11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1975For the effect the giving of Miranda -warnings has on the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, see the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 . 5 . 1975For the effect the giving of Miranda -warnings has on the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, see the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 . 5 . | 1 | 3 |
Dunaway v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences1987Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-217 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S., at 600-602 , 95 S.Ct., at 2260-2261 . 'The exclusionary rule, ... when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth.! 1987Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-217 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-2259 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S., at 600-602 , 95 S.Ct., at 2260-2261 . 'The exclusionary rule, ... when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth.! | 1 | 2 |
Hudson v. Michigangreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (describing a criminal defendant’s invocation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for a knock-and-announce *156 violation as a lottery with minimal cost and an enormous jackpot); Risk v. Schilling, 569 N.E.2d 646, 648 (Ind.1991) (Givan, J., dissenting) (lamenting that too many citizens use the judicial system as though it were a lottery). 2011See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (describing a criminal defendant’s invocation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for a knock-and-announce *156 violation as a lottery with minimal cost and an enormous jackpot); Risk v. Schilling, 569 N.E.2d 646, 648 (Ind.1991) (Givan, J., dissenting) (lamenting that too many citizens use the judicial system as though it were a lottery). | 1 | 1 |
Risk v. Schillinggreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (describing a criminal defendant’s invocation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for a knock-and-announce *156 violation as a lottery with minimal cost and an enormous jackpot); Risk v. Schilling, 569 N.E.2d 646, 648 (Ind.1991) (Givan, J., dissenting) (lamenting that too many citizens use the judicial system as though it were a lottery). | 1 | 1 |
Callender v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 96-97 , 138 N.E. 817, 818-19 (1923), we cited the Indiana Bill of Rights as authority for excluding evidence that had been seized without compliance with the existing statutes on search warrants for intoxicating liquors. 2008In Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 96-97 , 138 N.E. 817, 818-19 (1923), we cited the Indiana Bill of Rights as authority for excluding evidence that had been seized without compliance with the existing statutes on search warrants for intoxicating liquors. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Finally, suppression of evidence of the illegally intercepted telephone call and any evidence derived therefrom is also consistent with the constitutional protections established in Article One, Section Eleven of our Indiana Constitution. “ ‘The purpose of Article One, Section Eleven is to protect from unreasonable police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.’ ” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (quoting Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Shultz v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Finally, suppression of evidence of the illegally intercepted telephone call and any evidence derived therefrom is also consistent with the constitutional protections established in Article One, Section Eleven of our Indiana Constitution. “ ‘The purpose of Article One, Section Eleven is to protect from unreasonable police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.’ ” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (quoting Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.1995)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vestgreen1 sentence2003Further, the court agreed with the district court that to find that section 2515 permits the government to use unlawfully intercepted communications where the government was the innocent recipient of those communications “ ‘would eviscerate the statutory protection of privacy from intrusion by illegal private reception.’” Id. (citing United States v. Vest, 639 F.Supp. 899, 914-15 (D.Mass. 1986)). 5 The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and recognized a “clean hands” exception to section 2515 in United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir.1995), cert, denied. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Allen M. Dorfman, (Two Cases). Appeal of David Dorfman Appeal of William E. Webbe. United States of America v. Allen M. Dorfmangreen1 sentence2003The Seventh Circuit has observed that although Title III is generally consistent with Fourth Amendment law and “Title Ill’s suppression remedy has its roots in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, it is not simply coextensive with that rule.” United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1227 (7th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Stabenow v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). 1996Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of MRDgreen1 sentence1986Justice White, writing for the Leon majority, pointed out however that exclusion remains appropriate where: [[Image here]] 8. the affidavit on which the warrant is based is 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable'; 4. the warrant is so facially deficient (by failing to particularly describe the place to be searched or the items to be seized) that it could not be reasonably relied upon by the executing officers." M.R.D., supra, at 310 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 155-156 , 98 S. Ct. at 2676 . [27] In Leon, the United States Supreme Court addressed “whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” 468 U.S. at 900 , 104 S. Ct. at 3409. 1996The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was modified in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), reh. denied, to permit the use, in the prosecutor's case-in-chief, of evidence seized in good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. | 3 | 1985–2015 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 155-156 , 98 S. Ct. at 2676 . [27] In Leon, the United States Supreme Court addressed “whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” 468 U.S. at 900 , 104 S. Ct. at 3409. 2015Id. at 155-156 , 98 S. Ct. at 2676 . [27] In Leon, the United States Supreme Court addressed “whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” 468 U.S. at 900 , 104 S. Ct. at 3409. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2008Id. 2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2008Indiana adopted the exclusionary rule long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings. 2008Indiana adopted the exclusionary rule long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Harold D. Murdock
green
2 sentences2003Further, the court agreed with the district court that to find that section 2515 permits the government to use unlawfully intercepted communications where the government was the innocent recipient of those communications “ ‘would eviscerate the statutory protection of privacy from intrusion by illegal private reception.’” Id. (citing United States v. Vest, 639 F.Supp. 899, 914-15 (D.Mass. 1986)). 5 The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and recognized a “clean hands” exception to section 2515 in United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir.1995), cert, denied. 2003Id. at 1403-04 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Walder v. United States
green
2 sentences2003Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 . 6 . 2003Walder, 347 U.S. at 65 , 74 S.Ct. 354 . 6 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Gelbard v. United States
green
1 sentence2003Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-18 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Calandra
green
2 sentences2003In contrast, the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). 2003In contrast, the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Jacobsen
green
2 sentences2003Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-18 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 , 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984)). 2003The court disagreed and stated, “the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a judicially-fashioned rule serving different purposes than the eongressionally-created rule of section 2515—a rule that we are here limited to interpreting rather than modifying.” Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott
green
2 sentences2000Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). 2000Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 . 1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Koonce v. State
neutral
2 sentences1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 . 1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.