expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine in California

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402 , 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576 , 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [" `[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner'"].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a "mere guide" to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment Housing Com., supra , 43

2006Under the statutory construction doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “ ‘the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed.’ ” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 13 [241 *1143 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 ].) Here, section 33457.1 specifies the reports and information that “shall be . . . made available to the public” (§ 33457.1, italics added) prior to the hearing on a proposed amendment to a redevelopment plan.

2016Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed by a maxim of statutory *870 construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that is, ‘“[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ].) This maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.

2016Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed by a maxim of statutory *870 construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that is, ‘“[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ].) This maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402 , 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576 , 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [" `[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner'"].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a "mere guide" to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment Housing Com., supra , 43

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402 , 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576 , 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [" `[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner'"].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a "mere guide" to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment Housing Com., supra , 43

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402 , 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576 , 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [" `[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner'"].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a "mere guide" to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment Housing Com., supra , 43

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402 , 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576 , 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [" `[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner'"].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a "mere guide" to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment Housing Com., supra , 43

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [“ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that‘the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner’ ”].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a “mere guide” to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous.

2007Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 410 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ]; see also People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 593 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] [“ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that‘the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner’ ”].) Our Supreme Court has characterized the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a “mere guide” to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous.

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal. App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640)." ( Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: "`This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]' ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 ...; see also

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal.App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640).” (Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: “ ‘This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]’ (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 . . . ; see also C

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal. App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640)." ( Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: "`This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]' ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 ...; see also

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal. App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640)." ( Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: "`This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]' ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 ...; see also

1998For these reasons, we also disagree with the mother's argument that rule 1425, which provides that the case may be transferred based upon the residence of the child, conflicts with section 375 and must be declared constitutionally invalid under California Constitution, article VI, section 6 which provides, "To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform

1998For these reasons, we also disagree with the mother's argument that rule 1425, which provides that the case may be transferred based upon the residence of the child, conflicts with section 375 and must be declared constitutionally invalid under California Constitution, article VI, section 6 which provides, "To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform

1998Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 410 [ 267 Cal. Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ], original italics.) The Supreme Court also defined the phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius in People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 593 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] in the following fashion: "`[U]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner.' ([ Freytes v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal. App.3d 958 ,] 962 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 26 ].)" (Origina

1998Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 410 [ 267 Cal. Rptr. 589 , 787 P.2d 996 ], original italics.) The Supreme Court also defined the phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius in People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 593 [ 253 Cal. Rptr. 710 , 764 P.2d 1087 ] in the following fashion: "`[U]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is complete, and that there are no additional requirements which bind petitioner.' ([ Freytes v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal. App.3d 958 ,] 962 [ 132 Cal. Rptr. 26 ].)" (Origina

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal. App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640)." ( Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: "`This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]' ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 ...; see also

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal. App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640)." ( Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: "`This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]' ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 ...; see also

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal. App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640)." ( Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: "`This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]' ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 ...; see also

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1911) 15 Cal.App. 679 [ 115 P. 1091 ]; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 133, pp. 639-640).” (Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10 ; accord, In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 956 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ].) In the case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ], the Supreme Court noted: “ ‘This rule, of course, is inapplicable where its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary legislative intent. [Citation.]’ (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 . . . ; see also C

1998For these reasons, we also disagree with the mother's argument that rule 1425, which provides that the case may be transferred based upon the residence of the child, conflicts with section 375 and must be declared constitutionally invalid under California Constitution, article VI, section 6 which provides, "To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform

1998For these reasons, we also disagree with the mother’s argument that rule 1425, which provides that the case may be transferred based upon the residence of the child, conflicts with section 375 and must be declared constitutionally invalid under California Constitution, article VI, section 6 which provides, “To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform

1997(See Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp . (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397 , 403 .) "`"In the grants [of powers] and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the prescribed mode. . . ."'" ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 196 ; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88 , 98 .) It is a "cardinal rule that a statute `. . . is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions t

1997(See Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 .) "`"In the grants [of powers] and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the prescribed mode . . . ."'" (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 196 ; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 98 .) It is a "cardinal rule that a statute `. . . is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to wh

1997(See Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp . (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397 , 403 .) "`"In the grants [of powers] and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the prescribed mode. . . ."'" ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 196 ; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88 , 98 .) It is a "cardinal rule that a statute `. . . is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions t

1997(See Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 .) "`"In the grants [of powers] and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the prescribed mode . . . ."'" (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 196 ; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 98 .) It is a "cardinal rule that a statute `. . . is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no more at liberty to add provisions to wh

1976For a number of reasons the adoption of section 21080.5 reinforces our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend that the commission enjoy an exemption from the operation of CEQ A. First, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the creation of a limited express exemption suggests that a broader implied exemption could not have been intended. “ ‘In the grants [of powers] and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the pr

1976For a number of reasons the adoption of section 21080.5 reinforces our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend that the commission enjoy an exemption from the operation of CEQ A. First, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the creation of a limited express exemption suggests that a broader implied exemption could not have been intended. “ ‘In the grants [of powers] and in the regulation of the mode of exercise, there is an implied negative; an implication that no other than the expressly granted power passes by the grant; that it is to be exercised only in the pr

2018In Gray , the Medical Board appeared without notice at an arraignment and persuaded the trial court to order the medical license of one Dr. Gray suspended as a condition of bail. ( Gray , supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 635 , 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 .) With respect to Penal Code section 23, Gray held: "The statute does not authorize a licensing agency to recommend bail conditions expressly, nor does it authorize a trial court to suspend a professional license upon the recommendation of a state licensing agency." ( Id. at p. 643, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 .) We agree with this conclusion, as under the doctrine

2018In Gray , the Medical Board appeared without notice at an arraignment and persuaded the trial court to order the medical license of one Dr. Gray suspended as a condition of bail. ( Gray , supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 635 , 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 .) With respect to Penal Code section 23, Gray held: "The statute does not authorize a licensing agency to recommend bail conditions expressly, nor does it authorize a trial court to suspend a professional license upon the recommendation of a state licensing agency." ( Id. at p. 643, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 .) We agree with this conclusion, as under the doctrine

1997Proc., § 1859 ; Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315 , 325 ["`specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision'"].) Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ["the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed"], a statute is to be restricted to its express terms and to that which may reasonably be implied therefrom.

1997Proc., § 1859; Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 325 ["`specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision'"].) Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ["the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed"], a statute is to be restricted to its express terms and to that which may reasonably be implied therefrom.

2025He cites authority for the construction of ambiguities against the drafter (United States v. Cope (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3d 944 , 949– 950), for the presumption of consistent usage (United States v. Lewis (4th Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 262, 270 ), and for the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (United States v. Hill (11th Cir. 2011) 643 F.3d 807, 876 [“The inference is that which is not included is excluded”].) From these principles, he posits that the impersonal usage of “[t]he purpose” of the group attack on E.Y. admits no personal intent to kill—contrasted with his other admission i

2025But Rodriguez’s argument conflates the contractual terms of the plea agreement— which we interpret for their independent legal significance (see, e.g., People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50, 57 [construing terms of plea agreement, “like the terms of any contract,” for enforcement of those terms])—with the factual admissions that the trial court interpreted for their evidentiary significance.

2016Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed by a maxim of statutory *870 construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that is, ‘“[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ].) This maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.

2016Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed by a maxim of statutory *870 construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that is, ‘“[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ].) This maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.

2016Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed by a maxim of statutory *870 construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that is, ‘“[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ].) This maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.

2016Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed by a maxim of statutory *870 construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that is, ‘“[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ].) This maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.