wisdom waiver in Colorado

2025“But in this context, ‘intelligently’ does not refer to the wisdom of the waiver; rather, the court must honor a defendant’s request to self-represent if it is satisfied that [the] defendant knows 16 what . . . she is doing and understands the consequences.” People v. Johnson, 2015 COA 54, ¶ 18 . ¶ 40 Here, the court asked Eden several questions to determine why she was choosing to waive her right to counsel.

2025Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citation omitted); Woods, 931 P.2d at 533 ; see People v. Johnson, 2015 COA 54, ¶ 18 (an “intelligent” waiver refers to the defendant’s understanding of the 30 consequences rather than the wisdom of the waiver (citation omitted)). 3.

2026See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Short , 698 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo. 1985) (determining that child custody requires "a broad inquiry into all relevant factors bearing on the welfare of the child"); In re Marriage of Capparelli , 2024 COA 103M , ¶ 9, 561 P.3d 417 , 421 (concluding that the equitable distribution of martial property involves a consideration of a "variety of factors"); In re Marriage of Nelson , 2012 COA 205, ¶ 23 , 292 P.3d 1214, 1219 (noting that determining maintenance entails a "discretionary balancing of factors"). ¶73 The wisdom of the test set forth in West is illustrated in t

2026See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Short , 698 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo. 1985) (determining that child custody requires "a broad inquiry into all relevant factors bearing on the welfare of the child"); In re Marriage of Capparelli , 2024 COA 103M , ¶ 9, 561 P.3d 417 , 421 (concluding that the equitable distribution of martial property involves a consideration of a "variety of factors"); In re Marriage of Nelson , 2012 COA 205, ¶ 23 , 292 P.3d 1214, 1219 (noting that determining maintenance entails a "discretionary balancing of factors"). ¶73 The wisdom of the test set forth in West is illustrated in t

2026See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Short , 698 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo. 1985) (determining that child custody requires "a broad inquiry into all relevant factors bearing on the welfare of the child"); In re Marriage of Capparelli , 2024 COA 103M , ¶ 9, 561 P.3d 417 , 421 (concluding that the equitable distribution of martial property involves a consideration of a "variety of factors"); In re Marriage of Nelson , 2012 COA 205, ¶ 23 , 292 P.3d 1214, 1219 (noting that determining maintenance entails a "discretionary balancing of factors"). ¶73 The wisdom of the test set forth in West is illustrated in t

2026See Clark v. Clark , 346 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984); Anderson v. Archer , 510 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). ¶74 In Clark , 346 N.W.2d at 384-85 , the court considered whether a gradual reduction of "reasonable and liberal visitation" from fourteen weeks per year to 5.5 weeks per year was a restriction.

2026See Clark v. Clark , 346 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984); Anderson v. Archer , 510 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). ¶74 In Clark , 346 N.W.2d at 384-85 , the court considered whether a gradual reduction of "reasonable and liberal visitation" from fourteen weeks per year to 5.5 weeks per year was a restriction.

2026See Clark v. Clark , 346 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984); Anderson v. Archer , 510 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). ¶74 In Clark , 346 N.W.2d at 384-85 , the court considered whether a gradual reduction of "reasonable and liberal visitation" from fourteen weeks per year to 5.5 weeks per year was a restriction.

2025Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citation omitted); Woods, 931 P.2d at 533 ; see People v. Johnson, 2015 COA 54, ¶ 18 (an “intelligent” waiver refers to the defendant’s understanding of the 30 consequences rather than the wisdom of the waiver (citation omitted)). 3.

2023In this context, though, the terms “knowingly” and “intelligently” do not refer “to the wisdom of the waiver”; rather, the court must honor a defendant’s request to proceed pro se as long as “it is satisfied that [the] defendant knows what he or she is doing and understands the consequences.” Johnson, ¶ 18. ¶ 46 Once the defendant has validly waived his right to counsel, he is entitled to conduct his own defense, notwithstanding the obvious truth that “the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life

2015People v. Smith, 881 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo.App.1994) (citing People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 340 , 615 P.2d 660, 663 (1980). 119 Because a pro se defense is usually a bad one, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel.

2015People v. Smith, 881 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo.App.1994) (citing People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 340 , 615 P.2d 660, 663 (1980). 119 Because a pro se defense is usually a bad one, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel.

2015People v. Smith, 881 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo.App.1994) (citing People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 340 , 615 P.2d 660, 663 (1980). 119 Because a pro se defense is usually a bad one, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver of the fundamental right to counsel.

1983See, e.g., Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis.2d 461 , 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) (change in individual comparison rule best left to legislature; two justices dissenting); May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis.2d 30 , 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978) (majority of court of view that individual comparison rule leads to “harsh and unfair” results).

1983See, e.g., Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis.2d 461 , 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) (change in individual comparison rule best left to legislature; two justices dissenting); May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis.2d 30 , 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978) (majority of court of view that individual comparison rule leads to “harsh and unfair” results).