18 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fixel Enterprises, Inc. v. Theisgreen1 sentence2011Associates, and [he did] not wish to see it extended to cases involving contractual provisions for attorneys’ fees.” Fixel, 524 So.2d at 1017 (Grimes, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Although we recognize that the rule itself has been subject to criticism, see Williams v. State, 959 So.2d 830, 831-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Warner, J„ concurring specially), the wisdom of the rule itself is not before us. . 2009Although we recognize that the rule itself has been subject to criticism, see Williams v. State, 959 So.2d 830, 831-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Warner, J., concurring specially), the wisdom of the rule itself is not before us. [8] The dissent posits that this matter can be dealt with in postconviction, acknowledging that the fault in part lies with the defense counsel who should have moved to withdraw when an obvious conflict of interest arose. | 1 | 1 |
Sheppard v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The Court’s opinion in Sheppard v. State, 17 So.3d 275, 287 (Fla.2009), states that “the wisdom of the rule is not before us.” Id. at 283 n. 7. 2009The Court’s opinion in Sheppard v. State, 17 So.3d 275, 287 (Fla.2009), states that “the wisdom of the rule is not before us.” Id. at 283 n. 7. | 1 | 1 |
Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., Ltd.green1 sentence1993See Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., Ltd., 612 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Hollandgreen2 sentences1990As noted by the North Carolina Supreme Court when it adopted a similar position in Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 214-15 , 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (1988): We conclude that the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) represents the soundest approach to accountants' liability for negligent misrepresentation. 1990As noted by the North Carolina Supreme Court when it adopted a similar position in Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 214-15 , 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (1988): We conclude that the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) represents the soundest approach to accountants' liability for negligent misrepresentation. | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Ballgreen1 sentence1986See also, Mills v. Ball, 344 So.2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). [3] The wisdom of this rule is particularly evident in this case where we have been asked to rule for the first time on constitutional questions of considerable magnitude, without the benefit of any record except the various complaints and motions directed to the complaints, including appellees' motion to dismiss, the granting of which sparked this appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Thresh. & F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Traistergreen1 sentence1965See Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers’ Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Traister, Fla.App.1965, 173 So.2d 153 [opinion filed 2/19/65], In order to reach the question discussed above, it was necessary for us to consider appellant’s contention that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the traverse of its answer was filed more than ten days after the filing of the answer. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lovett v. State
green
2 sentences1929Lovett v. State, 29 Fla., 384 text, 403. 11 So. 1929Lovett v. State, 29 Fla., 384 text, 403. 11 So. | 2 | 1929–1929 |
First Fla. Bank, NA v. Max Mitchell & Co.
green
1 sentence1990On the other hand, we are persuaded by the wisdom of the rule which limits liability to those persons or classes of persons whom an accountant "knows" will rely on his opinion rather than those he "should have known" would do so... . 558 So.2d at 15 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sloman v. Florida Power and Light Co.
green
1 sentence1985This court followed the Williams rule in Sloman v. Florida Power and Light Co., 382 So.2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), which stated: The wisdom of that rule is obvious. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less in the County of Monroe, State of Florida,and Salvatore R. Ciccone
green
1 sentence1984The Department cites United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.1979), and numerous decisions from other states in support of the wisdom of such a rule. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Florida Canners Ass'n v. State, Dept. of Citrus
green
1 sentence1983The court characterized the challengers' argument "that there is not competent substantial evidence in the record" supporting the rule as "amount[ing] to an attack on the wisdom of the rule." 371 So.2d at 519 : They argue that there is no proof that the rule will accomplish the legislative objective. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Game & Fresh Water Fish Com'n v. Carlile
green
1 sentence1980Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Carlile, 341 So.2d 1015 (Fla.4th DCA 1977). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen
green
1 sentence1959Chief Justice Drew, in the Wiesen case, supra, reversed the lower court, stating: "This situation illustrates more than any other the wisdom of the rule that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the zoning authorities in matters of this kind." In City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 473 , citing City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, supra, the Court again stated the principle that court should not substitute their judgment for that of the zoning authorities. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt
green
1 sentence1959Chief Justice Drew, in the Wiesen case, supra, reversed the lower court, stating: "This situation illustrates more than any other the wisdom of the rule that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the zoning authorities in matters of this kind." In City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, Fla. 1957, 97 So.2d 473 , citing City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, supra, the Court again stated the principle that court should not substitute their judgment for that of the zoning authorities. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Coffee v. State
green
1 sentence1942In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in enlightened England, men and women confessed that they were guilty of witchcraft, communion with evil spirits and suffered at the stake therefore, and at this dáy men through fear of personal punishment, or through hope of averting such punishment, confess that they are guilty of crime, without the slightest foundation in truth for such confession, and for these reasons we say, that the theory that men will not confess to the commission of crimes of which they are innocent, is a fallacy.’ Coffee v. State, 25 Fla. 501 , 6 So. 493 , 23 Am. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Boynton v. Haggart
green
1 sentence1931With all due deference, candor compels me to say that I am doubtful of the wisdom of the rule of statutory construction therein adopted, for the reasons so ably pointed out in the opinions of Justices Field, Brewer and Gray respectively in the three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited in Rabinowitz v. Houk, and the opinion of Justice Sanborn in Boynton v. Haggart, 120 Fed. 819 , as well as for the reasons set forth in 27 R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Wolkowsky v. Kirchick
neutral
2 sentences1926Prom that testimony the Chancellor finds as a matter of fact, and expressly recites in the final decree, that “the parties brought about the separation for one year — mutually—and for the purpose of procuring a divorce and that in the alleged desertion and bringing of this suit there is collusion between the parties; that any decree of divorce entered in this cause would simply be a 'divorce by consent,’ contrary to public policy as well as contrary to the purpose and intent of the laws relating to divorce; that the complainant has not established the existence of any willful, obstinate and co 1926Prom that testimony the Chancellor finds as a matter of fact, and expressly recites in the final decree, that “the parties brought about the separation for one year — mutually—and for the purpose of procuring a divorce and that in the alleged desertion and bringing of this suit there is collusion between the parties; that any decree of divorce entered in this cause would simply be a 'divorce by consent,’ contrary to public policy as well as contrary to the purpose and intent of the laws relating to divorce; that the complainant has not established the existence of any willful, obstinate and co | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.