK 2 (1971–2016) MT 2 (1925–2006) KS 2 (1903–1966) DC 2 (1976–1978) HI 2 (2007–2015) MI 2 (1943–1976) CT 2 (1991–1992) CO 2 (1938–2025) NM 2 (1935–1974) RI 2 (1874–1946)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check