protective order hearing in Texas

2016In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained that the only protective orders that will support a conviction under rule 25.07 are those that are issued under statutes that require the person subject to the order to have either attended the hearing on the protective order or to have been given notice of the application for the protective order and hearing. 3 Harvey, 78 S.W.3d at 373 (“[i]t is the evident purpose of these procedures to insure that the person to whom the protective order applies has knowledge of the order, or at the very least such knowledge of 17.292 of the code of criminal p

2002Indeed, as the Court of Criminal Appeals found, A[t]he record contained several copies of official records that showed he had notice of the application for the protective order and the hearing to consider it.@ Harvey, 78 S.W.3d at 374 .

2015To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice suffered by the appellant.3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289 , 307 3 For the sake of our discussion, we will assume without deciding that appellant was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland at the protective order hearing, a civil proceeding separate from the criminal proceeding.

2015To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence bothdeficient performance by counsel andprejudice suffered bythe appellant.3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289 ,307 3 For the sake of our discussion,we will assumewithout decidingthat appellantwas entitled to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland at the protective order hearing, a civil proceeding separate from the criminal proceeding.

2012See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Young v. Young, 168 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (―In a bench trial, it is for the court, as trier of fact, to judge the witnesses, to assign the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.‖); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (―It was for the trial court alone to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court could have disregarded [respondent’s] denials in their entirety.‖).

2012See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Young v. Young , 168 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (“In a bench trial, it is for the court, as trier of fact, to judge the witnesses, to assign the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.”); In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (“It was for the trial court alone to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court could have disregarded [respondent’s] denials in their entirety.”).

2012See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Young v. Young, 168 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (―In a bench trial, it is for the court, as trier of fact, to judge the witnesses, to assign the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.‖); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (―It was for the trial court alone to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court could have disregarded [respondent’s] denials in their entirety.‖).

2012See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Young v. Young , 168 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (“In a bench trial, it is for the court, as trier of fact, to judge the witnesses, to assign the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.”); In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (“It was for the trial court alone to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court could have disregarded [respondent’s] denials in their entirety.”).

2012See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Young v. Young, 168 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (―In a bench trial, it is for the court, as trier of fact, to judge the witnesses, to assign the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.‖); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (―It was for the trial court alone to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court could have disregarded [respondent’s] denials in their entirety.‖).

2012See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Young v. Young , 168 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (“In a bench trial, it is for the court, as trier of fact, to judge the witnesses, to assign the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.”); In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (“It was for the trial court alone to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and the trial court could have disregarded [respondent’s] denials in their entirety.”).

2024See Williams v. Williams, 19 S.W.3d 544 , 546–48 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); Winsett v. Edgar, 22 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2024See Williams v. Williams, 19 S.W.3d 544 , 546–48 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); Winsett v. Edgar, 22 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2023See B.G., 2010 WL 3722870 , at *3; Bales, 2007 WL 2963703 , at *2; Rich, 2006 WL 2106715 , at *2. 8 Richard asserts that because he is claiming a procedural and substantive due- process violation—lack of proper service and notice to appear and show cause at the protective-order hearing—he is required to show only that “no fault or negligence on the plaintiff’s part contributed to the lack of service or notice.” See, e.g., Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015) (explaining that when a bill-of-review petitioner claims a due-process violation for no service of

2023A bill-of- review petitioner who fully participated at trial but did not timely move for a new trial or timely perfect an appeal must plead and prove the following to obtain relief: (1) he failed to timely move for a new trial or to otherwise advance an appeal of the trial court’s judgment; (2) his failure to do so was caused by an official mistake or by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party; (3) his failure to act was unmixed with any fault or negligence on his part; and (4) he has a meritorious ground of appeal. 5 Richard admits that the protective order was not a defaul

2023See B.G., 2010 WL 3722870 , at *3; Bales, 2007 WL 2963703 , at *2; Rich, 2006 WL 2106715 , at *2. 8 Richard asserts that because he is claiming a procedural and substantive due- process violation—lack of proper service and notice to appear and show cause at the protective-order hearing—he is required to show only that “no fault or negligence on the plaintiff’s part contributed to the lack of service or notice.” See, e.g., Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015) (explaining that when a bill-of-review petitioner claims a due-process violation for no service of

2022Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that Garcia was not likely to commit family violence against Huskins in the future. 3 See Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (orig. proceeding) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge announces his decision in open court . . . whether orally or by written memorandum . . . .”).

2022Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 638 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

2021Her medical records were not introduced at the hearing. 8 At the close of the protective order hearing, the trial court stated, “The Court is going to grant a lifetime protective order based on the injuries sustained by the Applicant causing serious bodily injury, having sustained a fracture to her nose.” Based on this oral finding, the trial court’s written protective order stated, “[T]he Court finds the Respondent has caused serious bodily injury to the Applicant.” We are aware of case law indicating that a fractured nose may be a “serious bodily injury.” In Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 5

2021See, e.g., In re C.F., 565 S.W.3d 832, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“When a motion for continuance does not comply with the rules—for example, when the motion is unwritten or unsupported by verified facts—appellate courts generally presume the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.”); Taherzadeh v. Ghaleh-Assadi, 108 S.W.3d 927, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (explaining that party moving for continuance in the context of a protective order hearing must comply with Tex. R.

2021App. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Hedicke v. State, 779 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Crim.

2021See, e.g., In re C.F., 565 S.W.3d 832, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“When a motion for continuance does not comply with the rules—for example, when the motion is unwritten or unsupported by verified facts—appellate courts generally presume the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.”); Taherzadeh v. Ghaleh-Assadi, 108 S.W.3d 927, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (explaining that party moving for continuance in the context of a protective order hearing must comply with Tex. R.

2019Pempsell concludes her issue by stating, “Litigation moves right along when one side convinces the other side to leave the courthouse.” “The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require adequate briefing.” ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010).

2019See In re Leder, 263 S.W.3d 283, 286-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding) (filing of counter-claim, jury demand, motion to vacate ex parte temporary orders, two motions for sanctions, and certificate of written discovery before obtaining a ruling on motion to transfer did not waive venue issue); Green v. Green, 424 S.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Tex. Civ.

2019See In re Leder, 263 S.W.3d 283, 286-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding) (filing of counter-claim, jury demand, motion to vacate ex parte temporary orders, two motions for sanctions, and certificate of written discovery before obtaining a ruling on motion to transfer did not waive venue issue); Green v. Green, 424 S.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Tex. Civ.

2019In the first paragraph, Pempsell notes that Article 7A.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “requires a certain level of evidence to support issuance of a protective order” and cites Shoemaker v. State of Texas for the Protection of C.L. in support of her assertion that “[o]n review, the Court of Appeals uses both legal and factual sufficiency standards.” 493 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

2016THE INSTANT PROSECUTION IS BARRED BY PRINCIPLES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL “[C]ollateral estoppel is a component of federal constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence....” Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13, 19 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978).

2015Cf. Menard v. State, 193 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (stating that, on allegation that juror had been sleeping and missed testimony, “trial court should consider whether ‘the sleeping juror missed large portions of the trial or [whether] the portions missed were particularly critical.’” (citing United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000))). 20 At the conclusion of the protective-order hearing, the trial judge specifically addressed Sam’s characterization of his daughter’s behavior as involving “deceit” and “lies.” She stated that she did not