wisdom rule in Missouri

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1980Relying primarily on State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. banc 1979), the State further argues that when a conventional manslaughter instruction is given, “before the jury may consider whether the defendant is guilty of manslaughter the jurors must first acquit him of the higher degree of homicide,” and in a case where such an acquittal on the higher degree “necessarily breaks the connection between defendant and the crime, a conviction for manslaughter cannot be upheld and thus should not be an option for the jury.” In the Handley case an alleged accomplice in a bank robbery was charged with

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1964In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncerta

1916Co., 211 Mo. 411, 415 , 109 S. W. 663 .]” The facts of the case in hand forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule dispensing with a new trial where the parties - have contested all the vital issues of the cause at the trial as though they were well pleaded and the triers of fact have fully considered and determined them.

1916Co., 211 Mo. 411, 415 , 109 S. W. 663 .]” The facts of the case in hand forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule dispensing with a new trial where the parties - have contested all the vital issues of the cause at the trial as though they were well pleaded and the triers of fact have fully considered and determined them.

1908We do not consider it necessary to discuss that rule at this time; we can add nothing in the way of argument to what we have already in many cases said. [Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566 ; Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 ; McElvain v. McElvain, 171 Mo. 244 ; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 263 ; Asbury v. Hicklin, 181 Mo. 658 ; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651 ; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58 ; Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 416 .] The cases relied on by appellant do' not in the least impair the force of those decisions.

1908We do not consider it necessary to discuss that rule at this time; we can add nothing in the way of argument to what we have already in many cases said. [Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566 ; Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 ; McElvain v. McElvain, 171 Mo. 244 ; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 263 ; Asbury v. Hicklin, 181 Mo. 658 ; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651 ; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58 ; Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 416 .] The cases relied on by appellant do' not in the least impair the force of those decisions.

1908We do not consider it necessary to discuss that rule at this time; we can add nothing in the way of argument to what we have already in many cases said. [Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566 ; Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 ; McElvain v. McElvain, 171 Mo. 244 ; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 263 ; Asbury v. Hicklin, 181 Mo. 658 ; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651 ; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58 ; Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 416 .] The cases relied on by appellant do' not in the least impair the force of those decisions.

1908We do not consider it necessary to discuss that rule at this time; we can add nothing in the way of argument to what we have already in many cases said. [Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566 ; Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 ; McElvain v. McElvain, 171 Mo. 244 ; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 263 ; Asbury v. Hicklin, 181 Mo. 658 ; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651 ; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58 ; Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 416 .] The cases relied on by appellant do' not in the least impair the force of those decisions.

1908We do not consider it necessary to discuss that rule at this time; we can add nothing in the way of argument to what we have already in many cases said. [Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566 ; Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 ; McElvain v. McElvain, 171 Mo. 244 ; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 263 ; Asbury v. Hicklin, 181 Mo. 658 ; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651 ; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58 ; Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 416 .] The cases relied on by appellant do' not in the least impair the force of those decisions.

1908We do not consider it necessary to discuss that rule at this time; we can add nothing in the way of argument to what we have already in many cases said. [Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566 ; Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 ; McElvain v. McElvain, 171 Mo. 244 ; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 263 ; Asbury v. Hicklin, 181 Mo. 658 ; Grantham v. Gossett, 182 Mo. 651 ; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58 ; Berg v. Moreau, 199 Mo. 416 .] The cases relied on by appellant do' not in the least impair the force of those decisions.

1903The facts of this case make a strong example of the wisdom of the rule which allows a plaintiff, .in exceptional cases, to recover notwithstanding his own contributory negligence, when the defendant sees the plaintiff’s peril and although able by ordinary care to avoid it, yet recklessly or wantonly inflicts the injury. [Kellny v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 67 ; Morgan v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 262 ].

1903The facts of this case make a strong example of the wisdom of the rule which allows a plaintiff, .in exceptional cases, to recover notwithstanding his own contributory negligence, when the defendant sees the plaintiff’s peril and although able by ordinary care to avoid it, yet recklessly or wantonly inflicts the injury. [Kellny v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 67 ; Morgan v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 262 ].

1891As was well said by Norton, J., in State v. Redemeier, 71 Mo. 173 , this state, acting upon the principle that “ in medio tutissimus est, has adopted a rule lying between these two* extremes, holding that the defense of insanity is established when the evidence offered in support of it preponderates in favor of the fact, and reasonably satisfies the jury that it existed at the time the criminal act charged was committed. .* * * The fact that insancity is so easily simulated demonstrates the wisdom of the rule, and affords a strong reason why we should adhere to it.” The court instructed on thi

1869(Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120 ; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo. 498 ; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590 .) The wisdom of the principle of these decisions has been vindicated by its transferrence, in express terms, into the organic law.

1869(Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120 ; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo. 498 ; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590 .) The wisdom of the principle of these decisions has been vindicated by its transferrence, in express terms, into the organic law.

1869(Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120 ; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo. 498 ; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590 .) The wisdom of the principle of these decisions has been vindicated by its transferrence, in express terms, into the organic law.