Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Social Services v. Janice P.green2 sentences1999"The possibility that such an extension might result in the suffering or deprivation of innocent children is too high a price to pay for any slight additional deterrent effect." In re Robert P., 61 Cal.App.3d 310 , 132 Cal.Rptr. 5, 12 (1976). 1999"The possibility that such an extension might result in the suffering or deprivation of innocent children is too high a price to pay for any slight additional deterrent effect." In re Robert P., 61 Cal.App.3d 310 , 132 Cal.Rptr. 5, 12 (1976). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2003The knock-and-announce protections and interests are limited, however, because “ ‘in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.’ ” State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). ¶ 13 The trial court cited to no eases that explicitly reject the application of the independent source doctrine to knock-and-announce violations. 2003The knock-and-announce protections and interests are limited, however, because “ ‘in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.’ ” State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). ¶ 13 The trial court cited to no eases that explicitly reject the application of the independent source doctrine to knock-and-announce violations. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Arroyogreen2 sentences2003The knock-and-announce protections and interests are limited, however, because “ ‘in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.’ ” State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). ¶ 13 The trial court cited to no eases that explicitly reject the application of the independent source doctrine to knock-and-announce violations. 1994The rationale behind the application of this test is that “ ‘in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.’ ” Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). | 1 | 2 |
Ibarra v. Holder, Jr.green1 sentence2018Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted) ); In re A.R. , 1999 UT 43 , ¶¶ 18-20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "th | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Doegreen2 sentences2000LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.7(b), 189 (3d ed. 1996) ("[T]hose state courts which have had to face the question have consistently held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings."); [5] see also Doe, 801 F.Supp. at 1567 (stating all state courts that have considered issue have found exclusionary rule applies in juvenile delinquency hearings). 2000Those courts have looked beyond the informal, civil nature of juvenile proceedings and found "the potential penalties for being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent are on par with those resulting from a criminal conviction...." Doe, 801 F.Supp. at 1568 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Christopher B.
green
2 sentences1999In In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d 414 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 726 (1986), the court held that a "parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since `the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence' unlawfully seized." Id. at 728 (quoting In re Christopher B., 82 Cal.App.3d 608 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 390 (1978)). 1999In In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d 414 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 726 (1986), the court held that a "parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since `the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence' unlawfully seized." Id. at 728 (quoting In re Christopher B., 82 Cal.App.3d 608 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 390 (1978)). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
In Re Mary S.
green
2 sentences1999In In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d 414 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 726 (1986), the court held that a "parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since `the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence' unlawfully seized." Id. at 728 (quoting In re Christopher B., 82 Cal.App.3d 608 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 390 (1978)). 1999In In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d 414 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 726 (1986), the court held that a "parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since `the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence' unlawfully seized." Id. at 728 (quoting In re Christopher B., 82 Cal.App.3d 608 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 390 (1978)). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. Calandra
green
2 sentences1999The leading case, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), dealt with the question of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was applicable to criminal grand jury proceedings. 1999The leading case, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), dealt with the question of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was applicable to criminal grand jury proceedings. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Burton v. Chen
green
2 sentences2025As Andrus points out, because EIDPA “incorporates the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,” it arguably “requires exclusion not only of the records themselves, but of the evidence derived therefrom.” If EIDPA’s exclusionary rule applies to subscriber records lawfully obtained by a federal law enforcement agency and an arrest or search warrant has been issued based on that information, any statements made at the time of the suspect’s arrest or evidence seized during the search might be inadmissible __________________________________________________________ amendment and find it of little help in 2025As Andrus points out, because EIDPA “incorporates the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,” it arguably “requires exclusion not only of the records themselves, but of the evidence derived therefrom.” If EIDPA’s exclusionary rule applies to subscriber records lawfully obtained by a federal law enforcement agency and an arrest or search warrant has been issued based on that information, any statements made at the time of the suspect’s arrest or evidence seized during the search might be inadmissible __________________________________________________________ amendment and find it of little help in | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State Ex Rel. AR v. CR
green
2 sentences2018Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted) ); In re A.R. , 1999 UT 43 , ¶¶ 18-20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "th 2018Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted) ); In re A.R. , 1999 UT 43 , ¶¶ 18-20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "th | 1 | 2018–2018 |
New York v. Harris
green
2 sentences1994We analyze only the second prong, which requires that Bello’s consent cannot have been the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop, “or in other words, ‘whether the “taint” of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.’ ” 4 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1643-44 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990)). 1994We analyze only the second prong, which requires that Bello’s consent cannot have been the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop, “or in other words, ‘whether the “taint” of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.’ ” 4 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1643-44 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990)). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Thurman
green
1 sentence1994We analyze only the second prong, which requires that Bello’s consent cannot have been the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop, “or in other words, ‘whether the “taint” of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.’ ” 4 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1643-44 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990)). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences1991The Trouble with Leon It is viewed from this historical perspective that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), represents such a qualitative change in the development of exclusionary rule jurisprudence. 1991The Trouble with Leon It is viewed from this historical perspective that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), represents such a qualitative change in the development of exclusionary rule jurisprudence. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences1983Linkletter required the weighing of “the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1737 . 1983Linkletter required the weighing of “the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1737 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1983In Linkletter, supra, the Court addressed the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), should apply to convictions that had become final before Mapp was decided. 1983In Linkletter, supra, the Court addressed the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), should apply to convictions that had become final before Mapp was decided. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.