wisdom rule in California

2009History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then ‘[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.’ (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine[, supra,] 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) H] We conclude that judicially compelled payment of money

2009History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then ‘[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.’ (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine[, supra,] 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) H] We conclude that judicially compelled payment of money

2009History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then ‘[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.’ (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine[, supra,] 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) H] We conclude that judicially compelled payment of money

2009History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then ‘[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.’ (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine[, supra,] 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) H] We conclude that judicially compelled payment of money

2009History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then ‘[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.’ (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine[, supra,] 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) H] We conclude that judicially compelled payment of money

1996History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then “[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.” (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 461 , 586 P.2d 942 ]; In re Marriage of Shelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) We conclude that judicia

2023(See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924 (Yvanova); Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 814 (Saterbak).) The instant matter underscores the wisdom of that principle.

2023(See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924 (Yvanova); Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 814 (Saterbak).) The instant matter underscores the wisdom of that principle.

2020(See Lowery, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 427 [construing a threat statute to encompass only true threats to preserve its constitutionality, but not adopting the language at issue from Hines and In re M.S.].)8 DISPOSITION The trial court’s judgment is reversed. 8 We question the wisdom of such a rule if it would apply to a credible, but metaphorical, threat of harm.

2015Those cases arise from the premise that “[u]nder both the [d]ue [pjrocess and the [c]ommerce [c]lauses of the Constitution, a [s]tate may not, when imposing an income-based tax, ‘tax value earned outside its borders.’ ” (Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1983) 463 U.S. 159, 164 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 545 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 ]; see Barclays, supra, 512 U.S. 298 .) However, those cases are not controlling — or relevant — because they only considered the constitutionality of California’s apportionment scheme in isolation, not in the context of differential treatment.

2015(Oregon Waste, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 100, fn. 4 [“the degree of a differential burden or charge on interstate commerce ‘measures only the extent of the discrimination’ and ‘is of no relevance to the determination whether a [s]tate has discriminated against interstate commerce’ ”].) Nor does the Board cite any authority that would support the proposition that the commerce clause can only invalidate a single statute or deduction and not “California’s entire tax scheme of requiring multistate unitary businesses to use combined reports.” Indeed, we question the wisdom of a rule that would allow a

2015Those cases arise from the premise that “[u]nder both the [d]ue [pjrocess and the [c]ommerce [c]lauses of the Constitution, a [s]tate may not, when imposing an income-based tax, ‘tax value earned outside its borders.’ ” (Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1983) 463 U.S. 159, 164 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 545 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 ]; see Barclays, supra, 512 U.S. 298 .) However, those cases are not controlling — or relevant — because they only considered the constitutionality of California’s apportionment scheme in isolation, not in the context of differential treatment.

2015Those cases arise from the premise that “[u]nder both the [d]ue [pjrocess and the [c]ommerce [c]lauses of the Constitution, a [s]tate may not, when imposing an income-based tax, ‘tax value earned outside its borders.’ ” (Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1983) 463 U.S. 159, 164 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 545 , 103 S.Ct. 2933 ]; see Barclays, supra, 512 U.S. 298 .) However, those cases are not controlling — or relevant — because they only considered the constitutionality of California’s apportionment scheme in isolation, not in the context of differential treatment.

2009History has borne out the wisdom of this analysis, for since then ‘[t]he California Supreme Court has consistently limited the collateral order doctrine to situations where a trial judge orders either payment of money or the performance of some act.’ (Samuel v. Stevedoring Services (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 414, 418 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 ], citing Bauguess v. Paine[, supra,] 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Skelley, supra, 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 ; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 529 P.2d 53 ].) H] We conclude that judicially compelled payment of money

2009But the history and plain language of section 1447(c), leave no doubt that Congress made the mailing of a certified copy of the remand order the “determinable jurisdictional event after which the state court can exercise control over the case without fear of further federal interference.” (Trans Penn, supra, 50 F.3d at p. 225.) Though legitimate questions may be asked as to the wisdom of that rule, we decline to second-guess Congress by rewriting the statute.

2009It holds the power to dismiss, as the attorney-general in England holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official responsibility.” (P eople v. More (1887) 71 Cal. 546, 547 [ 12 P. 631 ].) But in granting authority to a court to dismiss “in furtherance of justice,” the Legislature “required the court to spread upon the minutes for public reference the reason for its action in dismissing a felony prosecution.” (People v. Romero (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [ 57 P.2d 557 ].) “From the standpoint of the public welfare, potent argum

2009It holds the power to dismiss, as the attorney-general in England holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official responsibility.” (P eople v. More (1887) 71 Cal. 546, 547 [ 12 P. 631 ].) But in granting authority to a court to dismiss “in furtherance of justice,” the Legislature “required the court to spread upon the minutes for public reference the reason for its action in dismissing a felony prosecution.” (People v. Romero (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [ 57 P.2d 557 ].) “From the standpoint of the public welfare, potent argum

2009(See Unzueta v. Ocean View *358 School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ] [construing statute to avoid absurd result “should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases”].) Thus, we hold that jurisdiction was not returned to the state court until September 2007, when the district court clerk mailed a certified copy of the remand order to the superior court.

2009(See Unzueta v. Ocean View *358 School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ] [construing statute to avoid absurd result “should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases”].) Thus, we hold that jurisdiction was not returned to the state court until September 2007, when the district court clerk mailed a certified copy of the remand order to the superior court.

2009It holds the power to dismiss, as the attorney-general in England holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official responsibility.” (P eople v. More (1887) 71 Cal. 546, 547 [ 12 P. 631 ].) But in granting authority to a court to dismiss “in furtherance of justice,” the Legislature “required the court to spread upon the minutes for public reference the reason for its action in dismissing a felony prosecution.” (People v. Romero (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [ 57 P.2d 557 ].) “From the standpoint of the public welfare, potent argum

2009It holds the power to dismiss, as the attorney-general in England holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official responsibility.” (P eople v. More (1887) 71 Cal. 546, 547 [ 12 P. 631 ].) But in granting authority to a court to dismiss “in furtherance of justice,” the Legislature “required the court to spread upon the minutes for public reference the reason for its action in dismissing a felony prosecution.” (People v. Romero (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 667, 670 [ 57 P.2d 557 ].) “From the standpoint of the public welfare, potent argum

2006(See Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284, fn. 5 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 439 ] [corporation must be represented by counsel]; Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 522-526 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 ] [individual has right to self-representation in state civil proceedings].) But that is the effect of the trial court’s ruling: Because Gottlieb did not personally undertake the defense of his judgment-proof companies, he is saddled with individual liability under the default judgment entered against them.

2006(See Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284, fn. 5 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 439 ] [corporation must be represented by counsel]; Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 522-526 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 ] [individual has right to self-representation in state civil proceedings].) But that is the effect of the trial court’s ruling: Because Gottlieb did not personally undertake the defense of his judgment-proof companies, he is saddled with individual liability under the default judgment entered against them.

2006(See Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284, fn. 5 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 439 ] [corporation must be represented by counsel]; Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 522-526 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 ] [individual has right to self-representation in state civil proceedings].) But that is the effect of the trial court’s ruling: Because Gottlieb did not personally undertake the defense of his judgment-proof companies, he is saddled with individual liability under the default judgment entered against them.

2006(See Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284, fn. 5 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 439 ] [corporation must be represented by counsel]; Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 522-526 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 ] [individual has right to self-representation in state civil proceedings].) But that is the effect of the trial court’s ruling: Because Gottlieb did not personally undertake the defense of his judgment-proof companies, he is saddled with individual liability under the default judgment entered against them.

1998They provide no basis whatever for a conclusion that the federal charter would require such instructions ... on the court’s own motion.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 168, original italics; see also Kubat v. Thieret (7th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 351, 365-366 [“No federal court has imposed on trial judges a duty to sua sponte instruct on lesser included offenses, and we agree with the district court that the wisdom of such a rule would be questionable.”].) The only “ ‘cogent reason[]’ ” offered by the majority for departing from the United States Supreme Court’s decisions is its bald assertion that “the r

1998They provide no basis whatever for a conclusion that the federal charter would require such instructions... ow the court's own motion." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 886 of 77 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 1109 of 960 P.2d, original italics; see also Kubat v. Thieret (7th Cir.1989) 867 F.2d 351, 365-366 ["No federal court has imposed on trial judges a duty to sua sponte instruct on lesser included offenses, and we agree with the district court that the wisdom of such a rule would be questionable."].) The only "`cogent reason[ ]'" offered by the majority for departing from the United States Supreme Court's deci

1996(E.g., Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 493 ].) Because the order denying substitution of attorneys does not overcome that obstacle, and because it is neither a final judgment nor an order made appealable by statute, we have no jurisdiction to review it. *1238 Disposition The appeal is dismissed.

1996(E.g., Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 493 ].) Because the order denying substitution of attorneys does not overcome that obstacle, and because it is neither a final judgment nor an order made appealable by statute, we have no jurisdiction to review it. *1238 Disposition The appeal is dismissed.

1993(Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.) 5 III.

1985However, Harris applied a rule that, “Where an attorney is retained in an action to represent a party litigant, all statutory notices and legal proceedings therein must be signed or inaugurated by the attorney of record alone [citation].” (Id., at p. 401; see Cowee v. Marsh (1958) 50 Cal.2d 240, 243-244 [ 324 P.2d 553 ]; Goetz v. Superior Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 784, 786-787 [ 322 P.2d 217 ].) Here, we have no cause to examine the wisdom of this rule because defendant’s attorney caused the formal order to be served upon plaintiffs.

1985However, Harris applied a rule that, “Where an attorney is retained in an action to represent a party litigant, all statutory notices and legal proceedings therein must be signed or inaugurated by the attorney of record alone [citation].” (Id., at p. 401; see Cowee v. Marsh (1958) 50 Cal.2d 240, 243-244 [ 324 P.2d 553 ]; Goetz v. Superior Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 784, 786-787 [ 322 P.2d 217 ].) Here, we have no cause to examine the wisdom of this rule because defendant’s attorney caused the formal order to be served upon plaintiffs.

1985However, Harris applied a rule that, “Where an attorney is retained in an action to represent a party litigant, all statutory notices and legal proceedings therein must be signed or inaugurated by the attorney of record alone [citation].” (Id., at p. 401; see Cowee v. Marsh (1958) 50 Cal.2d 240, 243-244 [ 324 P.2d 553 ]; Goetz v. Superior Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 784, 786-787 [ 322 P.2d 217 ].) Here, we have no cause to examine the wisdom of this rule because defendant’s attorney caused the formal order to be served upon plaintiffs.

1985However, Harris applied a rule that, “Where an attorney is retained in an action to represent a party litigant, all statutory notices and legal proceedings therein must be signed or inaugurated by the attorney of record alone [citation].” (Id., at p. 401; see Cowee v. Marsh (1958) 50 Cal.2d 240, 243-244 [ 324 P.2d 553 ]; Goetz v. Superior Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 784, 786-787 [ 322 P.2d 217 ].) Here, we have no cause to examine the wisdom of this rule because defendant’s attorney caused the formal order to be served upon plaintiffs.