wisdom rule in Illinois

1993One brief glance toward the recent history of Eastern Europe is persuasive of the wisdom of that wall, the wisdom of this rule.” Valentine, 201 Ill.

1992One brief glance toward the recent history of Eastern Europe is persuasive of the wisdom of that wall, the wisdom of this rule.” (People v. Valentine (1990), 201 Ill.

1979(See, e.g., Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 14 Ill. 2d 434, 439 .) The wisdom of this principle of judicial review is emphasized when the agency’s area of competence involves the subtleties of conduct often present in cases of racial discrimination.

1966(See, e.g., Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 14 Ill.2d 434, 439 .) The wisdom of this principle of judicial review is emphasized when the agency’s area of competence involves the subtleties of conduct often present in cases of racial discrimination.

2000We wrote in *94 McCauley, 163 Ill.2d at 446 , 206 Ill.Dec. 671 , 645 N.E.2d 923 , that "`[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [his] rights.' (Emphasis omitted.) [Citation.] If our system is, indeed, such a system, we have no reason to fear both lawful and protected consultation." I, for one, continue to believe in the wisdom of this rule.

2000We wrote in McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 446 , that “ ‘[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [his] rights.’ (Emphasis omitted.) [Citation.] If our system is, indeed, such a system, we have no reason to fear both lawful and protected consultation.” I, for one, continue to believe in the wisdom of this rule.

1974(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1973(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1974(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1973(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1974(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1973(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1974(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1973(See Nelson v. Cook (1856), 17 Ill. 443 ; Johnson v. Chicago and Pacific Elevator Co. (1882), 105 Ill. 462 ; Skala v. Lehon (1931), 343 Ill. 602 ; Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273 .) The wisdom of the rule and the reason for its continuance have been severely questioned.

1974(See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill.App.2d 187 ; Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 Ill.App.2d 534 ; Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), sec. 50.) Whether the time has arrived or conditions are ripe for a modification of this rule through judicial decision or legislative enactment is a question not relevant to a decision in this case.

1973(See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill.

1996The Supreme Court Decision in Darling The Health Center next contends that the Supreme Court of Illinois in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), specifically recognized that hospitals may employ physicians.

1996The Supreme Court Decision in Darling The Health Center next contends that the Supreme Court of Illinois in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), specifically recognized that hospitals may employ physicians.

1982App.3d 80 , 394 N.E.2d 739 .) The question in determining the validity of a search is reasonableness, based upon circumstances facing the officers at the time. ( People v. McKnight (1968), 39 Ill.2d 577 , 237 N.E.2d 488 ; People v. Ledwa (1980), 81 Ill.

1982App.3d 80 , 394 N.E.2d 739 .) The question in determining the validity of a search is reasonableness, based upon circumstances facing the officers at the time. ( People v. McKnight (1968), 39 Ill.2d 577 , 237 N.E.2d 488 ; People v. Ledwa (1980), 81 Ill.

1982App.3d 80 , 394 N.E.2d 739 .) The question in determining the validity of a search is reasonableness, based upon circumstances facing the officers at the time. ( People v. McKnight (1968), 39 Ill.2d 577 , 237 N.E.2d 488 ; People v. Ledwa (1980), 81 Ill.

1982(People v. Kelly (1979), 76 Ill.

1982It is axiomatic in this tangled area of the law that each case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances, and the present case amply demonstrates the wisdom of the rule. ( People v. Kelly (1979), 76 Ill.

1979App. 3d 731 , 331 N.E.2d 219 .) The wisdom of this rule is illustrated by this case.

1978(Christopher v. West (1951), 409 Ill. 131 , 98 N.E.2d 722 ; Mead v. & Northwestern Ry.

1978(Christopher v. West (1951), 409 Ill. 131 , 98 N.E.2d 722 ; Mead v. & Northwestern Ry.

1976Prior to examining the evidence, the court made the following comment: “Deference is unquestionably due the factual determinations of an agency charged with the primary responsibility for adjudication in a specialized area. [Citation.] The wisdom of this principle of judicial review is emphasized when the agency’s area of competence involves the subtleties of conduct often present in cases of racial discrimination.” ( 34 Ill. 2d 266 , 274, 215 N.E.2d 286 , 291.) After reviewing the record, the court observed that a “suspicion” might reasonably remain that an unfair employment practice had been

1976Prior to examining the evidence, the court made the following comment: “Deference is unquestionably due the factual determinations of an agency charged with the primary responsibility for adjudication in a specialized area. [Citation.] The wisdom of this principle of judicial review is emphasized when the agency’s area of competence involves the subtleties of conduct often present in cases of racial discrimination.” ( 34 Ill. 2d 266 , 274, 215 N.E.2d 286 , 291.) After reviewing the record, the court observed that a “suspicion” might reasonably remain that an unfair employment practice had been

1974(See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill.App.2d 187 ; Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 Ill.App.2d 534 ; Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), sec. 50.) Whether the time has arrived or conditions are ripe for a modification of this rule through judicial decision or legislative enactment is a question not relevant to a decision in this case.

1973(People v. Davis, 29 Ill.2d 127, 130 .) The wisdom of such a rule is apparent; however, it is inapplicable to the present case.

1973No city ordinance in Illinois can “* # * add to, subtract from, or affect the provisions of a statute * * * and if it is in conflict with a statute it is invalid * * (Traders Development Corp. v. Zoning Board, 20 Ill.App.2d 383, 392 , 156 N.E.2d 274 .) The wisdom of this principle is readily apparent.

1973No city ordinance in Illinois can “* # * add to, subtract from, or affect the provisions of a statute * * * and if it is in conflict with a statute it is invalid * * (Traders Development Corp. v. Zoning Board, 20 Ill.App.2d 383, 392 , 156 N.E.2d 274 .) The wisdom of this principle is readily apparent.

1966Recently, the wisdom of this rule was discussed in both a majority and dissenting opinion in Mesich v. Austin, 70 Ill App2d 334, 217 NE2d 574 (1966).

1955Suffice it to say that appellant’s present attack upon the wisdom of the rule stems from the case of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 92 L. ed. 1782.

1948Whatever might be our own view as to the wisdom of the rule, or the propriety of the exception to its application suggested in the Appellate Court opinion, it is sufficient to say that it. is the accepted rule in Illinois, and must be given effect.” The case of National Bond & Investment Co. v. Moss, 263 Ill.

1935Mr. Justice Moran, in a special concurring opinion, in the case of Welch v. People, 30 Ill.

1932In Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 317 , it is said that “proof of possession of stolen property recently after the theft, in the absence of any explanation, shows a strong probability of guilt, but it is for the jury to determine its force, after due consideration of the kind of property, the length of time that has elapsed, the character of the property and the explanation as to how the defendant came into possession.” This court in the case of People v. Surace, 295 Ill. 604 , sustained a conviction where an instruction was given in almost the precise language used in the instruction in this case

1907(Sanitary District v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385 ; Smith v. Smith, 169 id. 623; Heldmaier v. Rehor, 188 id. 458; Phillips v. Town of Scales Mound, 195 id. 353.) The wisdom of the rule is illustrated in this case, in which some of the jurors stated in their affidavits that since the trial they have concluded that injustice was done to the defendant in the amount of the verdict, and they were anxious to overthrow their own solemn act as jurors.

1904As said by our Supreme Court in Graham v. Sadlier, supra, p. 98: “ When parties after whatever previous preparation re^ duce their agreement to writing such written agreement is ‘ the final consummation of their negotiation and the exact expression of their purpose.’ What has preceded it, if not incorporated into it, is regarded as intentionally rejected.” This conclusive presumption is, singularly enough, borne out and the wisdom of the rule vindicated by appellant when he testified that the promise of appellees not to engage in the coal business was “ deliberately ” omitted from the written