origin rule in New York

2018The origin of the standard may be traced to Berry v State of Georgia (10 Ga 511), an 1851 case from the Georgia Supreme Court ( see United States v Johnson , 327 US 106 , 110 n 4; United States v Stofsky , 527 F2d 237, 243 [2d Cir]).

1980Thus, despite the express wording of subdivision 2 of section 5-703 of the General Obligations Law that such oral contracts are "void”, the courts of this State have construed the statute to be merely a rule of evidence (Hutchins v Van Vechten, 140 NY 115, 120 ) which, like the construction of the English statute, bars only the remedy and does not make the contract absolutely void (4 Kent, Commentaries on American Law [14th ed], p 451, n 1; Simpson, Contracts [2d ed], § 91, n 68; 3 Williston, Contracts [3d ed], § 531, n 3).

1980In essence and analogous to the rationale expressed by Justice Cardozo in Underhill v Schenck ( 238 NY 7 ), plaintiff asserts that the origin of her claim is not in a right of property, but in a contract or relation.

1980McMann v Richardson ( 397 US 759, 770 ), which the majority terms the origin of the rule of judging the effectiveness of an attorney by a standard of reasonable competence, in discussing whether an attorney properly advised his client to waive a trial states: "Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s judgment might be on given facts.” Significantly, the court indicated that a defendant assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his attorney’s as

1980While in People v Bennett ( 29 NY2d 462 ) the court refused to define with precision what constitutes ineffective legal representation it did, nevertheless, find ineffectiveness in that the attorney had rendered the trial a farce and mockery of justice.

1969Meyer v. Warden ( 269 N. Y. 426 ) to an earlier statement in King v. People ( 5 Hun 297 ).

1968Co., 26 N. Y. 422 ); and whether the origin of the rule be found in the theory that 1 ‘ A policy is a contract of indemnity ’ ’ so that in the absence of an interest in the property “ the holder of the policy sustains no loss ” (Peabody 3 Riggs v. Washington County Mut.

1940Whatever the origin of the rule, it is qualified today by the principle of election, it being held that where a creditor holding the joint obligation of several parties proceeds to recover judgment against part of them it is evidence of a choice to thus hold part and let the others go.” (Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 84 .) “ In the absence of statute providing otherwise, and there is no such statute applicable to this case, it is the rule that a plaintiff who enters judgment against one of several joint obligors causes a merger of his entire claim against all of the obligors in the judgmen

1940Whatever the origin of the rule, it is qualified today by the principle of election, it being held that where a creditor holding the joint obligation of several parties proceeds to recover judgment against part of them it is evidence of a choice to thus hold part and let the others go.” (Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 84 .) “ In the absence of statute providing otherwise, and there is no such statute applicable to this case, it is the rule that a plaintiff who enters judgment against one of several joint obligors causes a merger of his entire claim against all of the obligors in the judgmen

1940Whatever the origin of the rule, it is qualified today by the principle of election, it being held that where a creditor holding the joint obligation of several parties proceeds to recover judgment against part of them it is evidence of a choice to thus hold part and let the others go.” (Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 84 .) “ In the absence of statute providing otherwise, and there is no such statute applicable to this case, it is the rule that a plaintiff who enters judgment against one of several joint obligors causes a merger of his entire claim against all of the obligors in the judgmen

1935Extended discussion is unnecessary in view of the recent decisions examining the subject at length, particularly those of the Court of Appeals in Carley v. Harper (219 N. Y, 295) and Ely v. Megie (Id. 112), of Surrogate Slater in Matter of Mould ( 117 Misc. 1 ; affd., 204 App. Div. 889 ; affd., 236 N. Y. 582 ) and of Surrogate Wingate in Matter of Lilienthal ( 139 Misc. 225 ), and others.

1935Extended discussion is unnecessary in view of the recent decisions examining the subject at length, particularly those of the Court of Appeals in Carley v. Harper (219 N. Y, 295) and Ely v. Megie (Id. 112), of Surrogate Slater in Matter of Mould ( 117 Misc. 1 ; affd., 204 App. Div. 889 ; affd., 236 N. Y. 582 ) and of Surrogate Wingate in Matter of Lilienthal ( 139 Misc. 225 ), and others.

1935Extended discussion is unnecessary in view of the recent decisions examining the subject at length, particularly those of the Court of Appeals in Carley v. Harper (219 N. Y, 295) and Ely v. Megie (Id. 112), of Surrogate Slater in Matter of Mould ( 117 Misc. 1 ; affd., 204 App. Div. 889 ; affd., 236 N. Y. 582 ) and of Surrogate Wingate in Matter of Lilienthal ( 139 Misc. 225 ), and others.

1935Extended discussion is unnecessary in view of the recent decisions examining the subject at length, particularly those of the Court of Appeals in Carley v. Harper (219 N. Y, 295) and Ely v. Megie (Id. 112), of Surrogate Slater in Matter of Mould ( 117 Misc. 1 ; affd., 204 App. Div. 889 ; affd., 236 N. Y. 582 ) and of Surrogate Wingate in Matter of Lilienthal ( 139 Misc. 225 ), and others.

1922Indeed, it does not appear that the Frohman contract, to which the plaintiffs trace the origin of their claim, involved a grant of motion picture rights (see Manners v. Morosco, 252 U. S. 317 ), which, however, the original producers of the drama purported to assign to the plaintiff Alcet Enterprises, Inc., long after the expiration of the five-year period.

1914But happily I am not left to my own imperfect deductions in this matter, for the Court of Appeals in Crossman v. Crossman has, as before stated, confirmed my doubt, as has Matter of Dake, 75 App. Div. 403 .

1874Co., 15 John., 358 ; People v. Thompson, 21 Wend., 252 ; 23 id., 567, 589; The People v. Pease, 27 N.Y., 63 ; see also Kyd on Corporations, 399; Cole on Quo Warranto, 221.) The writ of quo warranto and proceedings by information in the nature of a quo warranto have been abolished (Code, § 428), and a remedy by action is given.

1873The origin of this doctrine is clearly set forth in the opinion of Bronson, J., in the case of Van Keuren v. Parmelee *445 ( 2 N. Y., 523 ).

1835In thecase of Seton and others v. Low, 1 Johns.