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30 California opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jauregui v. City of Palmdalegreen2 sentences2023(Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 781, 800 [“California decisions involving voting issues quite closely follow federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis”].) 33 In a separate argument, amicus curiae Kenneth Blackwell contends Proposition N “could” dilute the voting strength of Black citizens of the City. 2023(Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 781, 800 [“California decisions involving voting issues quite closely follow federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis”].) 33 In a separate argument, amicus curiae Kenneth Blackwell contends Proposition N “could” dilute the voting strength of Black citizens of the City. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Landaugreen2 sentences2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se 2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se | 2 | 2 |
Loving v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th 2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th | 2 | 2 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences1996To be sure, these procedures may have "symbolic" value of some kind. ( Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 764 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 613 ].) Such value, however, is too slight to compel their invocation. [18] A similar argument is that Anders 's "prophylactic" procedures must be extended beyond an indigent criminal defendant's first appeal as of right in order to reach an indigent parent's appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status under direct compulsion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its requirement of similar 1996To be sure, these procedures may have "symbolic" value of some kind. ( Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 764 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 613 ].) Such value, however, is too slight to compel their invocation. [18] A similar argument is that Anders 's "prophylactic" procedures must be extended beyond an indigent criminal defendant's first appeal as of right in order to reach an indigent parent's appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status under direct compulsion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its requirement of similar | 2 | 2 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se 2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se | 1 | 2 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1984In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 ], the United States Supreme Court held that where law enforcement officers undertake custodial interrogation of a suspect, specific procedural safeguards must be followed to protect the individual’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1984In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 ], the United States Supreme Court held that where law enforcement officers undertake custodial interrogation of a suspect, specific procedural safeguards must be followed to protect the individual’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 2 |
Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2007It simply forbids state courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation." ( Id. at p. 537, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) [5] There is a distinction, the court explained, between "state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters." ( Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 538, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) Thus, the mere repeal of a state-mandated policy addressing a racial issue does not violate equal protection. 2007It simply forbids state courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation." ( Id. at p. 537, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) [5] There is a distinction, the court explained, between "state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters." ( Crawford, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 538, 102 S.Ct. 3211 .) Thus, the mere repeal of a state-mandated policy addressing a racial issue does not violate equal protection. | 1 | 2 |
Hirabayashi v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th 2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th | 1 | 2 |
Glossip v. Oklahoma Revisions: 2/25/25green1 sentence2026The term readily brings to mind something like perjurious testimony (Glossip v. Oklahoma, supra, 604 U.S. at p. 246 [discussing a Napue violation in terms of “false testimony”]), or forged or fraudulent documents (Chessman v. Teets (1955) 350 U.S. 3 , 3–4 [allegations that prosecutor and court reporter created a fraudulent transcript raised a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castillogreen2 sentences2018(See Litmon , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ["It is not entirely clear what analytical framework, Mathews, Barker or some amalgam, will ultimately be applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating a procedural due process claim of excessive pre-trial delay in the context of involuntary civil commitments."]; Landau , at p. 31, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [same].) The Court of Appeal in Litmon applied the Barker and Mathews due process balancing tests to a person alleged to be an SVP, concluding that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for bringing a person to trial on an SVP 2018(See Litmon , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ["It is not entirely clear what analytical framework, Mathews, Barker or some amalgam, will ultimately be applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating a procedural due process claim of excessive pre-trial delay in the context of involuntary civil commitments."]; Landau , at p. 31, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [same].) The Court of Appeal in Litmon applied the Barker and Mathews due process balancing tests to a person alleged to be an SVP, concluding that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for bringing a person to trial on an SVP | 1 | 1 |
In Re Sade C.green2 sentences2016(Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 992-993.) The court rejected arguments “that Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures must be extended to reach an indigent parent’s appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status under direct compulsion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its requirement of fundamental fairness.” (Id. at p. 985.) In rejecting the argument that the Anders *1235 procedure should be extended to reach the appeal in Sade C., the court used the balancing test announced in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 4 2016(Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 992-993.) The court rejected arguments “that Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures must be extended to reach an indigent parent’s appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status under direct compulsion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its requirement of fundamental fairness.” (Id. at p. 985.) In rejecting the argument that the Anders *1235 procedure should be extended to reach the appeal in Sade C., the court used the balancing test announced in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 4 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Browngreen1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537, fn. 6 .) Secondly, “[i]t is elementary that [a] defendant waive[s] [an argument based on the U.S. Constitution] by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds below.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 .) After the trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion, he failed to bring any Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment objection to the attention of the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Canaan v. Abdelnouryellow2 sentences2014(Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 715 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 710 P.2d 268 ], overruled on another point in Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 183 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 , 56 P.3d 1029 ].) California decisions involving voting issues quite closely follow federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 2014(Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 715 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 710 P.2d 268 ], overruled on another point in Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 183 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 , 56 P.3d 1029 ].) California decisions involving voting issues quite closely follow federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis. | 1 | 1 |
Edelstein v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2014(Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 715 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 710 P.2d 268 ], overruled on another point in Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 183 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 , 56 P.3d 1029 ].) California decisions involving voting issues quite closely follow federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 2014(Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 715 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 710 P.2d 268 ], overruled on another point in Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 183 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 , 56 P.3d 1029 ].) California decisions involving voting issues quite closely follow federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2012Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment claim is a “nonstarter” because, as in a recent California Supreme Court case, “nothing in [the] rules or procedures authorized, encouraged, or established that the judges nominated grand jurors in a manner that discriminated against [Hispanics and Asian-Americans].” (People v. Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 738.) There is ample evidence in the record of nondiscriminatory motivations and methods of the superior court and its officers. 2012Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment claim is a “nonstarter” because, as in a recent California Supreme Court case, “nothing in [the] rules or procedures authorized, encouraged, or established that the judges nominated grand jurors in a manner that discriminated against [Hispanics and Asian-Americans].” (People v. Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 738.) There is ample evidence in the record of nondiscriminatory motivations and methods of the superior court and its officers. | 1 | 1 |
ANDERSON Et Al. v. MARTINgreen2 sentences2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th 2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.red2 sentences1999(See Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 255 [ 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047-1048 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 ].) Therefore, courts can look to “both federal and state rules on damages . . . , [choosing] whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statute[].” (Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. (1969) 396 U.S. 229, 240 [ 90 S.Ct. 400, 406 , 24 L.Ed.2d 386 ].) This means that the remedies available in section 1983 actions may include equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 1999(See Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 255 [ 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047-1048 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 ].) Therefore, courts can look to “both federal and state rules on damages . . . , [choosing] whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statute[].” (Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. (1969) 396 U.S. 229, 240 [ 90 S.Ct. 400, 406 , 24 L.Ed.2d 386 ].) This means that the remedies available in section 1983 actions may include equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. | 1 | 1 |
Carey v. Piphusgreen2 sentences1999(See Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 255 [ 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047-1048 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 ].) Therefore, courts can look to “both federal and state rules on damages . . . , [choosing] whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statute[].” (Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. (1969) 396 U.S. 229, 240 [ 90 S.Ct. 400, 406 , 24 L.Ed.2d 386 ].) This means that the remedies available in section 1983 actions may include equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 1999(See Carey v. Piphus (1978) 435 U.S. 247, 255 [ 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047-1048 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 ].) Therefore, courts can look to “both federal and state rules on damages . . . , [choosing] whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statute[].” (Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. (1969) 396 U.S. 229, 240 [ 90 S.Ct. 400, 406 , 24 L.Ed.2d 386 ].) This means that the remedies available in section 1983 actions may include equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. | 1 | 1 |
| Washington v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffin v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ford v. Wainwrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Geigerred | 1 | 1 |
| Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozabgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. Womancaregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Mitchell P.green | 1 | 1 |
| McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Truax v. Raichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People ex rel. Van Loben Sels v. Reclamation District No. 551green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Korematsu v. United Statesred2 sentences2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th 2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chessman v. Teets
green
1 sentence2026The term readily brings to mind something like perjurious testimony (Glossip v. Oklahoma, supra, 604 U.S. at p. 246 [discussing a Napue violation in terms of “false testimony”]), or forged or fraudulent documents (Chessman v. Teets (1955) 350 U.S. 3 , 3–4 [allegations that prosecutor and court reporter created a fraudulent transcript raised a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim]). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Otto
green
2 sentences2018(See Litmon , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ["It is not entirely clear what analytical framework, Mathews, Barker or some amalgam, will ultimately be applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating a procedural due process claim of excessive pre-trial delay in the context of involuntary civil commitments."]; Landau , at p. 31, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [same].) The Court of Appeal in Litmon applied the Barker and Mathews due process balancing tests to a person alleged to be an SVP, concluding that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for bringing a person to trial on an SVP 2018(See Litmon , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ["It is not entirely clear what analytical framework, Mathews, Barker or some amalgam, will ultimately be applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating a procedural due process claim of excessive pre-trial delay in the context of involuntary civil commitments."]; Landau , at p. 31, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [same].) The Court of Appeal in Litmon applied the Barker and Mathews due process balancing tests to a person alleged to be an SVP, concluding that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for bringing a person to trial on an SVP | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Litmon
green
2 sentences2018(See Litmon , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ["It is not entirely clear what analytical framework, Mathews, Barker or some amalgam, will ultimately be applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating a procedural due process claim of excessive pre-trial delay in the context of involuntary civil commitments."]; Landau , at p. 31, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [same].) The Court of Appeal in Litmon applied the Barker and Mathews due process balancing tests to a person alleged to be an SVP, concluding that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for bringing a person to trial on an SVP 2018(See Litmon , supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ["It is not entirely clear what analytical framework, Mathews, Barker or some amalgam, will ultimately be applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating a procedural due process claim of excessive pre-trial delay in the context of involuntary civil commitments."]; Landau , at p. 31, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [same].) The Court of Appeal in Litmon applied the Barker and Mathews due process balancing tests to a person alleged to be an SVP, concluding that "[t]he ultimate responsibility for bringing a person to trial on an SVP | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se 2018In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [Citation.] The burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker 's multifactor test lies with the defendant." ( Id. at p. 233, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 717 , 315 P.3d 1 .) California courts have also analyzed a defendant's due process right to a speedy trial under Mathews , in which the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine whether due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required a hearing prior to the initial termination of Social Se | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.
green
2 sentences2016(Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 992-993.) The court rejected arguments “that Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures must be extended to reach an indigent parent’s appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status under direct compulsion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its requirement of fundamental fairness.” (Id. at p. 985.) In rejecting the argument that the Anders *1235 procedure should be extended to reach the appeal in Sade C., the court used the balancing test announced in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 4 2016(Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 992-993.) The court rejected arguments “that Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures must be extended to reach an indigent parent’s appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status under direct compulsion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its requirement of fundamental fairness.” (Id. at p. 985.) In rejecting the argument that the Anders *1235 procedure should be extended to reach the appeal in Sade C., the court used the balancing test announced in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 4 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
green
1 sentence2015“We allow our police to make arrests only on ‘probable cause,’ a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to the States as well as to the Federal Government.” ( Papachristou, supra, at p. 169 .) Unlike vagrancy statutes, firearms statutes target conduct that cannot be easily mistaken for non-criminal behavior. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Burgener
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537, fn. 6 .) Secondly, “[i]t is elementary that [a] defendant waive[s] [an argument based on the U.S. Constitution] by failing to articulate an objection on federal constitutional grounds below.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 .) After the trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion, he failed to bring any Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment objection to the attention of the trial court. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Coalition For Economic Equity v. Pete Wilson
green
2 sentences2007According to Wilson II, section 31 does not even implicate the equal protection clause because it does not create "an impediment to protection against unequal treatment" but only "an impediment to receiving preferential treatment." ( Wilson II, supra, 122 F.3d at p. 708 .) "`[I]n the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge,'" the court reasoned, "`courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits, and what it requires.' [Citation.]" ( Id, at p. 709.) Pointing out that the federal Constitution permits narrowly tailored affirmative action preferences only if justified by a 2007According to Wilson II, section 31 does not even implicate the equal protection clause because it does not create "an impediment to protection against unequal treatment" but only "an impediment to receiving preferential treatment." ( Wilson II, supra, 122 F.3d at p. 708 .) "`[I]n the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge,'" the court reasoned, "`courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits, and what it requires.' [Citation.]" ( Id, at p. 709.) Pointing out that the federal Constitution permits narrowly tailored affirmative action preferences only if justified by a | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Buchanan v. Warley
green
2 sentences2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th 2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Shelley v. Kraemer
green
2 sentences2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th 2000See also Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 10 [ 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 ] (striking down state ban on interracial marriage; “The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to' eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States”); Anderson v. Martin (1964) 375 U.S. 399, 402 [ 84 S.Ct. 454, 456 , 11 L.Ed.2d 430 ] (invalidating state statute requiring designation of candidates’ race on electoral ballots; “The vice . . . [is] not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification th | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Andrews v. City of Philadelphia red | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mu'Min v. Virginia green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Hortencia Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Indiana green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Holt
green
2 sentences1999The court reviewed the series of cases we have summarized, and found two themes: “First, the possibility of racial prejudice against a black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is sufficiently real that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that inquiry be made into racial prejudice; second, the trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire.” (Id. at p. 424 [ 111 S.Ct. at p. 1904 ].) In People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782 , 937 P.2d 213 ], the California Supreme Court reiterated the principles set out in M 1999The court reviewed the series of cases we have summarized, and found two themes: “First, the possibility of racial prejudice against a black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is sufficiently real that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that inquiry be made into racial prejudice; second, the trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire.” (Id. at p. 424 [ 111 S.Ct. at p. 1904 ].) In People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782 , 937 P.2d 213 ], the California Supreme Court reiterated the principles set out in M | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Washington v. Glucksberg green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Collins v. City of Harker Heights green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Elliott v. Cheshire County green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Duncan v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Bloom v. Illinois green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Reitman v. Mulkey green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Cipriano v. City of Houma green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.