30 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1971–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.). 2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.). | 8 | 8 |
Illinois v. Krullgreen2 sentences2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.). 2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.). | 3 | 10 |
Weeks v. United Statesred2 sentences2016The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule succinctly holds that evidence obtained by the government during, or as a result of, an unlawful search "c[an] not constitute proof against the victim of the search." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 484, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) ). 2016The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule succinctly holds that evidence obtained by the government during, or as a result of, an unlawful search "c[an] not constitute proof against the victim of the search." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 484, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) ). | 1 | 3 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule succinctly holds that evidence obtained by the government during, or as a result of, an unlawful search "c[an] not constitute proof against the victim of the search." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 484, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) ). 2016The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule succinctly holds that evidence obtained by the government during, or as a result of, an unlawful search "c[an] not constitute proof against the victim of the search." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 484, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) ). | 1 | 3 |
Witmer v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensinggreen1 sentence2016See Sitoski, 11 A.3d at 21 (“[o]ur Courts have consistently held that a licensee may not seek civil remedies, i.e., the reversal of a license suspension, where the licensee’s rights as a criminal defendant have been compromised”); Witmer v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 880 A.2d 716, 719 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (holding that the sanctions imposed by the Implied Consent Law, i.e., a license suspension, “are civil in nature and are wholly unrelated to the consequences of a DUI criminal prosecution”); Kachurak, 913 A.2d at 986 (“[t]he law is clear that the legality of the underlying DU | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tannergreen2 sentences2016Id. at 129-30 (citing, inter alia, State v. Tanner, 304 Or. 312 , 745 P.2d 757, 761 (1987) (noting Oregon Supreme Court “identified privacy as the principal interest protected against unlawful searches”)). 2016Id. at 129-30 (citing, inter alia, State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 761 (Or. 1987) (noting Oregon Supreme Court “identified privacy as the principal interest protected against unlawful searches”)). | 1 | 1 |
Sitoski v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensinggreen1 sentence2016See Sitoski, 11 A.3d at 21 (“[o]ur Courts have consistently held that a licensee may not seek civil remedies, i.e., the reversal of a license suspension, where the licensee’s rights as a criminal defendant have been compromised”); Witmer v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 880 A.2d 716, 719 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (holding that the sanctions imposed by the Implied Consent Law, i.e., a license suspension, “are civil in nature and are wholly unrelated to the consequences of a DUI criminal prosecution”); Kachurak, 913 A.2d at 986 (“[t]he law is clear that the legality of the underlying DU | 1 | 1 |
McGuire v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 , 47 S.Ct. 259, 260 [ 71 L.Ed. 556 (1927) ].” Dabbierio, supra at 681 . 2014McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 , 47 S.Ct. 259, 260 [ 71 L.Ed. 556 (1927) ].” Dabbierio, supra at 681 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dabbieriogreen2 sentences2014Although the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in 1914, for more than four decades, we declined to adopt the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. 1 For example, in Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174 , 138 A. 679, 681 (1927), we recognized but explicitly rejected Weeks in upholding, under state constitutional law, the admission of evidence that had been obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant. 2 Rather than follow Weeks , the Dabbierio Court “[found itself] in more complete accord with ... 2014Although the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in 1914, for more than four decades, we declined to adopt the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. 1 For example, in Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174 , 138 A. 679, 681 (1927), we recognized but explicitly rejected Weeks in upholding, under state constitutional law, the admission of evidence that had been obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant. 2 Rather than follow Weeks , the Dabbierio Court “[found itself] in more complete accord with ... | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., People v. Smith, 31 Cal. App.4th 1185, 1192-1193 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 524 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1995) (holding that because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule serves to deter police misconduct, while evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment is excluded on principles of due process and to preserve the integrity of the justice system, the good faith exception does not apply to confessions obtained in violation of Miranda). 2013See, e.g., People v. Smith, 31 Cal. App.4th 1185, 1192-1193 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 524 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1995) (holding that because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule serves to deter police misconduct, while evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment is excluded on principles of due process and to preserve the integrity of the justice system, the good faith exception does not apply to confessions obtained in violation of Miranda). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen2 sentences2000See Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 392-399 , 586 A.2d at 896-99 (discussing history of Article I, § 8). 2000See Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 392-399 , 586 A.2d at 896-99 (discussing history of Article I, § 8). | 1 | 1 |
Knuckles v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parolegreen2 sentences1996Although in Knuckles v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 111 Pa.Cmwlth. 487 , 533 A.2d 1156, 1157 (1987), we stated that “the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is generally not applicable to parole violation hearings,” (emphasis added), citing Nickens , the use of the word “generally” was a misstatement of the holding in Nickens . 1996Although in Knuckles v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 111 Pa.Cmwlth. 487 , 533 A.2d 1156, 1157 (1987), we stated that “the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is generally not applicable to parole violation hearings,” (emphasis added), citing Nickens , the use of the word “generally” was a misstatement of the holding in Nickens . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2019The Commonwealth further explained that the USAO EDPA agreed they 2 See US v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984) holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. 2 ------------------------------ -·-·--·--··-··· .... -. would not pursue any federal charges if Appellant accepted the Commonwealth's offer of eight (8) to sixteen (16) years plus the four (4) year probation by February 26, 2018. 1991In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule may not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a facially valid but somehow defective search warrant. | 3 | 1991–2019 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2006There has been significant Pennsylvania case law about the search and seizure provisions of Article I, Section 8, in the context of unreasonable seizures of evidence, since the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 15 was made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). 2006There has been significant Pennsylvania case law about the search and seizure provisions of Article I, Section 8, in the context of unreasonable seizures of evidence, since the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 15 was made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). | 2 | 2000–2006 |
Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Wysocki
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 79 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Illinois v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2017Thus, the Davis/Krull rule is just a specific example of the good-faith exception. -5- J-S60007-17 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 , 183–186 (1990). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 129-30 (citing, inter alia, State v. Tanner, 304 Or. 312 , 745 P.2d 757, 761 (1987) (noting Oregon Supreme Court “identified privacy as the principal interest protected against unlawful searches”)). 2016Id. at 129-30 (citing, inter alia, State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 761 (Or. 1987) (noting Oregon Supreme Court “identified privacy as the principal interest protected against unlawful searches”)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Olmstead v. United States
red
2 sentences2001The right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and, much more recently, by the state exclusionary equivalent, Article I, § 8, has been most simply and eloquently expressed in the notion that, at least as against the government, there is a "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 , 48 S.Ct. 564, 572 , 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 2001The right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and, much more recently, by the state exclusionary equivalent, Article I, § 8, has been most simply and eloquently expressed in the notion that, at least as against the government, there is a "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 , 48 S.Ct. 564, 572 , 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Calandra
green
2 sentences1993In Turk , however, the tapes were not suppressed but were used in a grand jury proceeding, where under United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be invoked by a witness. 1993In Turk , however, the tapes were not suppressed but were used in a grand jury proceeding, where under United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be invoked by a witness. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Mason
green
2 sentences1989The Commonwealth also refers us to Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421 (1985), where this Court is said to have adopted a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. 1989The Commonwealth also refers us to Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421 (1985), where this Court is said to have adopted a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stone v. Powell
green
2 sentences1978Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 1978Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1976Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, speaking for the majority in Brown , said: "While we therefore reject the per se rule which the Illinois courts appear to have accepted, we also decline to adopt any alternative per se or `but for' rule." 422 U.S. at 603 . *532 Mr. Justice POWELL, joined by Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, in his concurring opinion sets forth the extremes of the rule of exclusion and then makes this observation: "Between these extremes lies a wide range of situations that defy ready categorization, and I will not attempt to embellish on the factors set forth in the Court's opinion other than to emp | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Joseph F. Schipani
green
2 sentences1971Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court “. . . for a hearing, findings, and conclusions (1) on the question whether with respect to any petitioner there was electronic surveillance which violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) if there was such surveillance with respect to any petitioner, on the nature and relevance to his conviction of any conversation which may have been overheard through that surveillance”: Id. at page 186. 1971“Adversary proceedings will not magically eliminate all error, but they will substantially reduce its incidence by guarding against the possibility that the trial judge, through lack of time or unfamiliarity with the information contained in and suggested by the materials, will be unable to provide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands”: Id. pages 182-84. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.