34 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1901–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Turzagreen2 sentences2009The contrary would authorize a return of conditions that existed in the days of the inquisition.”); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128 , 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940) (The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against "the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed.”). . 2009The contrary would authorize a return of conditions that existed in the days of the inquisition.”); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128 , 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940) (The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against "the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed.”). . | 5 | 5 |
City of Austin v. Fostergreen2 sentences2024And to be clear, Bothwell’s suggestion that compound interest may not require “any express stipulation” does not survive Cherokee Nation or the present case. 48 See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 , 776 & n.36 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 675-676 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 558-559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied); William C. 2024And to be clear, Bothwell’s suggestion that compound interest may not require “any express stipulation” does not survive Cherokee Nation or the present case. 48 See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 , 776 & n.36 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 675-676 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 558-559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied); William C. | 3 | 3 |
Spiller v. Spillergreen2 sentences2024And to be clear, Bothwell’s suggestion that compound interest may not require “any express stipulation” does not survive Cherokee Nation or the present case. 48 See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 , 776 & n.36 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 675-676 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 558-559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied); William C. 2024And to be clear, Bothwell’s suggestion that compound interest may not require “any express stipulation” does not survive Cherokee Nation or the present case. 48 See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 , 776 & n.36 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 675-676 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 558-559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied); William C. | 3 | 3 |
Harvey v. Stategreen2 sentences1988The wisdom of that rule lies in the fact that reasonable notice should be given not only to the trial court but the State, as well, as to the misconduct relied upon and to prevent a purely fishing expedition on the part of the accused. 201 S.W.2d at 45 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 1988The wisdom of that rule lies in the fact that reasonable notice should be given not only to the trial court but the State, as well, as to the misconduct relied upon and to prevent a purely fishing expedition on the part of the accused. 201 S.W.2d at 45 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 594 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Crim. 2016Harvey v. State, 201 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex.Crim.App. 1947); State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). | 2 | 2 |
Warszower v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 142-50 (3d ed.1982)); see also Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 , 61 S.Ct. 603 , 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ("The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”); East v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 396 , 175 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1942) ("The wisdom of this rule lies in the fact that no man should be convicted of a crime, the commission of which he confesses, unless the State shows, by other testimony, that the confessed crime was in fa 2013Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 142-50 (3d ed.1982)); see also Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 , 61 S.Ct. 603 , 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ("The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”); East v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 396 , 175 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1942) ("The wisdom of this rule lies in the fact that no man should be convicted of a crime, the commission of which he confesses, unless the State shows, by other testimony, that the confessed crime was in fa | 2 | 2 |
East v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 142-50 (3d ed.1982)); see also Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 , 61 S.Ct. 603 , 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ("The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”); East v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 396 , 175 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1942) ("The wisdom of this rule lies in the fact that no man should be convicted of a crime, the commission of which he confesses, unless the State shows, by other testimony, that the confessed crime was in fa 2013Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 142-50 (3d ed.1982)); see also Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 , 61 S.Ct. 603 , 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ("The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”); East v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 396 , 175 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1942) ("The wisdom of this rule lies in the fact that no man should be convicted of a crime, the commission of which he confesses, unless the State shows, by other testimony, that the confessed crime was in fa | 2 | 2 |
Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo. v. United subsidiaries' accounting, budgetary and dividend policies, States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 , 62 S.Ct. 366, 373 , 86 L.Ed. 432 . to present *206 publicly an unprejudiced financial picture Our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the of the enterprise, and to effectuate a fair and feasible plan Commission's action is based upon substantial evidence and expeditiously.’ is consistent with the authority granted by Congress. 2015See Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo. v. United subsidiaries' accounting, budgetary and dividend policies, States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 , 62 S.Ct. 366, 373 , 86 L.Ed. 432 . to present *206 publicly an unprejudiced financial picture Our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the of the enterprise, and to effectuate a fair and feasible plan Commission's action is based upon substantial evidence and expeditiously.’ is consistent with the authority granted by Congress. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Pollack v. McMurreygreen1 sentence2011The rule is a salutary one, and ought to be adhered to whenever counsel disagree as to what has transpired between them.15 13 Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 393 (Tex. 1993). 14 682 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1984). 15 18 Tex. 535, 537 (1857) (emphasis added). 9 The Kennedy court noted ―the wisdom of the rule,‖ remarking that ―[a]greements of counsel in the course of a judicial proceeding which affect the interests of their clients should not be left to the fallibility of human recollection.‖16 Rule 11 does not specify that it applies only to suits pending only in the trial court.17 | 1 | 1 |
Birdwell v. Coxgreen1 sentence2011The rule is a salutary one, and ought to be adhered to whenever counsel disagree as to what has transpired between them.15 13 Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 393 (Tex. 1993). 14 682 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1984). 15 18 Tex. 535, 537 (1857) (emphasis added). 9 The Kennedy court noted ―the wisdom of the rule,‖ remarking that ―[a]greements of counsel in the course of a judicial proceeding which affect the interests of their clients should not be left to the fallibility of human recollection.‖16 Rule 11 does not specify that it applies only to suits pending only in the trial court.17 | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Hydegreen1 sentence2011The rule is a salutary one, and ought to be adhered to whenever counsel disagree as to what has transpired between them.15 13 Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 393 (Tex. 1993). 14 682 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1984). 15 18 Tex. 535, 537 (1857) (emphasis added). 9 The Kennedy court noted ―the wisdom of the rule,‖ remarking that ―[a]greements of counsel in the course of a judicial proceeding which affect the interests of their clients should not be left to the fallibility of human recollection.‖16 Rule 11 does not specify that it applies only to suits pending only in the trial court.17 | 1 | 1 |
Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.green2 sentences1998Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757-58 (Tex.1993). 1998Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757-58 (Tex. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Shearer v. Shearergreen2 sentences1988However, the Court reasoned that such a priori reasoning has not always been useful in legal analysis, positing the pronun-ciamento of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.” 480 N.E.2d at 391 (citing Holmes, The Common Law (1881)), Following that line of reasoning, the Court posited the proposition that if the doctrine of parental immunity was a good and useful one, the experience of the law would empirically establish the wisdom of that doctrine. 1988Surveying the growing tendency to abrogate the doctrine and the experience of states that never adopted the doctrine, the Court came to the conclusion that “[t]o continue to deny access to the courts on the grounds of ‘what may be,’ in the face of overwhelming experience to the contrary in the many other states, is nothing more than a denial of due process.” Id. at 391. | 1 | 1 |
Ainsworth v. Stategreen1 sentence1987Until the contrary is demonstrated, we must presume that the jury followed the instructions, Ainsworth v. State, 517 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Rose v. State, supra; Patton v. State, 717 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986, pet. pending), and did not let the information affect the sentence it set. | 1 | 1 |
| Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
Victoria Comfort Air Co. v. Alamo Express, Inc.green1 sentence1984Saldana v. Garcia, 155 Tex. 242 , 285 S.W.2d 197, 201 (1955); Elkins v. Auto Recovery Bureau, 649 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motherall Contractors, 599 S.W.2d 336, 343-44 (Tex.Civ.App.1980, no writ); Victoria Construction Co. v. Alamo Express, 529 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ); Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Tex.Civ.App.1974, no writ); Sympson v. Mor-Win Products Co., 501 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, no writ); Coleman v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 484 S.W.2d 449, 453-54 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ r | 1 | 1 |
| Coleman v. Pacific Employers Insurance Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stanfield v. Krollgreen | 1 | 1 |
Sympson v. Mor-Win Products, Inc.green1 sentence1984Saldana v. Garcia, 155 Tex. 242 , 285 S.W.2d 197, 201 (1955); Elkins v. Auto Recovery Bureau, 649 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motherall Contractors, 599 S.W.2d 336, 343-44 (Tex.Civ.App.1980, no writ); Victoria Construction Co. v. Alamo Express, 529 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ); Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Tex.Civ.App.1974, no writ); Sympson v. Mor-Win Products Co., 501 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, no writ); Coleman v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 484 S.W.2d 449, 453-54 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ r | 1 | 1 |
| Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motheral Contractors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Saldana v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montgomery Fly Cameron v. W. B. Hauck, Sheriff of Bexar County, Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Mastersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Phillips
green
2 sentences2024And to be clear, Bothwell’s suggestion that compound interest may not require “any express stipulation” does not survive Cherokee Nation or the present case. 48 See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 , 776 & n.36 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 675-676 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 558-559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied); William C. 2024And to be clear, Bothwell’s suggestion that compound interest may not require “any express stipulation” does not survive Cherokee Nation or the present case. 48 See In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 , 776 & n.36 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Foster, 623 S.W.2d 672, 675-676 (Tex. App.—Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 558-559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied); William C. | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Salazar v. State
green
2 sentences2009The contrary would authorize a return of conditions that existed in the days of the inquisition.”); Commonwealth v. Turza, 16 A.2d 401, 404 (Pa. 1940) (The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against “the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed.”). 3 See Salazar, 86 S.W.3d at 644 . 4 See Concurring Op. at 1-2 (Womack, J., concurring) (quoting WAYNE R. 2009The contrary would authorize a return of conditions that existed in the days of the inquisition."); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128 , 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940) (The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against "the hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed."). [3] See Salazar, 86 S.W.3d at 644 . [4] See Concurring Op. at 1-2 (Womack, J., concurring) (quoting WAYNE R. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines
green
2 sentences1970Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370 , 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952). 1970Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370 , 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952). | 2 | 1969–1970 |
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps
green
2 sentences1970Some twenty-seven years ago, we adopted the rule as a means of fixing liability on manufacturers and packagers of food products for human consumption, Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609 , 164 S.W.2d 828 , 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942), and on retail purveyors thereof, Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623 , 164 S.W.2d 835 , 142 A.L.R. 1424 (1942); but a decade later, we questioned the wisdom of applying the rule to retailers of food products, canned or packaged by others, and we refused to apply it to wholesalers of such products. 1970Some twenty-seven years ago, we adopted the rule as a means of fixing liability on manufacturers and packagers of food products for human consumption, Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609 , 164 S.W.2d 828 , 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942), and on retail purveyors thereof, Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623 , 164 S.W.2d 835 , 142 A.L.R. 1424 (1942); but a decade later, we questioned the wisdom of applying the rule to retailers of food products, canned or packaged by others, and we refused to apply it to wholesalers of such products. | 2 | 1969–1970 |
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey
green
2 sentences1970Some twenty-seven years ago, we adopted the rule as a means of fixing liability on manufacturers and packagers of food products for human consumption, Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609 , 164 S.W.2d 828 , 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942), and on retail purveyors thereof, Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623 , 164 S.W.2d 835 , 142 A.L.R. 1424 (1942); but a decade later, we questioned the wisdom of applying the rule to retailers of food products, canned or packaged by others, and we refused to apply it to wholesalers of such products. 1970Some twenty-seven years ago, we adopted the rule as a means of fixing liability on manufacturers and packagers of food products for human consumption, Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609 , 164 S.W.2d 828 , 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1942), and on retail purveyors thereof, Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623 , 164 S.W.2d 835 , 142 A.L.R. 1424 (1942); but a decade later, we questioned the wisdom of applying the rule to retailers of food products, canned or packaged by others, and we refused to apply it to wholesalers of such products. | 2 | 1969–1970 |
Weatherford v. State
green
2 sentences1945R. 530 , 21 S. W. 251 , that: “Upon grounds of public policy, courts have almost universally agreed upon the rule, that no affidavit, deposition, or other sworn statement of a juror, will be received to impeach a verdict, or to explain it, or to show on what grounds it was rendered (2 Thompson’s Trials, section 2618, and authorities cited), and the wisdom of the rule needs no argument to support it.” Also see Pilot v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 1932“Upon grounds of public policy, the courts have almost universally agreed upon the rule that no affidavit * * * or other sworn statement of a juror will be received to impeach the verdict, or to explain it, or to show on what grounds it was rendered, * * * and the wisdom of the rule needs no argument to support it.” Weatherford v. State, 31 Texas Crim. | 2 | 1932–1945 |
Moor v. Moor
green
2 sentences1943The wisdom of such a rule is well-grounded in the following statement: “It may be that, in dividing the property at the time the decree is granted, the court may take into consideration the wrong inflicted upon the wife by the cause for divorce, and not send away an injured woman with little save her mental sufferings, blasted hopes, and ruined life, but may give her compensation for her wrongs, beyond her interest in the community property.” Moor v. Moor, 24 Tex.Civ.App. 150 , 255 S.W. 231, 234 , writ refused. 1938App. 255 S.W. 231 , it is said the wisdom for such a rule is grounded upon such matters as that the court could take into consideration the wrong inflicted upon the wife by the cause for divorce, and not send away an injured woman with little save her mental sufferings, blasted hopes and ruined life, but may give her compensation for her wrongs, beyond her interest in the community property. | 2 | 1938–1943 |
State of Texas v. Zalman, Daniel
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 594 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Massey v. Armco Steel Co.
green
1 sentence1989This case, once again, points out the wisdom of the rule in Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983), and Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.1974), that is, the proper method of attacking the sufficiency of pleadings is by special exception. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring
green
1 sentence1989This case, once again, points out the wisdom of the rule in Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983), and Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.1974), that is, the proper method of attacking the sufficiency of pleadings is by special exception. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Trout v. State
green
2 sentences1988More recently, we decided Trout v. State, 702 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) on State’s Motion for Rehearing. 1988More recently, we decided Trout v. State, 702 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) on State's Motion for Rehearing. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Patton v. State
green
1 sentence1987Until the contrary is demonstrated, we must presume that the jury followed the instructions, Ainsworth v. State, 517 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Rose v. State, supra; Patton v. State, 717 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986, pet. pending), and did not let the information affect the sentence it set. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Elkins v. Auto Recovery Bureau
green
1 sentence1984Saldana v. Garcia, 155 Tex. 242 , 285 S.W.2d 197, 201 (1955); Elkins v. Auto Recovery Bureau, 649 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motherall Contractors, 599 S.W.2d 336, 343-44 (Tex.Civ.App.1980, no writ); Victoria Construction Co. v. Alamo Express, 529 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ); Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Tex.Civ.App.1974, no writ); Sympson v. Mor-Win Products Co., 501 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, no writ); Coleman v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 484 S.W.2d 449, 453-54 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ r | 1 | 1984–1984 |
De Leon v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
green
1 sentence1984Saldana v. Garcia, 155 Tex. 242 , 285 S.W.2d 197, 201 (1955); Elkins v. Auto Recovery Bureau, 649 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Irrigation Construction Co. v. Motherall Contractors, 599 S.W.2d 336, 343-44 (Tex.Civ.App.1980, no writ); Victoria Construction Co. v. Alamo Express, 529 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ); Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Tex.Civ.App.1974, no writ); Sympson v. Mor-Win Products Co., 501 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, no writ); Coleman v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 484 S.W.2d 449, 453-54 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ r | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Lowe v. Monk green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Cameron v. Hauck green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Fort Worth Gas Co. v. City of Fort Worth neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Pilot v. State neutral | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Bacon v. State neutral | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Moor v. Moor green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Gonzales v. State neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Rains v. Simpson green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Chapman v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Watson v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. R. v. McDade green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Ashe v. Yungst green | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.