protective order violation in Connecticut

2025The defendant, Angel A., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a- 59 (a) (1), and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223 (c) (2).1 The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) violated his right to jury unanimity by discharging the jury before disclosing to the parties a postverdict comment made to the court by a member of the jury, C.A.,2 following th

2025The defendant, Angel A., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a- 59 (a) (1), and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223 (c) (2).1 The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) violated his right to jury unanimity by discharging the jury before disclosing to the parties a postverdict comment made to the court by a member of the jury, C.A.,2 following th

2023At trial, the state argued to the jury that the defendant had violated the protective order (1) by going to P’s workplace and (2) by contacting another person, R, because such contact with him would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to P. The court gave the jury the following instructions: ‘‘The defendant is charged with violating the provision [of the protective order] that states, do not contact the protected person’s workplace or others with whom the contact would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected person.’’ (Emphasis added.) No specific unanimity instructions were g

2023In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). 2 The defendant was convicted in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford in Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223, and in Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of § 53a-223.

2023In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). 2 The defendant was convicted in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford in Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223, and in Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of § 53a-223.

2023At trial, the state argued to the jury that the defendant had violated the protective order (1) by going to P’s workplace and (2) by contacting another person, R, because such contact with him would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to P. The court gave the jury the following instructions: ‘‘The defendant is charged with violating the provision [of the protective order] that states, do not contact the protected person’s workplace or others with whom the contact would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected person.’’ (Emphasis added.) No specific unanimity instructions were g

2023At trial, the state argued to the jury that the defendant had violated the protective order (1) by going to P’s workplace and (2) by contacting another person, R, because such contact with him would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to P. The court gave the jury the following instructions: ‘‘The defendant is charged with violating the provision [of the protective order] that states, do not contact the protected person’s workplace or others with whom the contact would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected person.’’ (Emphasis added.) No specific unanimity instructions were g

2021The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction on the ground that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated when the police continued to question him after he invoked his right to counsel pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and, therefore, claims that his statements to the police improperly were admitted into evidence.

2021The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction on the ground that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated when the police continued to question him after he invoked his right to counsel pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and, therefore, claims that his statements to the police improperly were admitted into evidence.

2016Id., at 432-33 , 870 A.2d 1039 .

2016Specifically, it stated: "Our endorsement of that rule in Cologne leads us to conclude that the defendant ... should not be allowed to challenge the validity of the protective order that he is charged with violating...." Id. 7 The court in Wright also rejected the defendant's contention that he was denied the constitutional right to an attorney when he appeared at the protective order hearing without counsel.

2016The petitioner, Vinroy Hines, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his conviction for criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a)(1), 1 two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), 3 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Genera

2016The petitioner, Vinroy Hines, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his conviction for criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a)(1), 1 two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), 3 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Genera

2016The petitioner, Vinroy Hines, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his conviction for criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a)(1), 1 two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), 3 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Genera

2016The petitioner, Vinroy Hines, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his conviction for criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a)(1), 1 two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2), 2 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), 3 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of Genera

2015Those offenses are not at issue in this certified appeal. 2 The Appellate Court opinion appears to have relied on the defendant’s testimony, in which he claimed that he had said: ‘‘I would never pull a gun out on you.’’ See State v. Carter, 141 Conn. App. 377, 382 , 61 A.3d 1103 (2013).

2015Those offenses are not at issue in this certified appeal. 2 The Appellate Court opinion appears to have relied on the defendant’s testimony, in which he claimed that he had said: ‘‘I would never pull a gun out on you.’’ See State v. Carter, 141 Conn. App. 377, 382 , 61 A.3d 1103 (2013).

2010These convictions are not at issue in this appeal. 2 Subsequent protective orders were issued on August 6 and 29, and November 8, 2007. 3 The defendant told police that when he first saw the victim at the church he was on a sidewalk area outside the church and that upon seeing the victim, he hid in some bushes, then went inside after the victim and went upstairs. 4 General Statutes § 53a-181c provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and . . . such conduct violates a court order i

2010These convictions are not at issue in this appeal. 2 Subsequent protective orders were issued on August 6 and 29, and November 8, 2007. 3 The defendant told police that when he first saw the victim at the church he was on a sidewalk area outside the church and that upon seeing the victim, he hid in some bushes, then went inside after the victim and went upstairs. 4 General Statutes § 53a-181c provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and . . . such conduct violates a court order i

2010These convictions are not at issue in this appeal. 2 Subsequent protective orders were issued on August 6 and 29, and November 8, 2007. 3 The defendant told police that when he first saw the victim at the church he was on a sidewalk area outside the church and that upon seeing the victim, he hid in some bushes, then went inside after the victim and went upstairs. 4 General Statutes § 53a-181c provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and . . . such conduct violates a court order i

2010These convictions are not at issue in this appeal. 2 Subsequent protective orders were issued on August 6 and 29, and November 8, 2007. 3 The defendant told police that when he first saw the victim at the church he was on a sidewalk area outside the church and that upon seeing the victim, he hid in some bushes, then went inside after the victim and went upstairs. 4 General Statutes § 53a-181c provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and . . . such conduct violates a court order i

2005The defendant concedes that his claim was not preserved in the proceedings below and seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

2005The defendant concedes that his claim was not preserved in the proceedings below and seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

2002In his first appeal, the defendant claimed that “the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that the defendant’s failure to produce a certain witness permitted the jury to infer that the witness’ testimony would have been adverse to the defendant, (2) precluded evidence of the victim’s prior misconduct, (3) admitted evidence of a telephone conversation without a proper evidentiary foundation, (4) precluded the defendant from impeaching the victim regarding an alleged act of fraud and (5) allowed the state to impeach the defendant’s character with misconduct evidence.” State v. Young, 5

2002In his first appeal, the defendant claimed that “the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that the defendant’s failure to produce a certain witness permitted the jury to infer that the witness’ testimony would have been adverse to the defendant, (2) precluded evidence of the victim’s prior misconduct, (3) admitted evidence of a telephone conversation without a proper evidentiary foundation, (4) precluded the defendant from impeaching the victim regarding an alleged act of fraud and (5) allowed the state to impeach the defendant’s character with misconduct evidence.” State v. Young, 5

2002In his first appeal, the defendant claimed that “the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that the defendant’s failure to produce a certain witness permitted the jury to infer that the witness’ testimony would have been adverse to the defendant, (2) precluded evidence of the victim’s prior misconduct, (3) admitted evidence of a telephone conversation without a proper evidentiary foundation, (4) precluded the defendant from impeaching the victim regarding an alleged act of fraud and (5) allowed the state to impeach the defendant’s character with misconduct evidence.” State v. Young, 5

2002In his first appeal, the defendant claimed that “the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that the defendant’s failure to produce a certain witness permitted the jury to infer that the witness’ testimony would have been adverse to the defendant, (2) precluded evidence of the victim’s prior misconduct, (3) admitted evidence of a telephone conversation without a proper evidentiary foundation, (4) precluded the defendant from impeaching the victim regarding an alleged act of fraud and (5) allowed the state to impeach the defendant’s character with misconduct evidence.” State v. Young, 5

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St

2001Following a jury trial on three consolidated informations involving three separate incidents, the defendant, Michael A. Young, was found guilty of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b and General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-214, § 5, 1 and one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), 2 disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (l), 3 reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General St