Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in Illinois

2016The Krueger court explained that Illinois’s exclusionary rule had “always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute [citations], so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 *** (1979) (recognizing a substantive-procedural distinction not at issue here; specifically holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply where an ordinance was held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds)).” Id. at 74-75 .

2016The Krueger court explained that Illinois’s exclusionary rule had “always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute [citations], so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 *** (1979) (recognizing a substantive-procedural distinction not at issue here; specifically holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply where an ordinance was held unconstitutional on vagueness grounds)).” Id. at 74-75 .

1992Ed. 2d 441, 453 , 83 S. Ct. 407, 415-16 .) The fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a judicially created device designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights generally.

1991Those courts which have suppressed evidence obtained (beyond the confession itself) as a result of a fifth amendment violation of a request for counsel have expressed the view that the justification for the exclusion of evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct and have applied a fourth amendment exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 9 L.

2018Relying on the same policy rationales underlying our decision in Carrera, Krueger expressly rejected the holding in Krull that “the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not bar the use of evidence seized by a police officer who reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a statute that *** is later declared to be unconstitutional.” Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 71 .

2017Relying on the same policy rationales underlying our decision in Carrera , Krueger expressly rejected the holding in Krull that "the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not bar the use of evidence seized by a police officer who reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a statute that *** is later declared to be unconstitutional." Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 71 , 221 Ill.Dec. 409 , 675 N.E.2d 604 .

1982Ed. 2d 416 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 .) Direct, primary evidence obtained from an illegal search or seizure is suppressible under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 485 , 9 L.

1982Ed. 2d 416, 430 , 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2264 , Mr. Justice Powell concurring in part stated that “in some circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of law enforcement than can be justified by the rule’s deterrent purposes.

2003Exclusion of evidence is an extreme sanction and is applied only when the rule’s deterrent purpose is “most efficaciously served.” Evans, 514 U.S. at 11 , 131 L.

2003Exclusion of evidence is an extreme sanction and is applied only when the rule’s deterrent purpose is “most efficaciously served.” Evans, 514 U.S. at 11 , 131 L.

1988It is well-settled that under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule evidence obtained in violation of the amendment must be suppressed and may not be introduced at trial. ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ; Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338 , 84 L.Ed. 307 , 60 S.Ct. 266 ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 40 S.Ct. 182 .) In other words, the prosecution may not use illegally obtained evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.

1988It is well-settled that under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule evidence obtained in violation of the amendment must be suppressed and may not be introduced at trial. ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ; Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338 , 84 L.Ed. 307 , 60 S.Ct. 266 ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 40 S.Ct. 182 .) In other words, the prosecution may not use illegally obtained evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.

1992It is not a constitutional right, nor is it calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any “[Reparation comes too late.” (Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618, 637 , 14 L.

1986Ed. 2d 601 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the fourth amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L.

1991The violation was not of the fifth amendment constitutional right but of a prophylactic rule designed to implement that right (see McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. 171, 176 , 115 L.

1991The violation was not of the fifth amendment constitutional right but of a prophylactic rule designed to implement that right (see McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. 171, 176 , 115 L.

1986In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished the fourth amendment exclusionary rule from the function of Miranda to guard against the prosecutorial use of compelled statements as prohibited by the fifth amendment. ( Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; People v. Fuller (1986), 141 Ill.

1986In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished the fourth amendment exclusionary rule from the function of Miranda to guard against the prosecutorial use of compelled statements as prohibited by the fifth amendment. ( Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; People v. Fuller (1986), 141 Ill.

1986Ed. 2d 601 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the fourth amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L.

1986Ed. 2d 601 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the fourth amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L.

2009The appellate court then determined that defendant’s statements were properly suppressed under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule because they were not sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrests. 381 Ill.

2009Finding no alternate probable cause or attenuation, the appellate court concluded the statements must be suppressed under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 381 Ill.

1996This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N.E. 728 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 , 34 S.Ct. at 345 , 58 L.Ed, at 656 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative * * * sanction")), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627

1996This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N.E. 728 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 , 34 S.Ct. at 345 , 58 L.Ed, at 656 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative * * * sanction")), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627

1996This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N.E. 728 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 , 34 S.Ct. at 345 , 58 L.Ed, at 656 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative * * * sanction")), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627

1996This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N.E. 728 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 , 34 S.Ct. at 345 , 58 L.Ed, at 656 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative * * * sanction")), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627

1994(See People v. Janis (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 300, 309 .) The fourth amendment exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless search, applies in a civil forfeiture proceeding.

1994One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania (1965), 380 U.S. 693 , 14 L.

1994One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania (1965), 380 U.S. 693 , 14 L.

1991Those courts which have suppressed evidence obtained (beyond the confession itself) as a result of a fifth amendment violation of a request for counsel have expressed the view that the justification for the exclusion of evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct and have applied a fourth amendment exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 . ( United States v. Downing (1st Cir.1981), 665 F.2d 404, 408-09 ; Commonwealth v. White (1977), 374 Mass. 132, 138-39 , 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 .) In contrast, the rationale used in not apply

1991Those courts which have suppressed evidence obtained (beyond the confession itself) as a result of a fifth amendment violation of a request for counsel have expressed the view that the justification for the exclusion of evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct and have applied a fourth amendment exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 . ( United States v. Downing (1st Cir.1981), 665 F.2d 404, 408-09 ; Commonwealth v. White (1977), 374 Mass. 132, 138-39 , 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 .) In contrast, the rationale used in not apply

1991Wilson v. Zant (1982), 249 Ga. 373, 378 , 290 S.E.2d 442, 447 .

1991Wilson v. Zant (1982), 249 Ga. 373, 378 , 290 S.E.2d 442, 447 .

1991Those courts which have suppressed evidence obtained (beyond the confession itself) as a result of a fifth amendment violation of a request for counsel have expressed the view that the justification for the exclusion of evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct and have applied a fourth amendment exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 . ( United States v. Downing (1st Cir.1981), 665 F.2d 404, 408-09 ; Commonwealth v. White (1977), 374 Mass. 132, 138-39 , 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 .) In contrast, the rationale used in not apply

1991Those courts which have suppressed evidence obtained (beyond the confession itself) as a result of a fifth amendment violation of a request for counsel have expressed the view that the justification for the exclusion of evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct and have applied a fourth amendment exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 . ( United States v. Downing (1st Cir.1981), 665 F.2d 404, 408-09 ; Commonwealth v. White (1977), 374 Mass. 132, 138-39 , 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 .) In contrast, the rationale used in not apply

1991Those courts which have suppressed evidence obtained (beyond the confession itself) as a result of a fifth amendment violation of a request for counsel have expressed the view that the justification for the exclusion of evidence is to deter unconstitutional police conduct and have applied a fourth amendment exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 . ( United States v. Downing (1st Cir.1981), 665 F.2d 404, 408-09 ; Commonwealth v. White (1977), 374 Mass. 132, 138-39 , 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 .) In contrast, the rationale used in not apply

1988It is well-settled that under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule evidence obtained in violation of the amendment must be suppressed and may not be introduced at trial. ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ; Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338 , 84 L.Ed. 307 , 60 S.Ct. 266 ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 40 S.Ct. 182 .) In other words, the prosecution may not use illegally obtained evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.

1988It is well-settled that under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule evidence obtained in violation of the amendment must be suppressed and may not be introduced at trial. ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ; Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338 , 84 L.Ed. 307 , 60 S.Ct. 266 ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 40 S.Ct. 182 .) In other words, the prosecution may not use illegally obtained evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.

1986In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished the fourth amendment exclusionary rule from the function of Miranda to guard against the prosecutorial use of compelled statements as prohibited by the fifth amendment. ( Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; People v. Fuller (1986), 141 Ill.

1986App.3d 737, 742 , 490 N.E.2d 977, 980 .) The court determined: "It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will so taints the investigation process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.

1986In People v. Joseph (1984), 128 Ill.